Moon v. State
| Decision Date | 10 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. PD–1215–13,PD–1215–13 |
| Citation | 451 S.W.3d 28 |
| Parties | Cameron Moon, Appellant v. The State of Texas |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Jack G. Carnegie, Attorney at Law, Houston, TX, David Adler, Bellaire, TX, John Hagan, Jackson Gilmour & Dobbs, PC, Christine Wood, Thompson, Coe, Cousins & Irons, LLP, Houston, TX, ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT.
Dan McCrory, Assistant District Attorney, Houston, TX, Lisa C. McMinn, State's Attorney, Austin, ATTORNEY FOR THE STATE.
We granted the State's petition for discretionary review in this case in order to address several questions related to the appellate review of a juvenile court's waiver of its otherwise-exclusive jurisdiction over a person alleged to have committed a murder at the age of sixteen. What, exactly, is the appellate court's appropriate role in reviewing the adequacy of the juvenile court's statutorily required written order transferring the child to a criminal district court for prosecution as an adult? Ultimately, we hold that the court of appeals conducted an appropriate review of the juvenile court's transfer order, and we affirm its judgment.
On November 19, 2008, the State filed a petition in the 313th Juvenile Court in Harris County alleging that the appellant engaged in delinquent conduct by committing an intentional or knowing murder. On the same date, the State also filed a motion for the juvenile court to waive its exclusive jurisdiction and transfer the appellant to criminal district court for prosecution as an adult, alleging as grounds for the transfer that, because of the seriousness of the offense alleged, ensuring the welfare of the community required waiver of juvenile jurisdiction. The juvenile court granted the State's request for a hearing on the motion and, pursuant to Section 54.02(d) of the Juvenile Justice Code in the Texas Family Code,1 ordered that the Chief Juvenile Probation Officer obtain a complete diagnostic study, social evaluation, and full investigation of the appellant's background and the circumstances of the alleged offenses.2 The juvenile court also ordered the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Authority of Harris County to conduct an examination and file its report.
At the hearing, the State called a single witness to testify: Detective Jason Meredith, the Deer Park Police officer who investigated the crime scene and interviewed a number of potential suspects, including the appellant. Meredith's testimony on direct examination took the form of a non-chronological account of his investigation of the murder, up to and including his interrogation of the appellant. At the end of his testimony, over no objection from the appellant, the State introduced the following documents: (1) a juvenile offense report revealing the appellant's “Previous Referral” for “MISCHIEF-$500/$1499.99,” which, subsequent testimony would show, resulted from the appellant's alleged “keying” of another student's vehicle; (2) a “Juvenile Probation Certification Report” detailing the positive and negative behaviors, as well as the academic history, of the appellant while he was under the observation of the juvenile-justice system; and (3) a “Physician's Medical Assessment” prepared by the Harris County Juvenile Probation Health Services Division, which listed the findings of the appellant's physical—but not any psychological or behavioral—examination.
It was Dr. Silverman's ultimate opinion that the appellant, as a “dependent, easily influenced individual” whose “thought process lacks sophistication” (a characteristic Silverman considered “indicative of immaturity”) “would probably benefit from placement in a therapeutic environment specifically designed for adolescent offenders[.]” Silverman contrasted this environment to the “adult criminal justice programs[,]” which he deemed to have “few constructive, and possibly many destructive, influences to offer” the appellant. Silverman also noted that the appellant had, during his stint within the juvenile-justice system, already “responded to therapy.”
At the close of evidence, and after both parties delivered closing arguments, the juvenile court granted the State's motion to waive jurisdiction. At the behest of the appellant's counsel, the court also made the following oral findings: (1) “that there is insufficient time to work with the juvenile in the juvenile system”; (2) “that the seriousness of the offense, murder, makes it inappropriate to deal with in this system”; (3) that “the respondent did have a prior criminal mischief probation”; (4) that the instant offense “actually occurr[ed] at the time respondent was on probation which ... makes the services and resources of the juvenile system look to be inadequate”; (5) “that because there is a co-respondent [certified to stand trial in the adult criminal courts], there is a logic in putting respondents, where they are a year apart or two years apart, together”; and (6) that “judicial economy, although not the driving factor, is an issue” because “sometimes it's more convenient to hear the same matter, even though there are different people involved, in the same court for the convenience of the witnesses, the attorneys, and the system in general.”
The following day, the juvenile court signed and entered a written order waiving its jurisdiction. Closely following the language of the juvenile transfer statute, the order affirmed that the juvenile court had determined “that there is probable cause to believe that the child committed the OFFENSE alleged and that because of the seriousness of the OFFENSE, the welfare of the community requires criminal proceeding.”3 The juvenile court again simply recited from the statute when it stated that:
The juvenile court also specifically found in its written order: (1) that the appellant “is of sufficient sophistication and maturity to have intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily waived all constitutional rights heretofore waived[,] ... to have aided in the preparation of HIS defense and to be responsible for HIS conduct;” (2) that the alleged offense “WAS against the person of another;” and that (3) “there is little, if any, prospect of adequate protection of the public and likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of” the appellant “by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court.”
Per the trial court's order, the appellant's case was transferred to the jurisdiction of the 178th District Court in Harris County, where he stood trial, certified as an adult, against the first-degree felony charge of murder. The jury convicted the appellant and sentenced him to thirty years' confinement in the penitentiary.
Before the First Court of Appeals, the appellant complained that the juvenile court's stated “reasons for waiver” were supported by insufficient evidence and that the juvenile court therefore abused its discretion by waiving jurisdiction over the appellant.5 Specifically, the appellant contended that, by focusing on the appellant's ability to “intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waive[ ] all constitutional rights heretofore waived,” the juvenile court “misunderstood and misapplied the ‘sophistication and maturity’ element” of Section 54.02(f) —and that, even if it did not, there was still “no evidence to support the [juvenile] court's sophistication and maturity finding” as expressed.6 Indeed, given that this Court opined in Hidalgo that the purpose of the Section 54.02(d) “psychological examination” is to “provide[ ] insight on the juvenile's sophistication, maturity, potential for rehabilitation, decision-making ability, metacognitive skills, psychological development, and other sociological and cultural factors[,]” the appellant found it troubling that “the State presented no evidence of this type whatsoever.”7 The appellant also maintained that there was “no evidence supporting the juvenile court's findings relating to adequate protection [of] the public and likelihood of rehabilitation,”8 since “the only evidence was that” the appellant “is amenable to rehabilitation” and the ...
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...from the juvenile system before he can be tried as an adult for a felony offense such as capital murder. Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 28, 37-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). We are aware of no authority that condones a pretrial determination of age aside from juvenile proceedings, but even if there ......
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...they commit crimes.").97 Appellant's Br. 63.98 Id. (quoting In re Allen , 462 S.W.3d at 54 (Meyers, J., concurring)).99 Moon v. State , 451 S.W.3d 28, 37–38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).100 See Tex. Fam. Code § 51.04.101 Appellant's Br. 67.102 In re Allen , 462 S.W.3d at 53.103 Neal v. State , 25......
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...to acknowledge the great contributions of Christene Wood and John Hagan who worked with him on the Moon appeal. Footnotes Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.47(b) (repealed eff. Sept. 1, 2015). See Tex. Fam. Code § 51.17(a). See Tex. Fam. Code § 54.0......