Mooney v. State

• Decision Date: 30 September 2009
• Docket Number: No. CA CR 08–1207.,CA CR 08–1207.
• Citation: 331 S.W.3d 588,2009 Ark. App. 622
• Parties: Sonya Nate MOONEY, Appellantv.STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals

2009 Ark. App. 622

331 S.W.3d 588

Sonya Nate MOONEY, Appellant

v.STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. CA CR 08–1207.

Court of Appeals of Arkansas.

Sept. 30, 2009.Rehearing Denied Nov. 4, 2009.

Valerie L. Hays, Little Rock, for appellant.Dustin McDaniel, Att'y Gen., by: Kent G. Holt, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge.

Appellant Sonya Nate Mooney was convicted by a Craighead County jury on April 18, 2008, of first-degree murder and was sentenced to 420 months' imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction. She contends on appeal that there was not sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction of first-degree murder, that the trial court erred in allowing testimony of witnesses who had violated Arkansas Rule of Evidence 615 (2008), and that the trial court erred in failing to admonish the jury regarding comments made by defense counsel during closing arguments. We affirm.

Appellant was charged by information filed on April 11, 2006, with the capital murder of Veronica Jenkins on March 22, 2006. A mistrial was declared during the trial held August 6–8, 2007, when jury members were exposed to news reports bearing on crucial elements of the case. However, during the first trial, Kristie Kidd and Patrick Kidd, husband and wife, testified on behalf of the State. Gladys Jenkins did not testify during the first trial, but remained in the courtroom during the trial and was not subject to the Rule.¹

At the trial held in April 2008, the State's witnesses testified that appellant and Ms. Jenkins had been arguing via the telephone for several days leading up to the incident. Ms. Jenkins believed that appellant was stealing her boyfriend, with whom Ms. Jenkins had children. Ms. Jenkins had been staying several nights with her cousin, Kristie Kidd, because she had been evicted from her apartment in Jonesboro. The testimony was that appellant contacted several people, including Kristie Kidd and a probation officer in Jonesboro, in order to stop the telephone calls from Ms. Jenkins. Appellant testified that Ms. Jenkins had harassed her, threatened to harass her children, and followed her from her home.

On the day in question, appellant agreed to meet Ms. Jenkins at a park near the Kidds' home. As Ms. Jenkins walked out the door, followed by Patrick Kidd, appellant was pulling up to the front of the Kidds' house. Appellant and Ms. Jenkins met on the driveway and an altercation began. A neighbor reported witnessing appellant immediately strike Ms. Jenkins, who fell back. Ms. Jenkins said, “She cut me,” when she fell. Appellant offered to assist, but was told by the Kidds to leave. Appellant called 911 twice in order to get help to Ms. Jenkins. Appellant claimed that she did not intend to kill Ms. Jenkins, but only wanted to settle the dispute between them.

The defense moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the State failed to meet its burden of proof for capital murder, first-degree murder, second-degree murder, or manslaughter. The trial court denied the motion. The trial court also denied the directed-verdict motion when it was renewed at the end of the defense's case. During closing arguments, after defense counsel outlined in detail his argument for the jury to find appellant not guilty, he made the following statement to the jury:

You are not fourteen people too stupid to get out of jury duty. You were not the fourteen with back problems. Now, when you look out there-and you-all have been here all week—there's nobody here. You have family, a couple people that work here, people that are lost probably, a lawyer waiting to get the judge to sign an order during one of the breaks, but there's not a big lot of excitement here. Nobody cares. I mean really, nobody cares. That's why you're here. [I mean, we care and I just want to thank you for Sonya.] ²

Appellant was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to 420 months' imprisonment. This appeal followed.

Sufficient evidence of intent

Directed-verdict motions are treated as challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. Saulsberry v. State, 81 Ark.App. 419, 102 S.W.3d 907 (2003). The test for determining sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial; substantial evidence is evidence forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture. Smith v. State, 352 Ark. 92, 98 S.W.3d 433 (2003). Evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State; only evidence that supports a verdict is considered. Clements v. State, 80 Ark.App. 137, 91 S.W.3d 532 (2002). When we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we will affirm the conviction if there is substantial evidence to support it. Saulsberry, supra. Decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses are for the trier of fact. Robinson v. State, 353 Ark. 372, 108 S.W.3d 622 (2003). The fact finder is not required to believe any witness's testimony, especially the testimony of the accused, because he is the person most interested in the outcome of the trial. Winbush v. State, 82 Ark.App. 365, 107 S.W.3d 882 (2003). We do not weigh the evidence presented at trial nor do we weigh the credibility of the witnesses. Polk v. State, 82 Ark.App. 210, 105 S.W.3d 797 (2003).

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant her motion for directed verdict because the State did not prove with sufficient evidence the requisite intent necessary to support a conviction for first– or second–degree murder. First–degree murder requires that the jury find that it was appellant's purpose to cause Ms. Jenkins's death or to purposely engage in conduct to cause such a result. Ark.Code Ann. § 5–10–102 (Repl.2006). “Purposely” is defined as a person's conscious object. Ark.Code Ann. § 5–2–202 (Repl.2006). Second–degree murder requires that the perpetrator cause the death knowingly. Ark.Code Ann. § 5–10–103 (Repl.2006). “Knowingly” is defined as a result of the person's conduct when he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause the result. Ark.Code Ann. § 5–2–202.

Because there is no direct evidence of appellant's intent, it must be proved by circumstantial evidence that is of sufficient weight so as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. See Carmichael v. State, 340 Ark. 598, 12 S.W.3d 225 (2000). Appellant argues that neither the fact that she had a knife in her possession at the time of the altercation, nor the killing itself, infer intent, citing Palmore v. State, 29 Ark. 248 (1874). In Palmore, our supreme court determined that the jury should hear evidence of defendant's state of mind prior to the victim's death in order to determine defendant's intent.

Appellant argues that she had received threats from Ms. Jenkins. She testified that, during that time, she began carrying a knife or mace. She claims, therefore, that even though she had the knife with her at the time of the altercation, that does not imply intent to injure or kill Ms. Jenkins. Appellant contends that intent may be inferred by all the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing, including the type of weapon used, the manner in which the weapon was used, the nature, extent and location of the wounds, and the conduct of the parties. See Davis v. State, 365 Ark. 634, 232 S.W.3d 476 (2006) (sufficient evidence of intent where witnesses saw Davis go to his car, return with a gun, and shoot the victim three times at close range); Porter v. State, 358 Ark. 403, 191 S.W.3d 531 (2004) (sufficient evidence of intent where witnesses saw Porter shoot a Walmart employee in the back of the head, step over the victim, laugh, and say, “Now you know I'm not playing ... that mother f–––– hurting now.”); Smith v. State, 337 Ark. 239, 988 S.W.2d 492 (1999) (sufficient evidence of intent finding where defendant chose to use a sawed-off shotgun rather than a .22–caliber pistol he was carrying, and said, “Do you want me to shoot you too? You want some too?”); Booker v. State, 335 Ark. 316, 984 S.W.2d 16 (1998) (sufficient evidence of intent where defendant broke into victim's home, waited until she arrived, raped her, and stabbed her with knife and scissors from the house); Green v. State, 51 Ark. 189, 10 S.W. 266 (1889) (sufficient evidence of intent to kill where men took the victim from his hotel room to whip and beat him, resulting in multiple broken bones, severe cuts and lacerations, and a fractured skull).

Appellant claims that the circumstances surrounding the altercation with Ms. Jenkins, and continuing through the time of her arrest, are relevant to the issue of her intent. She claims that evidence that the victim provoked the killer is another circumstance that goes to the question of the killer's intent. See Simmons v. State, 227 Ark. 1109, 305 S.W.2d 119 (1957) (where our supreme court held that, in view of evidence of disagreements, threats, and provocation, evidence was insufficient to establish premeditation and deliberation necessary to sustain conviction for first-degree murder but would support conviction for murder in the second degree).

Appellant claims that the evidence was that beginning in October 2005, she was being harassed and stalked by Ms. Jenkins. Ms. Jenkins was angry over a relationship between appellant and the father of Ms. Jenkins's children. Appellant grew cautious of Ms. Jenkins as the calls increased and became more threatening. Appellant began carrying a knife or mace for protection. On March 21, 2006, the day before the incident, appellant called the parole officer hoping to get Ms. Jenkins to leave her alone. She met with Ms. Jenkins's boyfriend and told him to leave her alone. Ms. Jenkins called appellant around 10:20 p.m. indicating that she wanted to talk and settle things civilly.

The following day, after a morning of being stalked by Ms. Jenkins, the women agreed to meet at the park. Ms. Jenkins and appellant...