Mooneyham v. Cairo, V.&C. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 21 December 1910
• Citation: 247 Ill. 360,93 N.E. 405
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. MOONEYHAM, County Collector, v. CAIRO, V. & C. RY. CO.

247 Ill. 360

93 N.E. 405

PEOPLE ex rel. MOONEYHAM, County Collector,

v.CAIRO, V. & C. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 21, 1910.

Appeal from Saline County Court; G. H. Dorris, Judge.

Application by the People, on the relation of Joel Mooneyham, County Collector, against the Cairo, Vincennes & Chicago Railway Company, for judgment for delinquent taxes. From a judgment for the taxes, defendant appeals. Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.W. F. Scott (L. J. Hackney, of counsel), for appellant.

W. C. Kane, State's Atty., for appellee.

VICKERS, C. J.

The Cairo, Vincennes & Chicago Railway Company has appealed from a judgment of the county court of Saline county overruling certain objections filed by appellant to the rendition of judgment for various items of taxes levied by said county, and other municipalities in said county, against the property of appellant. In some instances the same objection is made to an item of taxes levied by different municipalities. Where this condition exists, it will not be necessary to consider such items separately.

Appellant objects to the taxes levied in the towns of Rector and Raleigh to pay bonded indebtedness, and in the town of Harrisburg to pay ‘outstanding indebtedness,’ for the reason, it is said, the certificate of the town clerk shows that these taxes were levied by the electors at the town meeting, when they should have been audited as claims by the board of auditors. All the certificates of the respective town clerks are substantially the same in form. Each of them contains a recital that the tax is to be levied ‘upon all real and personal property in said town liable for taxation for the year 1909, as appears from the record entries of moneys voted to be raised at the annual town meeting held in said town on the first Tuesday in April, A. D. 1909, and from the certificate of the board of town auditors of said town in my office remaining.’ These certificates were sufficient to enable the county clerk to properly extend the taxes, and that is the only office the certificate of the town clerk performs. Appellant does not contend, nor attempt to prove, that the several boards of town auditors did not, in fact, audit these items and property certify them to the town clerk. The certificate covers, not only taxes for town charges which, under the law, must be audited by the board of auditors, but also any moneys that were to be raised by taxation for future purposes, which must be authorized by the town meeting. The objections to these items of taxes were properly overruled.

In the towns of Raleigh, Harrisburg, and Eldorado an additional levy, under section 14 of the road and bridge law (Hurd's Rev. St. 1909, c. 121), was attempted under a certificate reciting that ‘in view of the contingency and emergency that recent and unusual storms, recent and unusual freshets, and rains in said town have so washed away the roads and embankments of said roads, and so washed away, damaged, and impaired the bridges in said town, that 36 cents on each $100 will be insufficient sum to replace and repair said roads and bridges.’ These certificates are insufficient to show a ‘contingency’ under section 14 of the road and bridge law, as that section has been construed by this court. People v. Toledo, St. Louis & Western Railroad Co., 231 Ill. 125, 83 N. E. 118;People v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Co., 243 Ill. 546, 90 N. E. 1080. The court erred in overruling the objections to the additional road and bridge taxes in the towns named.

In the town of Harriburg a levy of $500 was made to pay ‘contingent expenses' of the town. Appellant objects to this item of taxes, because the purposes for which the levy is made are not specifically stated. A contingent fund is necessary for all municipal corporations. The reason for making such a levy is to provide a fund, usually a small one, out of which items of expenses which will necessarily arise during the year, and which cannot appropriately be classified under any of the specific purposes for which other taxes are levied, may be paid. If all of the purposes for which a contingent fund could be used could be foreseen, so as to enable the municipality to specify each particular purpose, then no contingent fund would be necessary. Every detailed item of expense would be classified under its appropriate name. It is because it is impracticable to always provide in advance for incidental expenses that will arise during the year that a contingent fund is usually provided by the various municipalities of the state. In People v. Cairo, Vincennes & Chicago Railway Co., 237 Ill. 312, 86 N. E. 721, this court held that a levy for ‘incidentals' of $100 by the town of Pana was not void, because not sufficiently specific. Section 8, art. 13, c. 139, of Hurd's Rev. St. 1909, provides, among other things, that ‘contingent expenses necessarily incurred for the use and benefit of the town’ shall be deemed town charges. No question is made as to the amount of the levy. The court properly overruled the objection to this item of tax.

In the town of Harrisburg the aggregate of...