Moore-King v. Cnty. of Chesterfield, Virginia

Citation819 F.Supp.2d 604
Decision Date30 September 2011
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 3:09–CV–804–JAG.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
PartiesPatricia MOORE–KING, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF CHESTERFIELD, VIRGINIA, et al., Defendants.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Chandra Dore Lantz, Hirschler Fleischer PC, Richmond, VA, Roman Paul Storzer, Storzer & Greene PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Jeffrey Lee Mincks, Steven Latham Micas, Chesterfield County Attorney's Office, Chesterfield, VA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOHN A. GIBNEY, JR., District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss and cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 56. In this case, the plaintiff, Patricia Moore–King (Moore–King), challenges the zoning ordinance, business license tax ordinance, and fortune teller permit ordinance through which Chesterfield County regulates fortune teller businesses. Moore–King alleges that these ordinances violate her rights to free exercise of religion, free speech, and equal protection under the United States Constitution, and her rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). The County has moved to dismiss the “as applied challenges” set forth in the Complaint, contending that those claims are not ripe for judicial determination. Both parties have moved for summary judgment.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the County's motion to dismiss, grants the County's motion for summary judgment, and denies Moore–King's cross-motion for summary judgment.

I. Standards of Review
A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1)

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that the matter is not ripe for judicial consideration attacks a complaint by asserting that it fails to allege facts upon which jurisdiction can be based.1 See Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir.1982). [A]ll the facts alleged in the complaint are assumed to be true and the plaintiff, in effect, is afforded the same procedural protection as he would receive under a Rule 12(b)(6) consideration.” Id.; see also Wise v. United States, 8 F.Supp.2d 535, 541 (E.D.Va.1998) (quoting Adams on this point). For the purposes of this motion, the County assumes the facts set forth in the Complaint to be true, but asserts that because Moore–King has failed to state a proper claim that the zoning ordinances, as applied to her, violate her Constitutional and statutory rights, she has thereby failed to allege facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction can be based.

The Court will apply the standard utilized in motions brought under Rule 12(b)(6) in considering the allegations in the Complaint. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; it does not resolve contested factual issues. Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.1992). In considering the motion, a court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir.1999); Warner v. Buck Creek Nursery, Inc., 149 F.Supp.2d 246, 254–55 (W.D.Va.2001). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter which, accepted as true, “state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). This plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to demonstrate more than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. It requires the plaintiff to articulate facts that, when accepted as true, “show” that the plaintiff has stated a claim entitling him to relief, that is, the “plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir.2009) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Thus, the [f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545, 127 S.Ct. 1955, to one that is “plausible on its face,” id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, rather than merely “conceivable.” Id. Although the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations, the same is not true for legal conclusions. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.

In considering such a motion, a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir.1993); see also Martin, 980 F.2d at 952.

B. Motions for Summary Judgment Under Rule 56(a)

Under Rule 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The relevant inquiry in a summary judgment analysis is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In reviewing cross motions for summary judgment, as in the immediate case, the Court must review each motion separately on its own merits ‘to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law.’ Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir.2003) (quoting Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58, 62 n. 4 (1st Cir.1997)).

Summary judgment must be granted if the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). To defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence, or the appearance of some metaphysical doubt concerning a material fact.” Lewis v. City of Va. Beach Sheriff's Office, 409 F.Supp.2d 696, 704 (E.D.Va.2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Of course, the Court cannot weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations in its summary judgment analysis. Williams v. Staples, Inc., 372 F.3d 662, 667 (4th Cir.2004).

There are no material facts in dispute, therefore summary judgment is appropriate in this matter.

II. Statement of Material Facts

The Court has concluded that the following represent the salient facts for purposes of resolving the motion to dismiss and the motions for summary judgment.

Moore–King is a self-described “spiritual counselor” seeking relief from several County ordinances that allegedly violate her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the Constitution as well as her statutory rights under RLUIPA. Moore–King has named the County; James J.L. Stegmaier, County Administrator; Joseph A. Horbal, County Commissioner of Revenue; and Thierry G. Dupuis, County Chief of Police as defendants.

Moore–King conducts business under the trade name “Psychic Sophie.” She provides various personal services, the legitimacy of which cannot be established by objective means. These include Tarot card readings, psychic and clairvoyant readings, and answering strangers' personal questions in person, over the phone, and via email. Psychic Sophie charges fees for all her services. For personal or telephonic readings, she charges by the quarter hour; for email questions, she charges by the question. Customers may make appointments to meet Moore–King by providing their email addresses, phone numbers, and “PayPal” information. She is available to entertain at parties for a fee of $250.00 for the first two hours, and $50 per hour thereafter.

Moore–King began offering her psychic services in March 2009 from a small office she leased at 1241 Mall Drive, located in Chesterfield County. Her office complex contains numerous other businesses, including licensed mental health professionals.

In her work, Psychic Sophie incorporates lessons learned from the fields of astrology, “psychic/clairvoyant/medium development,” and energy healing. She describes her work as “spiritual counseling,” asserting that she “brings forth the inherent wisdom of the God-self within each of her client's souls in order to help them achieve spiritual enlightenment.” (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 7.) According to her Complaint, Moore–King “does not limit her religious beliefs to any one particular form of religion,” but rather embraces an assortment of Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, and New Age traditions, with a particular emphasis on the New Age religious movement. ( Id. ¶¶ 8–9.) On her website, however, Psychic Sophie asserts that she “does not follow particular religions or practices.” Moore–King practices Reiki, which involves “touching with the hands” that supposedly “produces beneficial effects by strengthening and normalizing certain vital energy fields held to exist within the body.” Merriam–Webster On-line Dictionary, http:// www. merriam- webster. com/ dictionary/ reiki (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). She is also an ordained minister of the Universal Life Church.

Moore–King has “practiced” for seventeen years, is now a veritable expert on psychic matters, and has published two books on Tarot card reading. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 20.) Her “clients are typically seeking information and advice concerning personal relationships ......

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4 cases
  • Moore–King v. Cnty. of Chesterfield
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • February 26, 2013
    ...of her business ... common to all businesses in Virginia and, most likely, in the entire nation.” Moore–King v. County of Chesterfield, 819 F.Supp.2d 604, 617 (E.D.Va.2011). It specifically held that Moore–King's business and speech purporting to predict future events constituted “quintesse......
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    • April 1, 2022
    ... ... not clearly established. See Meyers v. Baltimore Cnty., ... Md. , 713 F.3d 723, 731 (4th Cir. 2013); Henry v ... the conditions of confinement for inmates on Virginia's ... death row, addressing virtually all of the issues raised in ... decision); Moore-King v. Cnty. of Chesterfield, Va. , ... 819 F.Supp.2d 604, 614 (E.D. Va ... ...
  • Garden State Islamic Ctr. v. City of Vineland
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
    • December 12, 2018
    ...prejudice that would not evaporate simply by resubmitting a new application." Id. at 765 (citing Moore–King v. Cty. of Chesterfield, Va., 819 F.Supp.2d 604, 615–17 (E.D. Va. 2011) (explaining that Williamson County did not apply when facts indicated what would occur if plaintiff pursued add......
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    • March 29, 2017
    ...rather on anti–Muslim prejudice that would not evaporate simply by resubmitting a new application. See Moore–King v. Cty. of Chesterfield, Va. , 819 F.Supp.2d 604, 615–17 (E.D. Va. 2011) (explaining that Williamson County did not apply when facts indicated what would occur if plaintiff purs......

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