Moore-McCormack Lines v. Amirault

• Decision Date: 30 March 1953
• Docket Number: No. 4679.,4679.
• Citation: 202 F.2d 893
• Parties: MOORE-McCORMACK LINES, Inc. v. AMIRAULT et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

202 F.2d 893 (1953)

MOORE-McCORMACK LINES, Inc. v. AMIRAULT et al.

No. 4679.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

March 19, 1953.

As Modified March 30, 1953.

Leo F. Glynn, Boston, Mass. (Thomas H. Walsh, Boston, Mass., on the brief), for appellant.

Arthur J. Santry, Boston, Mass. (Putnam, Bell, Dutch & Santry, Boston, Mass., on the brief), for appellees.

Before MAGRUDER, Chief Judge, and WOODBURY and HARTIGAN, Circuit Judges.

MAGRUDER, Chief Judge.

On March 15, 1950, a joint civil action was filed in the court below by the five plaintiffs, citizens of Massachusetts, seeking to recover from Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., a Delaware corporation, money damages for personal injuries, and for losses of personal property, suffered by them as a result of a collision on the high seas between the fishing vessel Corinthian of Gloucester, Massachusetts, and defendant's freighter, the S.S. Mormacfir. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs were all members of the crew of the fishing vessel and were precipitated into the sea when she sank after being rammed in dense fog by the negligence of the steamship.

After an answer was filed denying liability, the parties on December 8, 1951, entered into a stipulation under which liability of the defendant was admitted, and the determination of the amount of damages sustained by each of the plaintiffs was referred to an auditor.

The auditor duly made his report, assessing the total damages sustained by each of the plaintiffs as follows: Amirault $5,595.80, Zeeman $12,945.25, Jerome Noble $13,383, Jerome Noble, Jr., $5,209.80, Goodick $11,095.15. Defendant's exceptions to the auditor's report were overruled and the report was affirmed by the district judge. Plaintiffs moved for judgment in accordance with the auditor's report, which motion the court allowed, and pursuant thereto judgment was entered May 16, 1952, awarding damages to the five plaintiffs in the respective amounts above stated, with costs.

Subsequently the clerk, by authority of the court, amended this judgment by adding in each instance to the amount of total damages assessed by the auditor a sum by way of interest thereon at 6 per cent from March 15, 1950, the date the complaint was filed, to May 16, 1952, the date of the entry of the original judgment.

Upon denial of its motion to strike from the judgment this allowance of interest defendant took the present appeal, upon which the only point presented is that the foregoing allowance of interest was erroneous as a matter of law.

Appellant contends that the district court disregarded what is said to be the mandatory provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1961 to the effect that interest shall be calculated only from the date of the entry of the judgment. The section reads:

"Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court. Execution therefor may be levied by the marshal, in any case where, by the law of the State in which such court is held, execution may be levied for interest on judgments recovered in the courts of the State. Such interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at the rate allowed by State law."

On the other hand, appellees defend the district court's award of interest as being a proper and required application of § 6B of Ch. 231, Mass.G.L.(Ter.Ed.), as amended by Ch. 244, Laws 1951, reading as follows:

"In any action of tort in which a verdict is rendered or a finding made for pecuniary damages for personal injuries to the plaintiff or for consequential damages, or for damage to property, there shall be added by the clerk of court to the amount of damages interest thereon from the date of the writ, even though such interest brings the amount of the verdict or finding beyond the maximum liability imposed by law."

In considering these opposing contentions, distinction must be made between (1) the running of interest upon a judgment debt from the date the judgment was entered to the date of payment, and (2) the allowance of pre-judgment interest to be included as an item of damages in the total amount of an ensuing money judgment, in order that the plaintiff may be more fully and justly compensated for the wrong complained of. The latter may be regarded as part of the substance of the claim sued upon, for which a money judgment is sought. The Massachusetts General Laws presently contain provisions covering both these situations. Section 6B of Ch. 231, as amended, provides that in actions of tort for personal injuries or damage to property there shall be added to the amount of damages as found by the jury "interest thereon from the date of the writ". Section 8 of Ch. 235 provides that every "judgment for the payment of money shall bear interest from the day of its rendition." There is no inconsistency between these two provisions of law.

28 U.S.C. § 1961 belongs in category (1) above. The provision goes back to § 8 of the Act of August 23, 1842, 5 Stat. 518. The purpose was simply to provide that money judgments of federal courts should bear interest from the date of the entry of the judgment, collectible in the same way and at the same rate as provided in the local state law for the allowance of interest on money judgments recovered in the state courts. Interest upon the amount of a money judgment rendered by a federal court runs automatically, by the mandatory provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1961, even though the judgment itself — as in the case at bar — contains no specific award of such interest. Blair v. Durham, 6 Cir., 1943, 139 F.2d 260. This is provided for as a matter of routine in the writ of execution issued by the Clerk of the Court to the U. S. Marshal commanding him to cause to be paid and satisfied unto the judgment creditor, out of the property of the judgment debtor within the district, the amount awarded in the money judgment "with interest thereon from said day of the rendition of said judgment". But 28 U.S.C. § 1961 has no bearing on the problem whether pre-judgment interest is allowable as an item of damages on a particular claim, to be included in the total amount of the money judgment. As to that we must seek elsewhere for the applicable rule of law.

In the leading case of Massachusetts Benefit Ass'n v. Miles, 1891, 137 U.S. 689, 11 S.Ct. 234, 34 L.Ed. 834, the plaintiff as beneficiary of a life insurance policy sued in a state court to recover the face amount of the policy, with interest. The defendant obtained the removal of the case to the federal court on the ground of diversity of citizenship. A jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff was rendered on October 18, but judgment thereon was not entered until two weeks later. It was held that this judgment of the federal court should be taken to include interest on the amount found by the jury, from the date of the verdict, pursuant to the provision of a state statute to the effect that every general judgment entered upon a verdict for a specific sum of money "shall be deemed and held to be a judgment for the sum found by the verdict, with interest thereon from the date of such finding." The Supreme Court said, 137 U.S. at page 691, 11 S.Ct. at page 235, that R.S. § 966 now found in 28 U.S.C. § 1961 "while providing only for interest upon judgments, does not exclude the idea of a power in the several states to allow interest upon verdicts, and, where such allowance is expressly made by a state statute, we consider it a right given to a successful plaintiff, of which he ought not to be deprived by a removal of his case to the federal court. The courts of the state and the federal courts sitting within the state should be in harmony upon this point." This case is cited with approval in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., Inc., 1941, 313 U.S. 487, 497, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Soileau, 5 Cir., 1948, 167 F.2d 767, 771, 6 A.L.R.2d 128, was an action for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been inflicted in the Parish of Evangeline, Louisiana, as a result of the alleged negligence of defendant in loading a piece of heavy machinery onto a truck. The case was brought in the federal district court of Louisiana solely on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Verdict having been found for the plaintiff in the sum of $15,000, it was held that the federal court, in rendering judgment thereon, should apply a Louisiana statute, Act No. 206 of 1916, LSA-R.S. 13:4203, providing "that legal interest shall, hereafter, attach from date of judicial demand, on all judgments, sounding in damages, `ex delicto', which may be rendered by any of the courts in this State." The reasoning was that the substantive law of the state was applicable; and that the state statute allowing interest from the date of filing suit created "a substantive right" affecting the amount of damages recoverable by money judgment. Therefore the federal court in such a diversity case was bound to apply the state statute.

But quite a different situation is presented when action is brought on a claim arising under federal, not state, law. See Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 1945, 324 U.S. 697, 714-716, 65 S.Ct. 895, 89 L.Ed. 1296, dealing with suits by employees under § 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b). As a further familiar instance, take an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq. A federal court in which such action is brought, in determining the items of damage to be awarded in a money judgment by way of compensation for the wrong, will not apply a state statute under which pre-judgment interest is allowed as an item of damages in torts cases. Louisiana & Arkansas Ry. Co. v. Pratt, 5 Cir., 1944, 142 F.2d 847, 153 A.L.R. 851; Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R. R. Co. v. Busby, 9 Cir., 1930, 41 F.2d 617; Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 2 Cir., 1933, 66 F.2d 526. Even in a case where action on a death claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act...