Moore v. Arizona 8212 5002
Decision Date | 05 November 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 73,73 |
Citation | 38 L.Ed.2d 183,414 U.S. 25,94 S.Ct. 188 |
Parties | Rockey MOORE v. State of ARIZONA. —5002 |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Almost three years after he was charged and 28 months after he first demanded that Arizona either extradite him from California, where he was serving a prison term, or drop a detainer against him, petitioner was tried for murder in Arizona. Prior to trial, he filed a state habeas corpus application, alleging a deprivation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a speedy trial. In affirming the denial of the petition, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that under this Court's decisions in Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 26 L.Ed.2d 26 (1970), and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), a showing of prejudice to the defense at trial was essential to establish a federal speedy trial claim. The state court found no such prejudice here because petitioner was afforded a preliminary hearing and allowed to subpoena witnesses.1 109 Ariz. 111, 506 P.2d 242 (1973).
The state court was in fundamental error in its reading of Barker v. Wingo and in the standard applied in judging petitioner's speedy trial claim. Barker v. Wingo expressly rejected the notion that an affirmative demonstration of prejudice was necessary to prove a denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial:
407 U.S., at 533, 92 S.Ct., at 2193 (footnote omitted).
In addition to possible prejudice, any court must thus carefully weigh the reasons for the delay in bringing an incarcerated defendant to trial. In the face of petitioner's repeated demands, did the State discharge its 'constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring him (to trial)'? Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969).
Moreover, prejudice to a defendant caused by delay in bringing him to trial is not confined to the possible prejudice to his defense in those proceedings. 2 Inordinate delay,
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