Moore v. Autoliv Asp, Cause No. 1:01-CV-384 (N.D. Ind. 4/23/2002)

• Decision Date: 23 April 2002
• Docket Number: Cause No. 1:01-CV-384.
• Parties: APRIL MOORE, Plaintiff, v. AUTOLIV ASP, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

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APRIL MOORE, Plaintiff, v. AUTOLIV ASP, et al., Defendants.

Cause No. 1:01-CV-384.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

April 23, 2002.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

ROGER B. COSBEY, Magistrate Judge.

1. Introduction

This matter is before the Court¹ on a motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's Amended complaint brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA:), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, for lack of jurisdiction, or alternatively for summary judgment.² Defendant Autoliv ASP, filed the instant motion on January 29, 2002, and defendant Blue Line Staffing joined Autoliv's motion on February 5, 2002.³ The Plaintiff filed her response on March 11, 2002. The Defendants indicate they will not file a reply.

However, on March 20, 2002, we notified the parties that we would construe the motion as one for summary judgment and allowed them to submit additional Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) materials. On March 28, 2002, the Plaintiff filed an affidavit to supplement her response. Therefore, this matter is now ripe, and for the following reasons, the Defendants' motion will be DENIED.

2. Procedural and Factual Background

On April 21, 2001, the Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against the Defendants with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging she was terminated in violation of the Americans with Disability Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. After investigating the matter, the EEOC issued its Determination, and notice of right to sue ("Right-to-Sue letter") on July 12, 2001.

On October 22, 2001, the Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis with an attached initial proposed complaint, alleging receipt of the EEOC's Right-to-Sue letter on October 22, 2001. On October 24, 2001, Chief Judge Lee took the motion under advisement, noting that the Plaintiff appeared to have mistakenly alleged she received her Right-to-Sue letter on the same day she filed her complaint and granted her an opportunity to amend. Subsequently, on November, 21, 2001, the Plaintiff submitted a proposed amended complaint, this time alleging receipt of the right to sue letter on September 3, 2001, with a marginal notation "moved three times." (Docket No. 3/6 at 2.)

In her affidavit, the Plaintiff seeks to explain why it took her until September 3, 2001, to receive a letter sent on July 12, 2001. Specifically, she maintains that financial circumstances forced her to move from the address she provided to the EEOC to her sister's home. (Pl.'s Aff., ¶ 2(b).) Later, she moved again, this time in with a friend. (Id., ¶ 2(c).) The Plaintiff further maintains that because she had no definite residence, she had her mail forwarded to an Aunt's home, where she did not live at all. Apparently, the mail was forwarded to the Aunt, but was not available to the Plaintiff because the Aunt was, at least part of the time, out of town. (Id., ¶ 2(d).)

3. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). However, Rule 56(c) is not a requirement that the moving party negate his opponent's claim. Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 916 F.2d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir. 1990). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and in which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53 (1986). The standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the directed verdict standard under Rule 50(a), which requires the court to grant a directed verdict where there can be but one reasonable conclusion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986). A scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is not sufficient to successfully oppose summary judgment; "there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. at 2512; In Re Matter of Wildman, 859 F.2d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 1988); Klein v. Ryan, 847 F.2d 368, 374 (7th Cir. 1988); Valentine v. Joliet Township High School District No. 204, 802 F.2d 981, 986 (7th Cir. 1986). No genuine issue for trial exists "where the record as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 957 F.2d 317, 322 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986)).

Initially, Rule 56 requires the moving party to inform the court of the basis for the motion, and to identify those portions of the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admission on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The non-moving party may oppose the motion with any of the evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), but reliance on the pleadings alone is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 1988); Guenin v. Sendra Corp., 700 F. Supp. 973, 974 (N.D. Ind. 1988); Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d 102, 105 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 960 (1983). In ruling on a summary judgment motion the court accepts as true the non-moving party's evidence, draws all legitimate inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and does not weigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-251, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. However, "[i]t is a gratuitous cruelty to parties and their witnesses to put them through the emotional ordeal of a trial when the outcome is foreordained" and in such cases summary judgment is appropriate. Mason v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank, 704 F.2d 361, 367 (7th Cir. 1983).

Substantive law determines which facts are material; that is, which facts might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not preclude summary judgment even when they are in dispute. Id. The issue of fact must be genuine. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e). To establish a genuine issue of fact, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1356; First National Bank of Cicero v. Lewco Securities Corp., 860 F.2d 1407, 1411 (7th Cir. 1988). The non-moving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. A summary judgment determination is essentially an inquiry as to "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.

In any event, in employment discrimination matters, the standard on summary judgment is applied with "added rigor." Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir. 1993). As the Seventh Circuit reiterated in Robinson v. PPG Industries, Inc., 23 F.3d 1159, 1169 (7th Cir. 1994), citing the standard set out in Sarsha:

Summary judgment is appropriate only when the materials before the court demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This standard is applied with added rigor in employment discrimination cases, where intent and credibility are crucial issues. Accordingly, we will affirm the decision of the district court only if, had the record before that court been the record of a complete trial, the defendant would have been entitled to a directed verdict.⁴ [citations omitted].

However, the 7th Circuit has recently clarified its use of the phrase added rigor, stating that the "original use of this phrase indicates that it was merely included to stress the fact that employment discrimination cases typically involve questions of intent and credibility, issues not appropriate for this court to decide on a review of a grant of summary judgment." Alexander v. Wisconsin Dept. of Health and Family Servs. 263 F.3d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 2001).

4. Discussion

A plaintiff alleging an ADA claim must file suit within 90 days after the EEOC provides notice of a right to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); 2000e-5(f)(1); Threadgill v. Moore U.S.A., Inc., 269 F.3d 848, 849-50 (7th Cir. 2001) (Title VII). In most cases, the 90-day period begins to run on the day the Plaintiff actually receives the notice. See Bobbitt, 268 F.3d at 538; Houston v. Sidley & Austin, 185 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 1999); Jones v. Madison Service Corp., 744 F.2d 1309, 1312 (7th Cir. 1984); St. Louis, 744 F.2d at 1316; Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers, 585 F.2d 210, 216 (7th Cir. 1978).

However, the Seventh Circuit analyzes these cases in one of three ways. Simon v. City of Naperville, 71 F. Supp.2d 882, 883 (N.D.Ill. 1999) (citing Archie, 585 F.2d at 216; Jones, 744 F.2d at 1312; St. Louis, 744 F.2d at 1316); Garza v. Cook County State's Attorney, 1999 WL 528513, *2 (N.D.Ill. 1999). First, in cases where the Right-to-Sue letter is mailed to the claimant's residence but received by someone other than the claimant, the 90-day period commences on the date she actually receives the letter. See Archie, 585 F.2d at 216. Second, in cases where the Right-to-Sue letter is sent to the plaintiff's attorney, the 90-day period begins to run when the attorney actually receives the notice. See Jones, 744 F.2d at 1312. Finally, "when the claimant does not receive the notice in a timely fashion due to her own fault, the `actual notice' rule...