Moore v. British Airways PLC, Civil Action No. 19-30007-MGM

• Decision Date: 28 December 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 19-30007-MGM
• Citation: 511 F.Supp.3d 1
• Parties: Jennifer MOORE, Plaintiff, v. BRITISH AIRWAYS PLC, a foreign corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

511 F.Supp.3d 1

Jennifer MOORE, Plaintiff,

v.BRITISH AIRWAYS PLC, a foreign corporation, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 19-30007-MGM

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Filed December 28, 2020

Kevin Chrisanthopoulos, KC Law, Westfield, MA, for Plaintiff.

Anthony U. Battista, Pro Hac Vice, Marissa N. Lefland, Pro Hac Vice, Samantha M. Holloway, Pro Hac Vice, Condon & Forsyth LLP, New York, NY, Christopher J. Greeley, McGowan Nichols & Lavin, Owen P. McGowan, McGowan and Associates, Norwell, MA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Dkt. Nos. 33, 37)

MASTROIANNI, U.S.D.J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Jennifer Moore was traveling as a passenger on a British Airways flight when she suffered an injury while disembarking from the airplane. Plaintiff filed a claim against Defendant British Airways for damages under the Montreal Convention (Count One) and for negligence (Count Two). Defendant has moved for summary judgment on all claims. (Dkt. No. 33.) With her opposition, Plaintiff late-filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment that the incident at issue was an "accident" under the Montreal Convention. (Dkt. No. 37.) The court heard arguments on the motions on December 2, 2020. For the reasons discussed, the court will grant Defendant's motion and deny Plaintiff's motion.

II. BACKGROUND

On September 14 and 15, 2018, Plaintiff was traveling as a passenger on British Airways Flight 202 from Boston, Massachusetts to London, England as part of round-trip transportation. Upon arrival at London Heathrow Airport, due to a broken jet bridge, the passengers disembarked by portable stairs. British Airways and other air carriers commonly use a mobile staircase to disembark passengers when a jet bridge is unavailable. (Def.’s Statement of Material Facts (DSMF) ¶¶ 3–4, Dkt. No. 36; Pl.’s Counter-Statement of Material Facts (PSMF) ¶¶ 3–4, Dkt. No. 38.) A crew member was stationed at the top of the staircase and advised passengers to watch their step. (DSMF ¶ 5; PSMF ¶ 5.) With two pieces of hand baggage, Plaintiff proceeded down the more than 20 steps of the stairs, without incident, before reaching the last step. The last step was a bigger height than the previous steps, which Plaintiff was not expecting, causing her to lose her balance, fall, and injure her ankles. Her travel companion, Tammy Burnett, who had stepped down before Plaintiff had also been caught off guard by the last step and had tried to warn Plaintiff. No British Airway employees were assisting passengers at the last step, and no warning was given about the height difference of the last step.

After Plaintiff fell, a British Airways safety officer arrived at the scene and observed that the stairs were correctly positioned with a good grip on them. (Pitt Dep. Tr. (Ex. I) 8:20–25, Dkt. No. 34-9.) He testified that, by walking up and down the stairs, he observed the last step was "deeper than the other steps" and "noticeably slightly different." (Id. 16:1–17, 20:10–23.) The cabin service director of the flight testified that everything had been serviceable and nothing abnormal with respect to the mobile staircase. (Hinnigan Dep. Tr. (Ex. K) 12:16–13:3, Dkt. No. 34–11.) Plaintiff and her travel companion, Ms. Burnett, testified no precipitation, liquids, or garbage was on the staircase. (DSMF ¶¶ 12–13; PSMF ¶¶ 12–13.) Nor were passengers pushing or jostling each other while Plaintiff descended the staircase. (DSMF ¶ 14; PSMF ¶ 14.) A formal inspection of the staircase revealed that it was working as intended. (DSMF ¶ 19.) Although Plaintiff attempts to dispute this, she does not provide evidentiary support. (PSMF ¶ 19 (citing Moore Dep. Tr. (Ex. B), Dkt. No. 38-2; Phillips Expert Report (Ex. G), Dkt. No. 39-7).) Her deposition testimony and her expert's report do not provide any support for the contention that the staircase, including the larger difference in the last step, was not working as intended. Plaintiff's position more accurately is that the design or operation of the staircase, as intended, was defective.

According to Plaintiff, the last step was 13 inches from the step to the ground and all other steps were 7.4 inches in height. Plaintiff points to the report of her expert, Chad Phillips, which explains that the British Standard 5395-1:2000 states the maximum rise people can be expected to negotiate safely is 8.7 inches. (Phillips Expert Report (Ex. G) 8, Dkt. No. 38-7.) Phillips testified the British Standard 5395 is voluntary guidance that British Airways is not required to follow. (Phillips Dep. Tr. (Ex. R) 56:21–57:13, Dkt. No. 40-3.) He also testified the guidance is for steps or stairs that are connected to a building, and not the mobile stairs at issue. (Id. 58:22–59:14.) And he explained he relied on the British Standard 5395 to support his opinions regarding the dangers of the physical attributes of the stairs at issue, and not as operational requirements. (Id. 59:3–14; Phillips Dep. Tr. (Ex. M) 68:2–10, Dkt. No. 34-13.) When shown photographs of the staircase taken after the incident, Phillips testified he could not identify anything that showed Defendant should have set up the staircase differently. (Id. 32:1–15.¹ ) At the hearing, Plaintiff's counsel acknowledged that the standards cited by the expert were voluntary and none of them was directed to portable stairs but rather fixed stairs.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

To succeed on a motion for summary judgment "the moving party must show that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's position." Rogers v. Fair , 902 F.2d 140, 143 (1st Cir. 1990). The "evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact" and the moving party "is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is "genuine" when the evidence is such that a reasonable fact-finder could resolve the point in favor of the non-moving party, and a fact is "material" when it might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law. Morris v. Gov't Dev. Bank of P.R. , 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir. 1994). The nonmoving party bears the burden of placing at least one material fact into dispute after the moving party shows the absence of any disputed material fact. Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc. , 18 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994) (discussing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). The nonmoving party "can forestall summary judgment by presenting definite, competent evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute about a material fact.... The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Murray v. Kindred Nursing Centers West LLC , 789 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2015).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

"The Montreal Convention is a multilateral treaty, to which the United States and the United Kingdom are signatories, which governs international travel and limits liability for carriers" such as British Airways. Dagi v. Delta Airlines, Inc. , 961 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 2020) (internal footnotes omitted). Article 17(1) of the Convention, the relevant provision in this case, states that a "carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused the death or injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking." Montreal Convention art. 17(1). "If an action for damages falls within one of the Convention's damages provisions, then the treaty provides the sole avenue for relief -- that is, the Montreal Convention preempts all local claims that fall within its scope, even if the claims are not cognizable (i.e., even if they do not satisfy the conditions for liability) under the Convention." Dagi , 961 F.3d at 27–28. In other words, "[t]he Convention is preemptive: a carrier is not subject to liability under local law for passenger injuries ‘covered by’ the Convention, that is, ‘all personal injury cases stemming from occurrences on board an aircraft or in embarking or disembarking.’ " Acevedo-Reinoso v. Iberia Líneas Aéreas de España S.A. , 449 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng , 525 U.S. 155, 172, 119 S.Ct. 662, 142 L.Ed.2d 576 (1999) (discussing the Warsaw Convention² )).

"If the Convention applies (and local law is thereby preempted), the next question is whether the carrier is liable under the Convention." Acevedo-Reinoso , 449 F.3d at 12. For liability under Article 17(1), the injury must have been sustained during an "accident." Id. ; Dagi , 961 F.3d at 28. The First Circuit has held that to allege an "accident," (1) the claim must allege an occurrence which "arises from some inappropriate or unintended happenstance in the operation of the aircraft or airline" and, additionally, (2) a carrier's Article 17 liability is triggered only when "a passenger's injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger."³ Dagi , 961 F.3d at 28 (quoting Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. , 132 F.3d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 1998) ; Air France v. Saks , 470 U.S. 392, 405, 105 S.Ct. 1338, 84 L.Ed.2d 289 (1985), and citing Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. , 122 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1997), rev'd on other grounds , 525 U.S. 155, 119 S.Ct. 662, 142 L.Ed.2d 576 (1999) ). The Supreme Court has held that whether a passenger's injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger, so as to constitute an accident, is to be "flexibly" considered "after assessment of all the...