Moore v. Brouillette

Decision Date11 December 2020
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 20-1060 (CKK)
PartiesFERRIN MOORE, Plaintiff, v. DAN BROUILLETTE, Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia
MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this case, Mr. Ferrin Moore ("Plaintiff") raises three claims under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 against Secretary Dan Brouillette, in his official capacity as the Secretary of the United States Department of Energy ("Defendant"). Specifically, Plaintiff's Complaint asserts claims for a hostile work environment (Count I), disclosure of confidential medical information (Count II), and constructive discharge (Count III). See Compl. ¶¶ 75-95. Plaintiff's claims each derive from the alleged mistreatment he suffered as an employee of the Department of Energy ("DOE" or the "Agency") in 2019, while he was undergoing cancer treatment.

Now pending before the Court is Defendant's [12] Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment. Therein, Defendant moves to dismiss each of Plaintiff's claims under both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 56. See Def.'s Mot. at 1. Upon consideration of the briefing, the relevant authorities, and the record as a whole,1 the Court will DENY Defendant'smotion for summary judgment WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)(1). The Court also DENIES Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Counts I and II of the Complaint. The Court, however, GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss Count III of the Complaint and dismisses that claim WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court begins it analysis by recounting the factual background in this case. At this stage in the proceedings, the Court relies on the well-pled facts alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint. The Court, however, does not adopt the alleged facts set forth herein as its own.

Plaintiff began working at the DOE in June 2009. See Compl. ¶ 19. During his employment with the Agency, Plaintiff served as an Aviation Policy Officer within the DOE's Office of Aviation Management. See id. ¶¶ 18, 21. In this role, "Plaintiff's duties involved communicating with private sector company representatives or public sector agency representatives trying to do business with the [DOE]." Id. ¶ 52. Plaintiff's first level supervisor within the Office of Aviation Management was Mr. Glen Wattman, who served as the Director of Office of Aviation Management. Id. ¶ 22.

In 2013, while Plaintiff was working at the DOE, he was diagnosed with prostate cancer. Id. ¶ 23. That same year, Plaintiff "informed his supervisor Glenn Wattman of his cancer diagnosis." Id. ¶ 28. By January 2019, however, Plaintiff's "cancer had spread to his bladder," id. ¶ 24, which "substantially impaired [his] ability to urinate." Id. ¶ 26. On account of this bladder cancer, Plaintiff learned in January 2019 that he would need "additional medical treatment," id. ¶ 29, and, accordingly, Plaintiff asked Mr. Wattman for medical leave, see id. ¶ 30. When Mr. Wattman inquired into the reason for Plaintiff's leave request, Plaintiff explained that "his cancer had spread to his bladder and that he needed the leave for medical treatment for his cancer in thefuture, including surgery, follow up chemotherapy treatments, and medical appointments." Id. ¶ 31.

"Mr. Wattman approved of [Plaintiff's] leave requests." Id. ¶ 40. In January 2019, Plaintiff "was granted about two weeks of leave for surgery and recuperation related to his cancer." Id. ¶ 33. Then beginning in February 2019, Plaintiff was granted "the ability to telework from his home instead of coming into the office." Id. ¶ 34. Between February and June 2019, Plaintiff was also granted leave twice a week, so that he could undergo chemotherapy, which included two radiation sessions per week. See id. ¶¶ 37-39.

Around the time of Plaintiff's 2019 cancer treatment, however, his working relationship with Mr. Wattman began to fray. "After granting [Plaintiff's] leave requests . . . Mr. Wattman repeatedly complained to [Plaintiff] about his use and taking of leave," even though Mr. Wattman had not complained about Plaintiff's prior leave requests that were unrelated to his cancer treatment. Id. ¶¶ 42-43. Indeed, while Plaintiff was on leave in 2019, Mr. Wattman allegedly called Plaintiff repeatedly and "pressured him to return to work." Id. ¶ 44. And after Plaintiff did return to work following his January 2019 surgery, Mr. Wattman "began increasing Plaintiff's workload," id. ¶ 46, claiming that Plaintiff was not "at capacity," id. at ¶ 47. According to Plaintiff, Mr. Wattman provided him with "more work . . . than his coworkers Patricia Hagerty and Daniel Monahon," who did not have disabilities. Id. ¶¶ 48-49. Moreover, Mr. Wattman allegedly began to "use capitalization in his emails" to Plaintiff, which Plaintiff "understood as a written form of yelling." Id. ¶ 51.

In February and March 2019, Mr. Wattman also began to make "repeated derogatory jokes about [Plaintiff's] cancer and medical treatment." Id. ¶ 50. These "jokes" allegedly included comments about whether Plaintiff "was wearing a diaper" and whether Plaintiff "was sitting onthe pan, a reference to [the] medical device [Plaintiff] sat on while undergoing treatment." Id. Relatedly, Mr. Wattman allegedly disclosed Plaintiff's cancer to coworkers within the DOE, as well as Agency customers, without Plaintiff's authorization. See id. ¶¶ 53-65. For example, Mr. Wattman allegedly told one of Plaintiff's coworkers that Plaintiff would be "sitting in the chair," a reference to Plaintiff's chemotherapy treatment. Id. ¶ 57.

The workplace friction between Plaintiff and Mr. Wattman finally culminated in the summer of 2019. On June 26, 2019, Mr. Wattman sent Plaintiff an email stating that he "would take appropriate action related to the quality of life and working conditions he had established for [Plaintiff]." Id. ¶ 68 (quotations omitted). Plaintiff understood this email as a "threat" regarding his teleworking privileges. See id. ¶¶ 68-69. Consequently, Plaintiff provided this June 26, 2019 email to Ms. Ingrid Kolb, the Director of the Office of Management at the DOE and Mr. Wattman's immediate supervisor. See id. ¶¶ 70-71. Ms. Kolb allegedly informed Plaintiff "that she considered the email threatening," but Plaintiff received no further information regarding whether Mr. Wattman received any disciplinary sanctions. Id. ¶¶ 72-73. On July 19, 2019, Plaintiff contacted the DOE's equal employment opportunity office regarding Mr. Wattman's conduct, see id. ¶ 9, but Plaintiff ultimately resigned from his position at the Agency on August 8, 2019, see id. ¶¶ 74, 79.

Following his resignation from the DOE, Plaintiff "filed a formal complaint of discrimination and constructive discharge based on disability and retaliation with the Agency" on August 21, 2019. Id. ¶ 10; see also Def.'s Mot., Ex. 11, ECF No. 12-13 (Aug. 2019, EEO Compl.). Then, "[o]n September 19, 2019, the Agency issued a notice of acceptance of claims which stated that the Agency had supposedly received Plaintiff's formal complaint on September 6, 2019, but nevertheless would waive Plaintiff's deadline to file[,] and accepted his claims." Compl. ¶ 11.But after more than one-hundred and eighty days passed from the filing of his formal complaint with the DOE and no final agency action had been taken, Plaintiff filed his present Complaint before this Court on April 22, 2020. See id. ¶¶ 12-14 (alleging exhaustion of administrative claims pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.310(g) and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407(b)).

Therein, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendant under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 for a hostile work environment (Count I), disclosure of confidential medical information (Count II), and constructive discharge (Count III). See Compl. ¶¶ 75-95. On August 24, 2020, however, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety for failure to state any claim for which relief can be granted. See Def.'s Mot. at 1 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). And although no formal discovery has taken place in this action, Defendant also moved in the alternative for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See Def.'s Mot. at 1. After complete briefing from the parties, Defendant's motion is now ripe for this Court's review.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a complaint on the grounds that it "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "[A] complaint [does not] suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). Rather, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations that, if accepted as true, "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Courts "do not accept as true, however, the plaintiff's legalconclusions or inferences that are unsupported by the facts alleged." Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2014).2

III. DISCUSSION

The Court's analysis proceeds in three parts. First, the Court sets out its rationale for DENYING Defendant's summary judgment motion WITHOUT PREJUDICE at this stage in the proceedings. Next, the Court addresses the proper treatment of Defendant's thirteen documentary exhibits on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Finally, the Court considers each of Plaintiff's substantive claims. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will GRANT Defendant's motion to dismiss Count III of the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), but will DENY Defendant's motion to dismiss Counts I and II of the Complaint.

A. Defendant's Rule 56 Motion And...

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