Moore v. Bunk

• Citation: 154 Conn. 644,228 A.2d 510
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 23 March 1967
• Parties: Milton MOORE, Administrator (ESTATE of John H. MOORE) v. Bradford E. BUNK et al.

Page 510

228 A.2d 510

154 Conn. 644

Milton MOORE, Administrator (ESTATE of John H. MOORE) v. Bradford E. BUNK et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

March 23, 1967.

Joseph H. Sylvester, Shelton, with whom was David B. Cohen, Derby, for appellant (plaintiff).

Alan H. W. Shiff, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, was Philip R. Shiff, New Haven, for appellees (defendants Bunk et al.).

John H. Cassidy, Jr., Watertown, for appellee (defendant Zalenski).

Thomas J. Hagarty, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Joseph T. Sweeney, Hartford, for appellee (defendant Smith).

Before KING, C.J., and ALCORN, HOUSE, THIM and RYAN, JJ.

KING, Chief Justice.

This action was brought by the administrator of the estate of John H. Moore to recover damages for his death. The first count runs against the defendants Bradford E. Bunk and St. Stanislawa Benefits and Mutual Society, Inc., hereinafter referred to as Society, as permittee and backer, respectively, of Society's club liquor permit. The second count runs against the defendants Joseph Zaleski, George Smith, and George Morey.

The complant alleges that on July 18, 1964, the decedent, a minor sixteen years of age, while he was on Society's club premises, was given, and consumed, intoxicating liquors in such quantity that he became intoxicated and, as a consequence of that intoxication, so operated a motor vehicle as to cause it to collide with some trees, which resulted in the injuries from which he died.

The second count alleges that Zalenski, Smith, and Morey gave the liquor to the decedent, or permitted him to consume it, and that these acts were violations of General Statutes §§ 30-77 and 30-86 and constituted a proximate cause of his intoxication.

The first count alleges that Society and Bunk rented to the defendant Zalenski, who was not a member of Society, a portion of the club premises, knowing, or chargeable with knowledge, that intoxicating liquors would therein be dispensed to minors. It is further alleged that the decedent's intoxication, injuries, and death were proximately caused by Society and Bunk in that they rented the club premises to a nonmember, failed to obtain the signatures of the guests in a guest book, and failed to seal off the club barroom from the rented portion of the premises, all in violation of regulations of the liquor control commission; in that they allowed minors to loiter on the premises in violation of General Statutes § 30-90; in that they gave intoxicating liquor or allowed it to be given to a minor on the club premises; and in that they knew or should have known that minors were on the premises and were being given intoxicating liquor, but they failed or neglected to prevent such action from taking place.

All defendants demurred to the complaint, and, upon the sustaining of the demurrers, the plaintiff declined to plead over. From the judgment rendered for the defendants, the plaintiff appealed.

The plaintiff's primary claims are based on alleged violations of various general statutes and of regulations of the liquor control commission claimed to have been enacted for the benefit and protection of persons in the general circumstances of this plaintiff's decedent. Although it is not stated with the precision desirable in pleadings, it appears that the plaintiff is claiming that the violations of these statutes and regulations constituted negligence per se.

The crucial allegations of the complaint are that these violations were the proximate cause of the decedent's intoxication. It is, however, the general common-law rule that the proximate cause of intoxication is the voluntary consumption, rather than the furnishing, of intoxicating liquor. Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 436, 226 A.2d 383. Thus, the furnishing of intoxicating liquor was not the proximate cause of intoxication or of any damage proximately resulting from such intoxication, whether sustained by the intoxicated person himself or by another. The common-law rule as to proximate cause, of course, applies in any common-law action of negligence, even though that action includes, as specifications of negligence, one or more alleged violations of applicable statutes. This would include, of course, General Statutes § 30-86, which prohibits the furnishing of intoxicating liquor to minors, whether gratuitously or by sale.

The complaint alleges that the decedent consumed the liquor furnished, or permitted to be furnished, by the defendants. The voluntariness of that consumption, while not expressly alleged, is in nowise negated, as it must be to avoid the common-law rule.

There remains for consideration the question whether the portion of § 30-86 which prohibits, with certain exceptions not applicable to the present case, the furnishing of intoxicating liquor to minors, whether gratuitously or by sale, amounts to a legislative declaration that minors are legally incapable of consenting to the consumption of liquor and thus preclude their action in drinking the liquor from being voluntarily within the meaning of the common-law rule.

Although a minor is subject to a legal disability in the management of his property and in his contractual obligations, he nevertheless is permitted to make a will at the...