Moore v. City of Middletown

• Decision Date: 30 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. 2010–1363.,2010–1363.
• Citation: 133 Ohio St.3d 55,975 N.E.2d 977,2012 -Ohio- 3897
• Parties: MOORE et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF MIDDLETOWN, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

133 Ohio St.3d 55

975 N.E.2d 977

2012 -Ohio- 3897

MOORE et al., Appellants,

v.CITY OF MIDDLETOWN, Appellee.

No. 2010–1363.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Sept. 6, 2011.

Decided Aug. 30, 2012.

[Ohio St.3d 55]Syllabus of the Court

Property owners whose property is adjacent to property rezoned by a foreign municipality may use a declaratory-judgment action to challenge the constitutionality of the zoning action if the owner pleads that he has suffered an injury caused by the rezoning that is likely to be redressed.

Jay C. Bennett, Oxford, for appellants.

Crabbe, Brown & James, L.L.P., Robert J. Gehring, and Brian E. Hurley, Cincinnati; and Leslie S. Landen, Middletown Law Director, and Sara E. Mills, Assistant Law Director, for appellee.

Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn Co., L.P.A., Stephen L. Byron, and Rebecca K. Schaltenbrand, Cleveland; and John Gotherman, Columbus, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Municipal League.

Maurice A. Thompson, in support of neither party, for amicus curiae 1851 Center for Constitutional Law.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor General, Laura Eddleman Heim, Deputy Solicitor, and Michael L. Stokes and William J. Cole, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, in support of neither party, for amicus curiae state of Ohio.

O'CONNOR, C.J.

[Ohio St.3d 56]{¶ 1} In this appeal, we return to territory recently visited in Clifton v. Blanchester, 131 Ohio St.3d 287, 2012-Ohio-780, 964 N.E.2d 414. There, we held that propertyowners asserting a regulatory-taking claim lack standing to bring a mandamus action against a municipality to compel appropriation when the affected property is outside the municipality's corporate limits. Id. at ¶ 24 and 29.

{¶ 2} In this appeal, we are presented with a more complex question. The appellants here are property owners who allege that a foreign municipality rezoned land that lies in the municipality, but that is also adjacent to their property in another municipality, for the benefit of private enterprise rather than public health. They allege violations of due process and equal protection, as well as a regulatory taking for which they are entitled to compensation.

{¶ 3} Consistent with our decision in Clifton, we hold that the property owners do not have standing to bring a mandamus action to compel a municipality to appropriate property outside the municipality's jurisdiction. But, for the reasons that follow, we hold that the property owners do have standing to bring a declaratory-judgment action to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinances. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for additional proceedings consistent with this decision.

Relevant Background

{¶ 4} Because the claims were resolved on motions to dismiss for lack of standing and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, we accept as true all material allegations in the appellants' complaint and construe all reasonable inferences in their favor. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753 (1988).

{¶ 5} Appellants, Lori A. and Matthew E. Moore (“the property owners”), own property in Monroe, Ohio, that is adjacent to a parcel of property that lies wholly in Middletown, Ohio. The Middletown property, known as the Martin–Bake property, is central to this appeal.

{¶ 6} The Martin–Bake property includes 157 acres of land. Before August 2008, the Martin–Bake property was zoned only for low-density residential use. Although one side of the parcel abuts space zoned for industrial use, the Martin–Bake property is largely bordered by nonindustrial properties, such as residential housing, a church, a school, and a nursing facility. But through two enactments, Ordinance No. 02008–63 and Ordinance No. 02008–64, Middletown rezoned the Martin–Bake property into a general industrial zone and revised a setback provision that had required all industrial activities to be 600 feet from the property line, eliminating that requirement for activities that are “incidental or [Ohio St.3d 57]ancillary” to the manufacturing process. By doing so, Middletown permitted the Martin–Bake property to be transformed dramatically.

{¶ 7} A general industrial zone in Middletown, called an “I–2 District,” is “intended to accommodate those industrial uses which cannot entirely eliminate certain objectionable features and influences, but which must, nevertheless, be accommodated within the urban area.” Middletown Zoning Code 1258.01. As an I–2 District, the Martin–Bake property could be used for a wide array of pursuits, including the manufacturing, compounding, processing, packaging, or assembly of electric and gas appliances, as well as the manufacturing of acid, asphalt, bleach, concrete, helium, hydrogen, insecticides, lye, oxygen, “poison of any kind,” radium, “soda ash or caustic soda or similar chemical products,” fuel briquettes, fertilizers, gelatin, animal glue, turpentine, rubber, and soap. Middletown Zoning Code 1258.02(b)(1), (3), (4), and (10). It also could house a foundry, junk yard, or power-generating station. Middletown Zoning Code 1258.02(b)(5) and (c)(4) and (6).

{¶ 8} The property owners, however, allege that the ordinances cleared the way for construction of a coke plant that would be owned and operated by SunCoke Energy for the benefit of AK Steel Corporation, one of Middletown's biggest employers. Ordinance No. 02008–64 makes clear that the ordinance is

an emergency measure to make immediately available additional developable industrial land in the City, and necessary for the immediate preservation of the public health, safety and general welfare, to wit: to permit the development of a proposed project on the property which would stabilize the security of over two-thousand jobs in the City and create new jobs in the City, thereby increasing the City's tax base.

{¶ 9} Following the enactment of the ordinances, the property owners brought suit alleging that the rezoning ordinances were not for the benefit of the public, were “arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and unconstitutional,” ignored the “coke plant's close proximity to both a school and a nursing home, as well as the serious pollution produced by such [a] plant resulting in the substantial impairment of public health and safety of persons, as well as the drastic diminution in value of surrounding low intensity residentially zoned property.” In addition, they alleged that Middletown had passed the ordinance as an emergency measure “for the purpose of denying citizens of Middletown who opposed such unlawful legislation the opportunity to vote on such action pursuant to referendum.”

{¶ 10} The complaint sought both a declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus. The property owners requested a declaration that the ordinances are arbitrary, capricious, and unconstitutional and violate the Due Process and [Ohio St.3d 58]Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 16. In their request for a writ of mandamus, they claimed that Middletown's action constituted a taking of their private property and unlawfully deprived them of “property rights consistent with their investment backed expectations,” and entitled them to compensation for the taking. Thus, they claimed, Middletown had a clear legal duty to commence appropriation proceedings pursuant to R.C. Chapter 163.

{¶ 11} Middletown moved to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and (6), asserting that the appellants lacked standing to bring their claims, that they failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted, and that the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction over the claims. After briefing and a hearing, the trial court granted the motion.

{¶ 12} On the issue of standing, the trial court ruled that R.C. 2721.03 confers standing on the property owners to bring a declaratory-judgment action because they are persons affected by the municipal ordinance. Notably, the trial court expressly rejected Middletown's assertion that the property owners lacked standing to bring their due process and equal protection claims against Middletown because their property is in Monroe. It wrote, “this Court does not find that a jurisdictional boundary extinguishes Plaintiffs' standing to bring the instant action. In the present case, the Plaintiffs have alleged a legally protected interest in the rezoning of the Martin–Bake property.”

{¶ 13} Instead, the trial court held that the property owners' claims failed because although they “make a broad allegation that Defendant's zoning is unconstitutional as it has no relation to the health, safety or welfare of the City of Middletown,” they had not alleged sufficient facts to overcome the presumption that the ordinances are constitutional. Thus, the court concluded that they failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

{¶ 14} Turning to the takings claim, the court held that the claim must fail because the regulation was not directed at the property owners' property, and thus no regulation burdened that property. And it held that even if there had been a taking, mandamus to appropriate the land was unavailable as a matter of law because Middletown could not appropriate land outside its jurisdictional limits.

{¶ 15} On the property owners' appeal, the court of appeals heard arguments and then ordered supplemental briefs on the issue of standing. Moore v. Middletown, 12th Dist. No. CA2009–08–205, 2010-Ohio-2962, 2010 WL 2573817. A divided panel affirmed the trial court's ruling. In so doing, however, it held that the property owners lacked standing to bring their claims, without distinguishing between the declaratory-judgment and mandamus claims. The court of appeals recognized that the complaint was both for a declaratory judgment and a [Ohio St.3d 59]writ of mandamus, but...