Moore v. Croft

• Decision Date: 02 May 1929
• Docket Number: 5018
• Citation: 47 Idaho 568,277 P. 425
• Parties: CRAWFORD MOORE, as Trustee, Respondent, v. WILLIAM P. CROFT and IDA J. CROFT, His Wife, Appellants, and H. B. HARRIS, a Single Man, et al., Defendants. WILLIAM P. CROFT, as Administrator of the Estate of MARY I. CROFT Deceased, Plaintiff in Intervention and Appellant, v. CRAWFORD MOORE, as Trustee, HEYBURN-PAUL HIGHWAY DISTRICT and E. E. CARRIER, Treasurer of the HEYBURN-PAUL HIGHWAY DISTRICT, Defendants in Intervention and Respondents
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

277 P. 425

47 Idaho 568

CRAWFORD MOORE, as Trustee, Respondent, v. WILLIAM P. CROFT and IDA J. CROFT, His Wife, Appellants, and H. B. HARRIS, a Single Man, et al., Defendants. WILLIAM P. CROFT, as Administrator of the Estate of MARY I. CROFT Deceased, Plaintiff in Intervention and Appellant, v. CRAWFORD MOORE, as Trustee, HEYBURN-PAUL HIGHWAY DISTRICT and E. E. CARRIER, Treasurer of the HEYBURN-PAUL HIGHWAY DISTRICT, Defendants in Intervention and Respondents

No. 5018

Supreme Court of Idaho

May 2, 1929

HUSBAND AND WIFE-COMMUNITY PROPERTY-PRESUMPTION-ESTOPPEL BY MISREPRESENTATION-PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES.

1. Property acquired by either spouse after marriage is presumably community property.

2. Where wife possessing separate property permitted title with her knowledge to be taken in NAME of her husband, and during her lifetime knowingly permitted title to remain in him which representation on her part made it possible for husband after her death to represent himself as sole owner of property in mortgaging it, husband as administrator held estopped to claim property as that of deceased wife to same extent that she would be estopped were she living, in view of C. S., sec. 7803, as existing at time of her death.

3. Where decedent would be estopped, personal representative ordinarily will be estopped in same manner and to same extent.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District for Minidoka County. Hon. T. Bailey Lee, Judge.

Action to foreclose mortgage on real estate. Judgment for plaintiff. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed, with costs to respondent.

S. T Lowe, for Appellants.

The doctrine of estoppel does not apply and cannot defeat the estate of the minors in and to the property described in said mortgage. (Ewald v. Hufton, 31 Idaho 373, 173 P. 247; Missouri Central Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Eveler, 237 Mo. 679, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 486, 141 S.W. 877; Bjmerland v. Eley, 15 Wash. 101, 45 P. 730; Adams v. Black, 6 Wash. 528, 33 P. 1074.)

Edwin Snow and Karl Paine, for Respondent Moore, Trustee.

The presumption is that all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage is community property; hence the deed to the mortgagor created the presumption that the premises were community property. (Bannock Nat. Bank v. Automobile Accessories Co., 37 Idaho 787, 219 P. 200; Clifford v. Lake, 33 Idaho 77, 190 P. 714.)

It is a well-established principle that where the true owner of property, for however short a time, allows another to appear as the owner or having full control of, or disposition over, the property, and innocent third parties are thus led into dealing with the apparent owner, they will be protected; and such rights do not depend upon the actual title or right or authority of the party with whom they have directly dealt, but are derived from the conduct of the real owner, which precludes him from disputing against them the existence of the title or right or power which he caused or allowed to appear to be vested in the party using such property to obtain credit. (Chaney v. The Gauld Co., 28 Idaho 76, 152 P. 468; Grice v. Woodworth, 10 Idaho 459, 109 Am. St. 214, 80 P. 912, 69 L. R. A. 584.)

This has become the settled law of Idaho. (McKeehan v. Vollmer-Clearwater Co., 30 Idaho 505, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 1197, 166 P. 256; Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Harroun, 44 Idaho 643, 258 P. 929.)

"The rule of equitable estoppel is as applicable to a married woman who has placed the title to her real estate in her husband, who has thereby obtained a credit, as though she had put the title in the name of a third party. (Galbraith v. Lunsford, 87 Tenn. 89, 9 S.W. 365, 1 L. R. A. 522; 2 Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence, 3d ed., sec. 814.) The authorities so holding are numerous." (Goldberg v. Parker, 87 Conn. 99, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1059, 87 A. 555, 46 L. R. A., N. S., 1097.)

BRINCK, District Judge. Budge, C. J., and Givens and Wm. E. Lee, JJ., concur.

OPINION

BRINCK, District Judge.

This case involves the foreclosure of a note and mortgage executed by William P. Croft and wife, Ida J. Croft, for $ 2,000, upon lands standing of record in the name of the defendant William P. Croft. This note and mortgage were executed in blank at the same time and in the same manner, and induced by the same representations, as were the note and mortgage involved in Moore v. Croft (No. 5019), post, p. 572, 277 P. 423, and as to the main issues the decision in that case is controlling here.

In this case, however, appears the additional fact that the land mortgaged had been in part the separate property of Mary I Croft, deceased, a former wife of the defendant William P. Croft, who died intestate March 19, 1919, leaving minor children. William P. Croft, as administrator of her estate, intervened in this action, and as such administrator appeals from the decree of foreclosure which was rendered.

Property acquired by...