Moore v. Dallas Independent School Dist.

• Decision Date: 14 March 2008
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:07-CV-0009-D.
• Citation: 557 F.Supp.2d 755
• Parties: Elia MOORE, Plaintiff, v. DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

557 F.Supp.2d 755

Elia MOORE, Plaintiff, v. DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:07-CV-0009-D.

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.

March 14, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Gabriel H. Rubles, Robles Law Firm, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.

Eric V. Moye, Dawn Kahle Doherty, Michael W. Massiatte, Vincent & Moye PC, Dallas, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SIDNEY A. FITZWATER, Chief Judge.

The instant motion for partial judgment on the pleadings presents the question whether a school teacher has adequately pleaded a state-created danger claim arising from injuries she sustained when another teacher attempted to break up a fight between two middle school students. Concluding that she has not, the court dismisses this claim for relief, which is asserted in her complaint and in her proposed first amended complaint.

I

Since 1995 defendant Dallas Independent School District ("DISD") has been aware of the problem of student violence in its schools.¹ Yet the DISD Board of Trustees ("Board") has never forbidden teachers from trying to intervene in these fights to break them up. Consequently, DISD teachers and staff often take matters into their own hands and attempt to break up student fights. Other teachers and staff, however, decide to stay away from the fights. The Board has been aware for many years that, in practice, teachers and support staff attempt to break up fights and that they and others have been injured in the process. The Board has never acted to stop this practice. Despite the Board's knowledge of injuries to DISD teachers and staff, the Board has made a policy choice not to train DISD teachers and staff on how to deal with student violence. The Board has not enacted any policy specifically directed at protecting DISD teachers and staff. DISD teachers do not carry walkie talkies or radios, which would enable them to call for assistance when a fight breaks out.

The Board is required under both federal and state law to report incidence of student violence. But as student fights have become much more frequent in recent years within the school district, the Board has under-reported the acts of violence of which it was aware because it feared losing public funding. Attempting to keep the number of reported acts of student violence down, the Board has discouraged teachers from reporting student violence.

In 2005 plaintiff Elia Moore ("Moore") was a full-time math teacher at Marsh Middle School, a school within DISD. One of Moore's duties as a classroom teacher was to monitor students as they moved through the school hallways between classes. In 2005, as Moore was monitoring students in the hallway, a fight broke out near her between two eighth grade boys. Another teacher, Marvin Lane ("Lane"), rushed toward the boys and attempted to separate them. He was unable to do so, and his unsuccessful efforts caused him to lose his balance and start to fall. Moore attempted to keep her distance from the fight, but as Lane fell to the floor he kicked Moore's feet out from under her, causing her to fall hard on her knees. Once on the floor, the force of the three falling bodies shoved Moore up against the wall, injuring her neck and shoulders.

Moore later filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against DISD, alleging violations of her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Among her three constitutional claims, Moore asserts that the failure of the Board to curb the growing problem of student violence, and its failure to supervise and train teachers on how to respond to student violence, have deprived her of her substantive due process right to her bodily integrity. Moore contends that the Board's failure to implement a policy of teacher safety, and its failure to train teachers on how to deal with student fights, were the moving forces behind her injuries and demonstrate that the Board — which was aware for several years that teachers had been injured in attempts to break up student fights — was deliberately indifferent to the health and safety of DISD teachers, such as Moore.

DISD moves for partial judgment on the pleadings under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), seeking dismissal of Moore's claim that DISD deprived her of her substantive due process right to bodily integrity. DISD contends that Moore has failed to state a cognizable constitutional claim for the deprivation of her right to bodily integrity. DISD argues that, if Moore's substantive due process claim is based on DISD's failure to provide a safe work environment, the suit fails to state a claim because DISD had no constitutional duty to provide a safe working environment. It posits that, if Moore intends to base her claim on the state-created danger theory, her complaint fails to adequately plead this cause of action.

Before she responded to DISD's motion, Moore sought leave to amend her complaint. Her proposed first amended complaint attempts to clarify the ambiguity in her complaint concerning the basis for her entitlement to relief for the deprivation of her substantive due process right to bodily integrity. The proposed first amended complaint unequivocally grounds Moore's right to recovery on the state-created danger theory. The proposed first amended complaint also supplements the factual basis for Moore's state-created danger claim.

In responding to DISD's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, Moore urges the court not to decide the motion until it rules on her motion for leave to amend. DISD opposes Moore's motion for leave to amend, contending that granting such leave would be futile because the first amended complaint is subject to the same defects that the motion for partial judgment on the pleadings identifies concerning the complaint. In its reply in support of its motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, DISD makes numerous references to the first amended complaint, arguing that the first amended complaint is subject to dismissal on the same basis.

II

The court first addresses Moore's motion for leave to amend the original complaint.

Because Moore's November 13, 2007 motion for leave to amend was filed before the December 10, 2007 deadline for filing such motions, Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) controls the granting of plaintiffs request for leave to amend. See S & W Enters., L.L.C. v. Southtrust Bank of Ala., N.A., 315 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir.2003). Under Rule 15(a)(2), "[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires."

In the absence of any apparent or declared reason — such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. — the leave sought should, as the rules require, be "freely given."

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962).

DISD opposes Moore's motion solely on the basis that granting leave to amend would be futile, because Moore's state-created danger claim in the first amended complaint is subject to dismissal in that it fails to adequately plead this cause of action. Denying Moore's motion for leave to amend because it is subject to dismissal is within the court's discretion. See Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund v. Integrated Elec. Servs. Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 556 (5th Cir.2007) (affirming denial of motion to amend complaint under Rule 15(a) because proposed amendment would be subject to same grounds of dismissal as contained in defendants' original Rule 12(b)(6) motion); Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 873 (5th Cir.2000) ("While this court has not specifically defined `futility' in [the Rule 15(a) ] context, we join our sister circuits that have interpreted it to mean that the amended complaint would fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."); DeLoach v. Woodley, 405 F.2d 496, 497 (5th Cir.1968) (per curiam) ("Where a complaint, as amended, would be subject to dismissal, leave to amend [under Rule 15(a) ] need not be granted."). But the court cannot determine whether Moore's proposed first amended complaint is subject to dismissal without engaging in a detailed analysis of the proposed pleading in relation to cases that interpret the state-created danger theory. "If a proposed amendment is not clearly futile, then denial of leave to amend is improper." 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1487, at 637, 642 (2d ed. 1990) (emphasis added). Because Moore's proposed first amended complaint is not clearly futile, the court will not deny Moore's motion for leave to amend on the basis of futility.

Because futility of amendment is DISD's sole ground in opposing Moore's motion, the court discerns no compelling reason to deny granting leave under the liberal standard of Rule 15(a)(2). See, e.g., Siesta Village Market, LLC v. Perry, 530 F.Supp.2d 848, 861-62 (N.D.Tex.2008) (Fitzwater, C.J.), appeals docketed, Nos. 08-10145 (5th Cir. Feb. 18, 2008),08-10146 (5th Cir. Feb. 19, 2008),08-10148 (5th Cir. Feb. 19, 2008), and 08-10160 (5th Cir. Feb. 21, 2008). Accordingly, the court grants Moore's November 13, 2007 motion for leave to amend, and her proposed first amended complaint is deemed the operative pleading for purposes of deciding DISD's Rule 12(c) motion.

Ill

Granting Moore's motion for leave to amend does not, however, end the court's analysis of the sufficiency of the first amended complaint. DISD's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings predates plaintiffs motion for leave to file the amended complaint, which supersedes the complaint to which DISD's motion for judgment on the pleadings was directed. "[T]he court may nevertheless treat defendant's] motion as directed to the amended complaint because the defects in [plaintiffs] complaint reappear in the amended complaint." Holmes v. Nat'l Football League, 939 F.Supp. 517, 523 n. 7 (N.D....