Moore v. Dempsey, No. 199

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtHOLMES
Citation67 L.Ed. 543,261 U.S. 86,43 S.Ct. 265
Docket NumberNo. 199
Decision Date19 February 1923
PartiesMOORE et al. v. DEMPSEY, Keeper of Arkansas State Penitentiary

261 U.S. 86
43 S.Ct. 265
67 L.Ed. 543
MOORE et al.

v.

DEMPSEY, Keeper of Arkansas State Penitentiary.

No. 199.
Argued Jan. 9, 1923.
Decided Feb. 19, 1923.

Messrs. U. S. Bratton, of Detroit, Mich., Scipio A. Jones, of Little Rock, Ark., and Moorfield Storey, of Boston, Mass., for appellants.

Page 87

Mr. Elbert Godwin, of Melbourne, Ark., for appellee.

Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal from an order of the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissing a writ of habeas corpus upon demurrer, the presiding judge certifying that there was probable cause for allowing the appeal. There were two cases originally, but by agreement they were consolidated into one. The appellants are five negroes who were convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death by the Court of the State of Arkansas. The ground of the petition for the writ is that the proceedings in the State Court, although a trial in form, were only a form, and that the appellants were hurried to conviction under the pressure of a mob without any regard for their rights and without according to them due process of law.

The case stated by the petition is as follows, and it will be understood that while we put it in nerrative form, we are not affirming the facts to be as stated but nly what we must take them to be, as they are admitted by the demurrer: On the night of September 30, 1919, a number of colored people assembled in their church were attacked and fired upon by a body of white men. and in the disturbance that followed a white man was killed. The report of the killing caused great excitement and was followed by the hunting down and shooting of many negroes and also by the killing on October 1 of one Clinton Lee, a white man, for whose murder the petitioners were indicted. They seem to have been arrested with many others on the same day. The petitioners say that Lee must have been killed by other whites, but that we leave on one side as what we have to deal with is not the petitioners' innocence

Page 88

or guilt but solely the question whether their constitutional right have been preserved. They say that their meeting was to employ counsel for protection against extortions practiced upon them by the landowners and that the landowners tried to prevent their effort, but that again we pass by as not directly bearing upon the trial. It should be mentioned, however, that O. S. Bratton, a son of the counsel who is said to have been contemplated and who took part in the argument here, arriving for consultation on October 1, is said to have barely escaped being mobbed; that he was arrested and confined during the month on a charge of murder and on October 31 was indicted for barratry, but later in the day was told that he would be discharged but that he must leave secretly by a closed automobile to take the train at West Helena, four miles away, to avoid being mobbed. It is alleged that the judge of the Court in which the petitioners were tried facilitated the departure and went with Bratton to see him safely off.

A Committee of Seven was appointed by the Governor in regard to what the committee called the 'insurrection' in the county. The newspapers daily published inflammatory articles. On the 7th a statement by one of the committee was made public to the effect that the present trouble was 'a deliberately planned insurrection of the negroes against the whites, directed by an organization known as the 'Progressive Farmers' and 'Household Union of America' established for the purpose of banding negroes together for the killing of white people.' According to the statement the organization was started by a swindler to get money from the blacks.

Shortly after the arrest of the petitioners a mob marched to the jail for the purpose of lynching them but were prevented by the presence of United States troops and the promise of some of the Committee of Seven and other leading officials that if the mob would refrain, as

Page 89

the petition puts it, they would execute those found guilty in the form of law. The Committee's own statement was that the reason that the people refrained from mob violence was 'that this Committee gave our citizens their solemn promise that the law would be carried out.' According to affidavits of two white men and the colored witnesses on whose testimony the petitioners were convicted, produced by the petitioners since the last decision of the Supreme Court hereafter mentioned, the Committee made good their promise by calling colored witnesses and having them whipped and tortured until they would say what was wanted, among them being the two relied on to prove the petitioners' guilt. However this may be, a grand jury of white men was organized on October 27 with one of the Committee of Seven and, it is alleged, with many of a posse organized to fight the blacks, upon it, and on the morning of the 29th the indictment was returned. On November 3 the petitioners were brought into Court, informed that a certain lawyer was appointed their counsel and were placed on trial before a white jury—blacks being systematically excluded from both grand and petit juries. The Court and neighborhood were thronged with an adverse crowd that threatened the most dangerous consequences to anyone interfering with the desired result. The counsel did not venture to demand delay or a change of venue, to challenge a juryman or to ask for separate trials. He had had no preliminary consultation with the accused, called no witnesses for the defence although they could have been produced, and did not put the defendants on the stand. The trial lasted about three-quarters of an hour and in less than five minutes the jury brought in a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree. According to the allegations and affidavits there never was a chance for the petitioners to be acquitted; no juryman could have voted for an acquittal and continued to live Phillips County and if

Page 90

any prisoner by any chance had been acquitted by a jury he could not have escaped the mob.

The averments as to the prejudice by which the trial was environed have some corroboration in appeals to the Governor, about a year later, earnestly urging him not to interfere with the execution of the petitioners. One came from five members of the Committee of Seven, and stated in addition to what has been quoted heretofore that 'all our citizens are of the opinion that the law should take its course.' Another from a part of the American Legion protests against a contemplated commutation of the sentence of four of the petitioners and repeats that a 'solemn promise was given by the leading citizens of the community that it the guilty parties were not lynched, and let the law take its course, that justice would be done and the majesty of the law upheld.' A meeting of the Helena Rotary Club attended by members representing, as it said, seventy-five of the leading industrial and commercial enterprises of Helena, passed a resolution approving and supporting the action of the American Legion post. The Lions Club of Helena at a meeting attended by members said to represent sixty of the leading industrial and commercial enterprises of the city passed a resolution to the same effect. In May of the same year, a trial of six other negroes was coming on and it was represented to the Governor by the white citizens and officials of Phillips County that in all probability those negroes would be lynched. It is alleged that in order to appease the mob spirit and in a measure secure the safety of the six the Governor fixed the date for the execution of the petitioners at June 10, 1921, but that the execution was stayed by proceedings in Court; we presume the proceedings before the Chancellor to which we shall advert.

In Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 335, 35 Sup. Ct. 582, 590 (59 L. Ed. 969), it was recognized of course that if in fact a trial is dominated by a

Page 91

mob so that there is an actual interference with the course of justice, there is a departure from due process of law; and that 'if the State, supplying no corrective process, carries into execution a judgment of death or imprisonment based upon a verdict thus produced by mob domination, the State deprives the accused of his life or liberty without due process of law.' We assume in accordance with that case that the corrective process supplied by the State may be so adequate that intereference by habeas corpus ought not to be allowed. It certainly is true that mere mistakes of law in the course of a trial are not to be corrected in that way. But if the case is that the whole proceeding is a mask—that counsel, jury and judge were swept to the fatal end by an irresistible wave of public passion, and that the State Courts failed to correct the wrong, neither perfection in the machinery for correction nor the possibility that the trial court and counsel saw no other way of avoiding an immediate outbreak of the mob can prevent this Court from securing to the petitioners their constitutional rights.

In this case a motion for a new trial on the ground alleged in this petition was overruled and upon exceptions and appeal to the Supreme Court the judgment was affirmed. The Supreme Court said that the complaint of discrimination against petitioners by the exclusion of colored men from the jury came too l te and by way of answer to the objection that no fair trial could be had in the circumstances, stated that it could not say 'that this must necessarily have been the case'; that eminent counsel was appointed to defend the petitioners, that the trial was had according to law, the jury correctly charged, and the testimony legally sufficient. On June 8, 1921, two days before the date fixed for their execution, a petition for habeas corpus was presented to the Chancellor and he issued the writ and an injunction against the execution of the petitioners; but the...

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391 practice notes
  • Eaglin v. Louisiana, CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-9659 SECTION: "I"(3)
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Louisiana)
    • January 7, 2020
    ...question of whether a petitioner's "constitutional rights have been preserved," not his underlying "innocence or guilt." Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1923); see also In re Swearingen, 556 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2009) ("The Fifth Circuit does not recognize freestanding claims of ac......
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    ...been disagreement among scholars as to whether the result in Brown v. Allen Was foreshadowed by the Court's decision in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct. 265, 67 L.Ed. 543 (1923). Compare Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 84, 105 (1959); Reitz, Federal Hab......
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    • United States Supreme Court
    • April 21, 1993
    ...237 U.S. 309, 35 S.Ct. 582, 59 L.Ed. 969 (1915) (no jurisdiction to conduct trial in atmosphere of mob domination); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct. 265, 67 L.Ed. 543 (1923) (same); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (no jurisdiction to co......
  • Burns v. Lovett, No. 11419
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    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • July 31, 1952
    ...332 U.S. 708, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309. 12 Pyle v. Kansas, 1942, 317 U.S. 213, 63 S.Ct. 177, 87 L.Ed. 214. 13 Moore v. Dempsey, 1923, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct. 265, 67 L.Ed. 14 Ex parte Nielsen, 1889, 131 U.S. 176, 9 S.Ct. 672, 33 L.Ed. 118. 15 1950, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 80, 187 F.2d 192, certiora......
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386 cases
  • Eaglin v. Louisiana, CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-9659 SECTION: "I"(3)
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Louisiana)
    • January 7, 2020
    ...question of whether a petitioner's "constitutional rights have been preserved," not his underlying "innocence or guilt." Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1923); see also In re Swearingen, 556 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2009) ("The Fifth Circuit does not recognize freestanding claims of ac......
  • Stone v. Powell Wolff v. Rice, Nos. 74-1055
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • July 6, 1976
    ...been disagreement among scholars as to whether the result in Brown v. Allen Was foreshadowed by the Court's decision in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct. 265, 67 L.Ed. 543 (1923). Compare Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 84, 105 (1959); Reitz, Federal Hab......
  • Withrow v. Williams, No. 91-1030
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • April 21, 1993
    ...237 U.S. 309, 35 S.Ct. 582, 59 L.Ed. 969 (1915) (no jurisdiction to conduct trial in atmosphere of mob domination); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct. 265, 67 L.Ed. 543 (1923) (same); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (no jurisdiction to co......
  • Burns v. Lovett, No. 11419
    • United States
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    • July 31, 1952
    ...332 U.S. 708, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309. 12 Pyle v. Kansas, 1942, 317 U.S. 213, 63 S.Ct. 177, 87 L.Ed. 214. 13 Moore v. Dempsey, 1923, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct. 265, 67 L.Ed. 14 Ex parte Nielsen, 1889, 131 U.S. 176, 9 S.Ct. 672, 33 L.Ed. 118. 15 1950, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 80, 187 F.2d 192, certiora......
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8 books & journal articles
  • THE REASONABLENESS OF THE "REASONABLENESS" STANDARD OF HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996.
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    • March 22, 2022
    ...noncapital cases); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071 (West Supp. 2021) (same, for capital cases). (207.) 237 U.S. 309 (1915). (208.) 261 U.S. 86 (209.) Frank, 237 U.S. at 324-25, 332. (210.) The Court elaborated: [T]he State may supply such corrective process as to it seems proper. Geo......
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    • ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, The Nbr. 304-1, March 1956
    • March 1, 1956
    ...Norris v. Alabama 294 U. S. 587 (1935);Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400 (1942); Avery v.Georgia, 345 U. S. 559 (1953).49 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923).50 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 16with 1938 the Court defined equality insuch a way as to pave the way for thereversal in 1954 of the......
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    ...(en banc) (quoting 28 U.S.C. [section] 2255(e)). (23) Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 207 (1830). (24) 237 U.S. 309 (1915). (25) 261 U.S. 86 (26) See id. at 87; Frank, 237 U.S. at 324-26. (27) Frank, 237 U.S. at 345. (28) Moore, 261 U.S. at 92. (29) 344 U.S. 443 (1953). (30) Id. at ......
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    ...evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal habeas corpus."); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1923) ("[W]hat we have to deal with [on habeas review] is not the petitioners' innocence or guilt but solely the question whether their ......
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