Moore v. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, STATE, 4D02-714.
Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Citation | 833 So.2d 822 |
Docket Number | No. 4D02-714.,4D02-714. |
Parties | Cynthia Jean MOORE a/k/a Cynthia Jean Suarez, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. |
Decision Date | 04 December 2002 |
Gary Kollin of Gary Kollin, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
Ron Renzy of Wallberg & Renzy, P.A., Coral Springs, for appellee.
Cynthia Moore appeals the dismissal of her claims for negligence and false arrest against the Department of Corrections (DOC). We affirm.
Moore's lawsuit stemmed from the following events. While she was on probation, a DOC officer filed an affidavit saying that she had not paid her probation fees. The trial court issued an arrest warrant for a probation violation. Subsequently, Moore's probation was terminated, but Moore's probation officer did not revoke the outstanding warrant. The DOC probation officer assigned to Moore acknowledged that the probation was terminated; however, this officer was not the same person who filed the earlier affidavit for probation violation. The arrest warrant remained outstanding, and Moore was arrested pursuant to that warrant. At the heart of Moore's case is her contention that DOC had a duty to revoke the outstanding warrant for violation of probation once it received notice that her probation had been terminated. The alleged violation of this duty gave rise to her claims against DOC for negligence and false arrest.
For Moore to have an actionable negligence claim against a government entity, there must be a common law or statutory duty regarding the alleged negligent conduct. See Hinckley v. Palm Beach County Bd. of Comm'rs, 801 So.2d 193, 194-95 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
. Moore alleges that DOC had a common law duty not to subject her to a false arrest.
To analyze government tort liability, the supreme court divided government functions into four categories: I. legislative, permitting, licensing, and executive officer functions; II. enforcement of laws and the protection of the public safety; III. capital improvements and property control operations; and IV. providing professional, educational, and general services for the health and welfare of the citizens. Trianon Park Condo. Ass'n v. City of Hialeah, 468 So.2d 912, 919 (Fla.1985). The supreme court held that there is no duty of care and no corresponding tort liability for discretionary functions within categories I and II. See id. at 919.
Enforcement of public assistance laws to prevent fraud and charges resulting from State Attorney's office investigations have both been classified as discretionary category II functions which carry no duty of care to a particular individual. See Harris v. Kearney, 786 So.2d 1222, 1226 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
; see also State v. Kowalski, 617 So.2d 1099, 1099-1100 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).
In Harris v. Kearney, Harris omitted a new temporary job from her food stamps application on the advice of a Department of Children and Families (DCF) worker. 786 So.2d at 1223. Similarly to the instant case, a different DCF worker filed an affidavit saying that this omission constituted food stamp fraud, and the lower court issued an arrest warrant on that basis. Harris sued DCF for false arrest. This Court ruled that DCF did not have a duty toward the plaintiff because the government function of enforcing compliance with the food stamp statutes was an example of a Trianon category II discretionary power that did not give rise to a common law duty of care to an individual. See id. at 1226.
Likewise, we hold that probation supervision is also a Trianon category II function involving enforcement of laws and protection of public safety. See 468 So.2d at 919. Probation supervision is a discretionary duty involving the interpretation of existing probation statutes and supervision of probationers to protect the public. It does not give rise to a common law duty of care to individual probationers.
Harris is also instructive on Moore's false arrest claim. See Harris, 786 So.2d at 1225
. We follow our determination in Harris that the DCF worker's affidavit merely provided information. See id. at 1225-26. The probation...
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