Moore v. Dist. of Columbia

Decision Date05 February 2015
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 12–0490 BAH
Citation79 F.Supp.3d 121
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia
PartiesAngelique Moore, et al., Plaintiffs, v. District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.

79 F.Supp.3d 121

Angelique Moore, et al., Plaintiffs
v.
District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 12–0490 BAH

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed February 5, 2015


79 F.Supp.3d 123

Omid Safa–Esfahani, Jason Drew Wallach, Dickstein Shapiro LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Robert A. Deberardinis, Jr., Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BERYL A. HOWELL, United States District Judge

Pending before the Court is a motion for partial summary judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, filed by the defendants, the District of Columbia and five officers of the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”)1 (collectively, “defendants”), on eight of the sixteen

79 F.Supp.3d 124

claims asserted by the plaintiffs, Angelique Moore and her son Eric Moore, arising from an incident with the police that occurred in April 2011. For the reasons set out below, this motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The claims in this case stem from an altercation between the plaintiffs and the defendant MPD officers on April 1, 2011. The parties agree that this incident began when nineteen year old Mr. Moore2 was riding his bike along the sidewalk in front of a family friend's home, which was next door to a barbershop, where the five defendant police officers had just executed a search warrant. Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) ¶¶ 7–9, ECF No. 16; Defs.' Mot. Supp. Partial Summ. J. (“Defs.' Mot.”), Ex. 1 (Dep. Of Eric Moore (“E. Moore Dep.”) at 10:8–20), ECF No. 28–1. As Mr. Moore passed the barbershop, he claims that Lieutenant John Alter “stood in [his] path,” prompting Mr. Moore to “change [ ] course to ride safely around Lieutenant. Alter and to avoid making contact with the officer.” SAC ¶ 10. According to the plaintiffs, words were then exchanged between Mr. Moore and the Lieutenant Alter. The latter allegedly told Mr. Moore “to watch where he was going,” prompting Mr. Moore to respond that Lieutenant Alter saw him riding on the sidewalk, moved into Mr. Moore's path, and could have moved out of the way. SAC ¶ 11; E. Moore Dep. at 20:19–20.

The plaintiffs claim that Lieutenant Alter then approached and assaulted Mr. Moore by deliberately bumping Mr. Moore and knocking a baseball cap off of Mr. Moore's head. SAC ¶ 12; see also Defs.' Stm. Of Undisputed Material Facts (“Defs.' SMF”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 28; Pls.' Resp. to Defs.' SMF (“Pls.' Resp. SMF”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 29. Lieutenant Alter denies that this physical contact occurred. Pls.' Resp. SMF ¶ 1. Mr. Moore protested that Lieutenant Alter had no right to touch him, to which Lieutenant Alter allegedly stated “that he could do whatever he wanted and then threatened to impound Mr. Moore's bicycle at the Seventh District police station if Mr. Moore continued to speak.” SAC ¶ 13; see also Pls.' Resp. SMF ¶ 1. After further protest from Mr. Moore, Lieutenant Alter allegedly “abruptly snatched the bicycle from Mr. Moore and threw it onto the lawn” of the Moores' friends' residence, next door to the barbershop. SAC ¶ 14; E. Moore Dep. at 22:7–9.

This alleged encounter of a young man talking back to a police officer was the trigger for an escalating series of unfortunate events. Mr. Moore then called his mother, Ms. Moore, on his cell phone to report his encounter with Lieutenant Alter. Defs.' SMF ¶ 2; Pls.' Resp. SMF ¶ 2 (“Undisputed”). At his mother's request, Mr. Moore tried to get Lieutenant Alter to speak by telephone with Ms. Moore, but Lieutenant Alter refused to speak with Ms. Moore. SAC ¶ 16; see also Pls.' Resp. SMF ¶ 3; E. Moore Dep. 25:16–26:5; Pls.' Mem. Opp'n Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. (“Pls.' Opp'n”), Ex. 2 (Dep. Of Michael Callahan (“Callahan Dep.”) at 34:7–12), ECF No. 29–2. Lieutenant Alter disputes this allegation and claims that he spoke to Ms. Moore by telephone. Pls.' Resp. SMF ¶ 3. Ms. Moore told her son to wait at the scene and that she would join him. Defs.' SMF ¶ 3; Pls.' Resp. SMF ¶ 3.

After traveling about six blocks to the scene, Ms. Moore tried to speak to Lieutenant Alter about his treatment of Mr.

79 F.Supp.3d 125

Moore. SAC ¶ 18; E. Moore Dep. 29:21–22; Defs.' Mot., Ex. 2 (Dep. of Angelique Moore (“A. Moore Dep.”) at 17:17–19), ECF No. 28–2; Pls.' Opp'n., Ex. 1 (Dep. of John Alter (“Alter Dep.”) at 49:1–11), ECF No. 29–1. While Ms. Moore was talking with Lieutenant Alter, Officer Callahan exited the barber shop, approached Mr. Moore and said that “he would like to fuck him” and that “I like you and the other guys in jail would like you as well.” Defs.' SMF ¶ 4; Pls.' SMF ¶ 4; Callahan Dep. at 33:12–20; E. Moore Dep. 39:7–10. Officer Callahan denies that he made these statements. Pls.' Resp. SMF ¶ 4; Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (“Defs.' Mem.”) at 8, n.2, ECF No. 28. Mr. Moore responded by yelling and cursing at Officer Callahan to get away and to leave him alone. SAC ¶¶ 21, 27; A. Moore Dep. 23:11–24:2. Ms. Moore could see that her son became very upset, although she could not hear what Officer Callahan had said to her son. Defs.' SMF ¶ 5; Pls.' Resp. SMF ¶ 5 (“Undisputed”).

Ms. Moore then “tried to calm [ ] down” her son. Defs.' SMF ¶ 6; Pls.' Resp. SMF ¶ 6. They walked over to a “concrete landing” in their friends' front yard to have a private conversation. SAC ¶ 29. While Ms. Moore's back was turned to the officers, Mr. Moore saw one of the officers give a hand signal to Officer Callahan, and then, without any other warning, Officer Callahan tackled both plaintiffs to the concrete landing. SAC ¶¶ 29–32; see also Defs.' SMF ¶ 6; Pls.' Resp. SMF ¶ 6; E. Moore Dep. 46:12–48–3; A. Moore Dep. 26:12–20. Officer Callahan denies tackling the plaintiffs to the ground. Defs.' Mem. at 8, n.2. Ms. Moore was struck from behind and Officer Callahan landed on top of her body. SAC ¶ 33; A. Moore Dep. 27:4–13.

While Ms. Moore remained on the ground, Officers Callahan and Sharpton placed handcuffs on Mr. Moore and arrested him. Defs.' SMF ¶¶ 7–8; Pls.' Resp. SMF ¶¶ 7–8 (“Undisputed”); E. Moore Dep. 48:5–10; A. Moore Dep. 27:19–22–29:1–3. According to Mr. Moore, he was “originally told that he was being arrested for disorderly conduct,” but was subsequently charged with making threats to do bodily harm to Officers Callahan and Sharpton. Pls.' Resp. SMF ¶ 8; SAC ¶ 39. Officer Callahan states that he arrested Mr. Moore for threats to do bodily harm after Mr. Moore made the threat that “I will kill both of your asses.” Defs.' Mem. at 8, n.2 (citing Witness Statement Callahan at 2, Ex. 12, ECF No. 28–12).3 Mr. Moore was “incarcerated overnight” and then released the next day “subject to a deferred prosecution agreement.” SAC ¶ 39. The charge was eventually dropped but the plaintiffs allege that Mr. Moore nonetheless “remain[ed] saddled with a wrongful arrest record and suffers from all the indignities and disadvantages attendant therewith.” Id . ¶ 40.

When Ms. Moore finally stood up, she had pain in her right hand, arm and shoulder. A. Moore Dep. 29:20–22, 33:14–17; Defs.' Mot. Ex. 10 (A. Moore's Objs. and Resps. to Defs.' First Set of Interrogs. (“A. Moore Resp. to Defs.' Interrog.”), Resp. to Interrog. No. 7), ECF No. 28–10. She sought medical treatment for the injuries to her right hand and shoulder at Suburban Hospital, where she was employed, and sought subsequent treatment for her back. SAC ¶ 37; A. Moore Dep.

79 F.Supp.3d 126

33:10–17, 34:4–13; A. Moore Resp. to Defs.' Interrog. No. 8.

On May 13, 2011, Ms. Moore filed a complaint with the Office of Police Complaints (“OPC”) regarding the MPD Officers' conduct and this complaint was dismissed on January 4, 2012. SAC ¶¶ 42, 47.

B. Procedural History

About one year after their altercation with the MPD Officers, the plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit. Compl., ECF No. 1. The defendants' first motion for partial dismissal of the complaint, Defs.' Mot. Partial Dismissal Compl., ECF No. 3, was denied as moot, with the defendants' consent, when the plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ECF No. 8, setting out eighteen claims against the defendants. See Minute Order (May 29, 2012). The Court subsequently, in an oral ruling after a motions hearing, denied in part and granted in part the defendants' motion to dismiss the FAC, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Minute Order (March 8, 2013). The plaintiffs then filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), which is the operative complaint in this case. SAC, ECF No. 16.

The SAC alleges, in sixteen counts, violations of the plaintiffs' Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, as well as numerous common law claims, including assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence in hiring, training, supervision and retention, and negligent infliction of emotional distress, stemming from the April, 2011 incident involving the five defendant MPD defendants. See generally, SAC. After a discovery period of eight months,4 the defendants filed the pending motion seeking partial summary judgment...

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