Moore v. District of Columbia
| Decision Date | 24 August 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-7003,88-7003 |
| Citation | 886 F.2d 335 |
| Parties | , 58 USLW 2007, 56 Ed. Law Rep. 435 Lani MOORE, et al. v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Civil Action No. 87-00941).
Donna M. Murasky, with whom Frederick D. Cooke, Jr., Corp. Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., District of Columbia, were on the brief, for appellants.
Michael J. Eig, with whom Matthew B. Bogin, Washington, D.C., and Margaret A. Kohn were on the brief, for appellees.
Before EDWARDS, WILLIAMS and FRIEDMAN, * Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge FRIEDMAN.
The question in this case, here on appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, is whether under the Education of the Handicapped Act ("EHA"), 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1400 et seq., The Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986 ("HCPA"), 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(e)(4)(B) et seq., the district court has authority to award attorney fees to persons who prevail in administrative proceedings under that statute, in a suit brought solely to obtain those fees. The district court held that the Act authorizes it to award attorney fees in that situation and made an award. Moore v. District of Columbia, 666 F.Supp. 263 (D.D.C.1987). We hold that the Act does not give the district court authority to award such fees, and therefore reverse the district court's award.
A. The EHA is a comprehensive scheme providing federal funds to aid States and local agencies in complying with their constitutional obligations to provide public education for handicapped children. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009, 104 S.Ct 3457, 3467, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984); Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3037, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). As a condition of obtaining federal financial assistance, the States must have adopted "a policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public education," 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1412(1), and provide procedural safeguards for the enforcement of those rights. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415.
The "free appropriate public education" required is tailored to the unique needs of the handicapped child by means of an "individualized educational program." Prepared at meetings between a representative of the local school district, the child's teacher, and the parents or guardians of the child, the program must include statements about the child's present level of performance, annual goals, the specific educational services to be provided, and appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures to determine whether educational objectives are being achieved. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(19).
The EHA sets forth a number of procedural safeguards that give parents the opportunity directly to participate in decisions concerning the education of their handicapped children. Parents have the right (1) to examine all relevant records concerning the evaluation and educational placement of their child, Sec. 1415(b)(1)(A), (2) to receive prior written notice whenever the school district proposes or refuses to change the placement of their child, Sec. 1415(b)(1)(C), and (3) to receive an "impartial due process hearing" after registering a complaint "with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child." Sec. 1415(b)(1)(E). The filing of such a complaint with the school district creates the opportunity for a hearing before either the State educational agency, the local educational agency, or the intermediate educational agency, as State law provides. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(b)(2).
When the hearing is conducted by a local or an intermediate educational agency, any party aggrieved by the agency's findings and decision may obtain review by the State educational agency. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(c). Parties to that hearing or to the State review proceeding have "the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel" and by persons with special knowledge or training regarding the problems of handicapped children. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(d).
Administrative decisions are final, 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(e)(1), except that any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made at the hearing (that are not appealable to the State agency under subsection (c)) or any party aggrieved by the findings and decision of the State review proceeding may bring a civil action "with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to [section 1415]" in a State court or in a United States District Court. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(e)(2). In that judicial action, the court may take additional evidence at the request of a party, and "basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(e)(2).
As originally enacted, the EHA did not contain any provision for the payment of attorney fees to parents who were the prevailing parties. Parents asserting claims under the EHA frequently joined claims based on Sec. 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 in order to take advantage of the fee-awarding provisions of those statutes. In Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984), the Supreme Court held (1) that where the EHA covered a suit brought on behalf of a handicapped child, that Act provided the exclusive remedy for the enforcement of the child's rights, and (2) that because the EHA did not contain a provision for attorney fees, fees were not available in suits brought to enforce those rights.
Congress responded by enacting the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796-98 (HCPA), which effectively overturned the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Robinson. The HCPA amends the EHA "to authorize the award of reasonable attorneys' fees to certain prevailing parties, to clarify the effect of the Education of the Handicapped Act on rights, procedures, and remedies under other laws relating to the prohibition of discrimination, and for other purposes." Preamble to Pub.L. No. 99-372.
B. The appellees are nine learning disabled children who prevailed in due process hearings under the EHA in the District of Columbia and were placed in various private day schools throughout the District. After the District rejected their requests for reimbursement of the attorney fees and costs they had incurred in the administrative proceedings, the appellees brought the present action in the district court for the sole purpose of obtaining such fees and costs.
On cross-motion for summary judgment, the district court held that Sec. 1415(e)(4)(B) of the EHA (the provision added by the HCPA, that provides for the award of attorney fees), authorizes a court in a suit brought solely for that purpose, to award attorney fees for services rendered during the administrative proceedings. After an evidentiary hearing, the court awarded the nine appellees a total of $48,337.42 as attorney fees and costs covering both the administrative proceedings and the district court litigation.
As in every case of statutory interpretation, our analysis "must begin with the language of the statute itself." Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 187, 100 S.Ct. 2601, 2609, 65 L.Ed.2d 696 (1980). The provision of this statute providing for the award of attorney fees is Sec. 1415(e)(4)(B), which states:
In any action or proceeding brought under this subsection, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents or guardian of a handicapped child or youth who is the prevailing party.
A. In determining whether this provision authorizes a court to award attorney fees for services rendered in the administrative proceeding, in a suit brought solely to obtain such fees, three things stand out:
1. The reference to "brought under this subsection" is to subsection (e), which is one of six subsections of section 1415. When Congress wished to refer more broadly to other provisions of the statute, it said so explicitly. See, e.g., Sec. 1412 (), Sec. 1413(a) (), Sec. 1413(a)(9) (), Sec. 1415(e)(2) (), and Sec. 1415(e)(3) ().
The only reference in subsection 1415(e) to the bringing of actions or proceedings is the statement in Sec. 1415(e)(2) that "[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under subsection (b) of this section ... and any party aggrieved by the findings and decision under subsection (c) of this section [subsection dealing with administrative proceedings by State educational agencies],
shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this section, which action may be brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States without regard to the amount in controversy. In any action brought under this paragraph the court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.
Section 1415(e)(2) permits a "party aggrieved" by the administrative decision to bring a civil action "with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this section [section 1415]," i.e., such party may bring suit in a...
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