Moore v. Dnata U.S. Inflight Catering LLC
| Decision Date | 19 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | 20-cv-08028-JD |
| Parties | CHRISTIAN L. MOORE, Plaintiff, v. DNATA U.S. INFLIGHT CATERING LLC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Northern District of California |
Plaintiff Moore, on behalf of himself and a putative class of current and former employees, sued defendant Dnata U.S. Inflight Catering LLC for a variety of wage and hour claims under California state law. Dkt. No. 1, Ex. A. The complaint was originally filed in the San Francisco Superior Court, and was removed by dnata[1] under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), and alternatively on federal question subject matter jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C §§ 1331, 1441(a). A federal question is said to arise from the complete preemption of the state law employment claims by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), and the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. Dkt. No. 1.
Moore has asked to remand the case. Dkt. No. 13. For CAFA, Moore says that dnata has not reasonably demonstrated that the amount in controversy meets the statutory threshold of $5 million. Id. at 16. For the federal question theory he says that the complaint alleges purely state law claims that do not require an interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), and so the claims are not preempted or removable. Id. at 11.
The parties' familiarity with the record is assumed. dnata has not plausibly demonstrated a reasonable possibility that the amount in controversy satisfies the CAFA threshold. With respect to the alternative theory of a federal question removal was done improvidently and without subject matter jurisdiction, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1447(c) and (d).
The Court has detailed the standards for CAFA removal in a recent case, and incorporates that discussion here. See Anderson v. Starbucks Corp., No. 3:20-cv-01178-JD, 2020 WL 7779015, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2020) (). Moore does not contest the minimum diversity of citizenship required under CAFA, nor does he contend that the putative class is less than 100 individuals. The complaint alleged a class of “over seventy-five (75) Class Members, ” Dkt. No. 1, Ex. A ¶ 23, and dnata filed a declaration stating that its payroll records indicated that it employed “at least” 426 non-exempt workers who fit the putative class definition in the pertinent time period, Bhojwani Decl., Dkt. No. 14-1 ¶ 6, a headcount that Moore does not seriously question. The only disputed issue is whether dnata plausibly demonstrated that the amount in controversy exceeds the $5 million statutory threshold for CAFA jurisdiction.
It did not. To start, there is no presumption against removal when CAFA jurisdiction is at stake, as Moore seems to suggest. Dkt. No. 13 at 10; see Anderson, 2020 WL 7779015, at *2 () (quoting Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014)). To the contrary, Congress intended CAFA to be interpreted expansively in favor of removal. Id. (citing Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.2d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2019)).
To establish the amount in controversy required for CAFA jurisdiction, a defendant need only “‘plausibly show that it is reasonably possible that the potential liability exceeds $5 million.'” Anderson, 2020 WL 7779015, at *3 (quoting Greene v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 965 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 2020)). A defendant need not prove the jurisdictional amount with certainty, or make out the plaintiff's case for her. Id. (citing Harris v. KM Indus., Inc., 980 F.3d 694, 701 (9th Cir. 2020)). Nor does the Court need to perform a detailed mathematical analysis to determine whether a defendant's showing is adequate. Id. “Rather, ‘a defendant may rely on reasonable assumptions to prove that it has met the statutory threshold,' and on a ‘chain of reasoning that includes assumptions' based on reasonable grounds.” Id. at *3 (). Reasonable grounds may be established on the basis of the complaint and extrinsic evidence. Id. “‘[P]rospective attorney's fees must be included in the assessment of the amount in controversy.'” Id. (quoting Arias, 936 F.3d at 922).
A plaintiff need not introduce extrinsic evidence to contest the defendant's estimates. A plaintiff may rely entirely on “‘a reasoned argument as to why any assumptions on which [defendant's numbers] are based are not supported by evidence.'” Id. at *2. (quoting Harris, 980 F.3d at 700). That is what Moore has done here. He disputes dnata's reasoning, without introducing new evidence of his own.
Although the complaint alleges a variety of claims, dnata elected to estimate the CAFA jurisdictional amount based on waiting time penalties, wage statement penalties, and meal and rest break claims. See Dkt. No. 1 at 8-9; Dkt. No. 14 at 5-9. It also factors in an estimated 25% recovery for attorney's fees. Dkt. No. 1 at 10; Dkt. No. 14 at 10.
The problem that pervades dnata's estimate for the amount in controversy is that it assumes unreasonably high rates of violations. For example, dnata posits a 100% violation rate for each putative class member for the waiting time penalties. See Dkt. No. 14 at 8 (). It also assumes a 100% violation rate for the wage statement claims. See Id. at 9. These two assumptions are essential to its jurisdictional argument, and together they account for the lion's share of dnata's estimate of the amount in controversy. See id. at 10 ().
To be sure, there are circumstances in which a 100% violation rate may be a reasonable proposition for CAFA removal purposes. A defendant may adduce facts that plausibly support such a rate, and the complaint itself may allege facts that make a 100% incident rate a reasonable inference. See Anderson, 2020 WL 7779105 at *4 ().
None of that is present here. dnata did not provide any extrinsic evidence independently validating a 100% violation rate. Its main argument is that the complaint leaves no room for assuming less than 100%, see Dkt. No. 14 at 7-8, but that is rebutted by the plain language of the allegations. Moore consistently alleges that dnata acted “at times” and “on occasion” in a manner that violated California state employment laws. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 1, Ex. A ¶¶ 12-17. No. numbers are attached to those qualifiers. Moore also consistently alleges that the violations may have happened to only some of dnata's employees during the class period. Id.
Overall, Moore alleges only that some class members suffered some violations at some time during the class period. That is hardly grounds to infer a 100% violation rate for any of the claims. It is true that Moore makes the occasional reference to a “common course of conduct” and “intentionally” adopted wage and hour policies, see id. ¶¶ 26, 63, but those passing comments do not dilute the complaint's overarching allegations of sporadic and intermittent practices.
dnata tries to defend its 100% assumptions by saying that other district courts have accepted that approach. See Dkt. No. 14 at 7. Even taking this representation at face value, it is of no help to dnata because CAFA removal must be based on the facts of each case, and dnata did not show that those cases presented allegations akin to the ones here, or involved a similar lack of material extrinsic evidence. A good argument can also be made that those cases are out of step with recent decisions by the Ninth Circuit. See Ibarra v. Manheim, 775 F.3d 1193, 1198-99 (9th Cir. 2015).[2] dnata faults Moore for not providing “evidence” to counter the 100% violation rate assumption, Dkt. No. 14 at 8, but Moore was not required to do that. See Anderson, 2020 WL 7779015 at * 2. It was enough for him to rely on logic, fair inferences, and the allegations in the complaint, to critique dnata's arguments.
dnata's efforts to bolster its amount in controversy argument with the meal and rest break allegations, and attorney's fees, are equally unavailing. dnata rather randomly assumed a 20% meal and rest break violation rate, an assumption that is not tied to any evidence or the complaint, and appears to have been pulled out of thin air. Dkt. No. 14 at 9. Even spotting that figure the benefit of the doubt purely for the discussion here, it results in only approximately $1.5 million in penalties. Id. at 10. The estimated fees recovery of 25% is not inherently unreasonable, see Anderson, 2020 WL 7779015 at *4, but dnata applies it to the flawed waiting time and wage statement penalties, and so the amount attributed to fees cannot be used toward the jurisdictional threshold. See Dkt. No. 14 at 10. If the 25% were limited to the meal and rest break penalties, the total would still be well short of $5 million.
dnata had a full and fair opportunity to present evidence and arguments for removal under CAFA, and has come up short. It has failed to plausibly demonstrate that this case reasonably puts $5 million or more into play. Consequently, a remand on CAFA is warranted.
So too for dnata's alternative theory of removal on federal question subject matter jurisdiction. As in all federal cases, the foundational principle here is that the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited to what is authorized by the...
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