Moore v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 30 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 788, Sept. Term, 2019,788, Sept. Term, 2019 |
| Citation | 239 A.3d 764,247 Md.App. 682 |
| Parties | Trina MOORE v. DONEGAL MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Argued by: Thomas McElroy (Law Offices of Seymour R. Goldstein on the brief), all of Baltimore, MD, for Appellant
Argued by: Michael B. Mann (Mann & Casey PA on the brief), all of Towson, MD, for Appellee.
Panel: Graeff, Leahy, Shaw Geter, JJ.*
Graeff, J. Trina Moore, appellant, filed a complaint against Donegal Mutual Insurance Company ("Donegal"), appellee, alleging that Donegal breached a settlement agreement negotiated in the underlying case of Moore v. Belmont , No. 03-C-17-000487. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County denied Ms. Moore's Motion for Summary Judgment and granted Donegal's Motion for Summary Judgment. The court entered judgment in favor of Donegal, finding that there was no settlement agreement in the underlying case because Ms. Moore did not accept Donegal's offer until after it had lapsed.
On appeal, Ms. Moore presents the following questions for this Court's review, which we have rephrased slightly, as follows:
For the reasons set forth below, we shall reverse the judgment of the circuit court.
On January 18, 2017, Ms. Moore filed a negligence claim against Belmont Hospitality Inc. ("Belmont") in Moore v. Belmont . Trial began on May 16, 2018. Ms. Moore was represented by Joseph Spicer and Seymour Goldstein. Belmont's trial counsel was Christian Mann.
Michelle DiNizo was the insurance adjuster Donegal assigned to Ms. Moore's claim against Belmont. Prior to trial, Donegal offered to pay Ms. Moore $18,000 to settle her personal injury claims.
On May 17, 2018, at approximately 10:30 a.m., Mr. Goldstein called Ms. DiNizo and advised that Ms. Moore would settle the case for $21,500. Ms. DiNizo stated that Donegal was only willing to pay $18,000. In his deposition, Mr. Goldstein stated, and Donegal does not dispute on appeal, that Ms. DiNizo affirmed that the $18,000 offer was "still on the table."
The trial then continued. Ms. Moore closed her case, and according to Donegal, Ms. Moore did not call any witnesses to testify that Belmont acted negligently. Prior to the lunch recess, Belmont moved for judgment.
During the lunch recess, Ms. Moore's counsel advised counsel for Donegal that Ms. Moore accepted the offer of $18,000 to settle her personal injury claim. Defense counsel stated that he needed to speak to the insurance adjuster. Mr. Mann called Ms. DiNizo, who advised that the $18,000 offer was no longer available.
Mr. Goldstein then called Ms. DiNizo and confirmed that Ms. DiNizo previously had said that the $18,000 offer was still on the table. Ms. DiNizo advised that she had made a mistake in saying that. During her deposition, Ms. DiNizo explained that she should have told Mr. Goldstein in the first conversation that Donegal was not willing to pay $18,000.
Mr. Spicer brought the issue of the settlement offer to the attention of the circuit court, but the court refused to address it. At the close of trial, Belmont again moved for judgment, and the court denied the motion. On May 18, 2018, the jury returned a verdict finding that Belmont was not negligent.
On May 23, 2018, Ms. Moore filed a complaint against Donegal in the District Court for Baltimore County. Donegal requested a jury trial, and the case was moved to circuit court. In her amended complaint, Ms. Moore stated she was seeking $18,000 due to Donegal's breach of the settlement agreement.2
Ms. Moore filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, alleging that there was no dispute of material fact that the parties created a contract. Donegal also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, alleging that there was no dispute of material fact that there was no breach of contract between the parties.
On June 17, 2019, the circuit court held a hearing on the motions for summary judgment. At the hearing, counsel for Ms. Moore argued that there was no dispute of material fact in this case and only a question of law, i.e., whether a contract was formed when Ms. Moore accepted the $18,000 offer. She asserted that, after the initial $18,000 offer and her $21,500 demand, the adjuster said that the $18,000 offer was still on the table, and her acceptance of that offer a couple of hours later was given within a reasonable time. Accordingly, a contract was formed.
Donegal argued that summary judgment should be granted for three reasons. First, it asserted that, because there was a counter demand of $21,500, "everything is washed out." Second, counsel noted that, although the $18,000 offer was on the table at 10:30 a.m., there was no evidence that the adjuster said that the $18,000 offer was "going to continue for any period of time." He asserted that Donegal was entitled to summary judgment because there was a lapse of time before acceptance of the offer. Counsel argued that, once Belmont made its motion for summary judgment in the underlying case, things had changed, and Ms. Moore knew that the case was "in big trouble" because she had closed her case without producing evidence that the defendant had notice of the defect that she asserted caused her to fall.3 Third, Donegal argued that, because there was no release, there was no settlement agreement.
The court determined that Ms. Moore was not entitled to summary judgment, and it denied her motion. The court found, however, that Donegal was entitled to summary judgment. It stated:
Ms. Moore contends that the circuit court erred in granting Donegal's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying her motion. She asserts that Donegal "made an open-ended offer with no restrictions to settle [her] tort claim," which she accepted, "thereby creating a settlement contract between" her and Donegal. She asserts that there was "no evidence that the offer had lapsed," and her acceptance of the offer was within a reasonable amount of time when it was given within two hours from when she was told that the offer was "still on the table." Ms. Moore contends that there is no legal authority to support the circuit court's ruling that a change in the procedural posture of a case causes a settlement offer to lapse as a matter of law.
Donegal contends that the circuit court properly granted its Motion for Summary Judgment. Although Donegal disputes that an "open-ended offer" was made during the initial discussion, for purposes of argument in support of the court's grant of its Motion for Summary Judgment, it assumes that the offer was "open-ended." It argues, however, that there is no dispute that any such offer had lapsed by the time Ms. Moore accepted it. Donegal argues that, when a party does not specify "a time within which the offer is to be accepted," the other party must "accept the offer within a reasonable period of time, after it was made, for there to be a contract." It asserts that, in the "circumstances of an ongoing litigated trial, the reasonable period of time for a party to accept an offer would end at the time the trial is resumed and going forward," and Ms. Moore's decision to accept $18,000 two hours later was "far too late."4
This Court has set forth the standard of review of an order granting a motion for summary judgment, as follows:
Woolridge v. Abrishami , 233 Md. App. 278, 307–08, 163 A.3d 850 (quoting Heit v. Stansbury , 215 Md. App. 550, 555, 81 A.3d 639 (2013) ), cert. denied , 456 Md. 96, 171 A.3d 619 (2017). And, we generally review "only the grounds upon which the trial court relied in granting summary judgment." River Walk Apts., LLC v. Twigg , 396 Md. 527, 541–42, 914 A.2d 770 (2007) (quoting Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Berrett , 395 Md. 439, 451, 910 A.2d 1072 (2006) ).
"Settlement agreements are enforceable as independent contracts, subject to the same general rules of construction that apply to other contracts." 4900 Park Heights Avenue, LLC v. Cromwell Retail 1, LLC , 246 Md. App. 1, 19–20, 227 A.3d 757 (quoting Erie Ins. Exch. v. Estate of Reeside , 200 Md. App. 453, 460, 28 A.3d 54 (2011) ), cert....
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