Moore v. Equitrans, L.P.

• Decision Date: 23 February 2022
• Docket Number: No. 21-1134,21-1134
• Citation: 27 F.4th 211
• Parties: Jeffery J. MOORE; Sandra J. Moore, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. EQUITRANS, L.P., a Pennsylvania Limited Partnership, Defendant - Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

27 F.4th 211

Jeffery J. MOORE; Sandra J. Moore, Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.EQUITRANS, L.P., a Pennsylvania Limited Partnership, Defendant - Appellee.

No. 21-1134

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: October 27, 2021

Decided: February 23, 2022

ARGUED: Kenneth Eugene Webb, Jr., BOWLES RICE LLP, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellants. David K. Hendrickson, HENDRICKSON & LONG, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Patrick C. Timony, William M. Lorensen, BOWLES RICE LLP, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellants. Barbara A. Samples, Stephen E. Hastings, HENDRICKSON & LONG, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and WYNN and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part by published opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge Gregory and Judge Harris joined.

WYNN, Circuit Judge:

In 2012, Plaintiffs-Appellants Jeffery and Sandra Moore brought an action claiming that Defendant-Appellee Equitrans, L.P., breached the parties' right-of-way agreement and trespassed on the Moores' land by laying two segments of pipeline outside of the metes and bounds specified in their agreement. Three years later, a jury found that Equitrans either trespassed on the Moores' West Virginia property or violated the parties' right-of-way agreement. But the jury made no findings as to the proper remedy. While the Moores initially sought equitable relief in the form of an ejectment, a subsequent condemnation judgment in favor of Equitrans ultimately precluded such relief.

Several appeals and a remand later, the district court allowed the Moores to pursue damages for their breach-of-contract and trespass claims but denied leave to add a claim for intentional trespass. Later, while considering various evidentiary motions, the district court switched gears and barred any claim for breach-of-contract damages. After excluding large swaths of the Moores' evidence of trespass damages, the court sua sponte entered judgment in favor of Equitrans.

In this appeal, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint or in making its motion in limine rulings. Consequently, we affirm the district court on those issues. We also affirm judgment in favor of Equitrans on the issue of contract damages. And we reject the Moores' contention that the proper measure of trespass damages includes a portion of Equitrans's profits.

However, because the Moores lacked sufficient notice that they needed to come forward with all evidence of trespass damages, we vacate the portion of the district court's order entering judgment on trespass damages for procedural error and remand for further proceedings on that issue alone.

I.

Because we surveyed the long and convoluted procedural history of this matter in our opinion in Moore v. Equitrans, L.P. , 818 F. App'x 212, 213–17 (4th Cir. 2020), we provide here only the facts relevant to this appeal.

In 1960, Equitrans's predecessor, the Equitable Gas Company, acquired a right-of-way from Jeffery Moore's parents for the construction of a 16-inch natural-gas pipeline crossing roughly 1,600 feet of their rural, hillside property in West Virginia. In 1990, Moore and his wife obtained the deed for the property, which they proceeded to use as a cow pasture. In the mid-1990s, Equitrans replaced some corroded pipeline, part of which was on the Moores' property. Rather than removing the old pipe and replacing it with new pipe in the same ditch, Equitrans laid new pipe beside the old to maintain operation of the pipe during construction.

In 2012, the Moores discovered that some of the newly laid pipeline diverged from the metes and bounds described in the right-of-way by roughly fifteen feet. The Moores filed suit in state court, claiming breach of the right-of-way agreement, ejectment, and trespass. They sought damages for the breach, an ejectment order to remove the pipeline, compensatory damages arising from any removal, and compensatory damages for trespass. Equitrans removed the case to federal court.

Leading up to and during a two-day trial in March 2015, the Moores repeatedly indicated that they were seeking the trespass remedy of ejectment instead of monetary damages. In response, Equitrans explained that should the jury find trespass, Equitrans would pursue a condemnation action. At trial, the Moores failed to present any evidence of trespass damages. Nor did they propose jury instructions related to trespass damages or to willful or bad-faith trespass. Ultimately, the district court instructed the jury only on simple trespass, telling the jury that "[i]n West Virginia, trespass is defined as the entry on another person's property without lawful authority, and doing some damage, however inconsiderable, to that property." J.A. 652.¹

The jury found that one section of the original pipeline and one segment of newly laid pipeline "violated the terms of the 1960 right-of-way agreement or constituted a trespass." J.A. 678. However, the jury made no findings regarding whether the Moores were entitled to ejectment or monetary relief. Accordingly, in a May 2015 order, the district court explained that the remedy was "yet to be determined." J.A. 702.

In a separate memorandum opinion and order, the district court granted Equitrans's motion to stay the judgment pending resolution of a condemnation action. Moore v. Equitrans, L.P. , No. 1:12CV123, 2015 WL 2129259, at *4–5 (N.D.W. Va. May 6, 2015). Shortly thereafter, Equitrans filed a condemnation complaint regarding 0.56 acres of the Moores' property. See Equitrans, L.P. v. 0.56 Acres More or Less of Permanent Easement Located in Marion Cnty. , 145 F. Supp. 3d 622, 625–26 (N.D.W. Va. 2015). After a condemnation trial in 2017, the jury awarded $5,000—which came out to $5,556.16 with prejudgment interest—to the Moores as the fair market value of the condemned land. The Moores appealed.

Shortly after the condemnation trial, the Moores moved to amend the district court's May 2015 judgment regarding the proper remedy in this case. The district court denied the motion, choosing to maintain the stay until "the appeal in the condemnation action [was] resolved." Moore v. Equitrans, L.P. , No. 1:12CV123, 2017 WL 1455022, at *2 (N.D.W. Va. Apr. 21, 2017). We affirmed the condemnation judgment in March 2018. Equitrans, L.P. v. Moore , 725 F. App'x 221, 222 (4th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). Then, in December 2018, the district court lifted the stay and dismissed this case, reasoning that any attempt to amend the complaint would be "futile as plaintiffs have no available remedy for damages and no other rights remaining." J.A. 776. The Moores again appealed.

In 2020, this Court vacated and remanded the dismissal on the basis that the district court's precise reasoning was unclear. Moore , 818 F. App'x at 219. We expressed no opinion as to "the merits of any proposed amendment, or whether the court should permit it at this stage." Id.

Upon remand, the case was reassigned to a different district judge. The Moores sought leave to amend their complaint (1) to add claims of intentional trespass, inverse condemnation, and bad faith or oppressive conduct and (2) to seek monetary damages for breach of contract and trespass, as well as attorney's fees for condemnation. The district court found that the Moores pleaded damages for breach of contract and simple trespass in their initial complaint and should be allowed to proceed on those claims but denied leave to amend for all other claims, including intentional trespass.

In anticipation of a damages trial, the parties filed several Daubert motions and motions in limine. But in January 2021, the district court entered judgment sua sponte. Moore v. Equitrans, L.P. , No. 1:12-CV-123, 2021 WL 1654012, at *2, 5–6 (N.D.W. Va. Jan. 4, 2021). Considering the pending evidentiary motions as well as a motion for reconsideration, the district court found that the Moores had waived all breach-of-contract damages and could not present any evidence of such at trial. Id. at *1–2. The district court then granted several of Equitrans's various motions in limine, including one to exclude all testimony of the Moores' expert witness, David Howell. Id. at *4–6 [; J.A. 2317–21]. Concluding that the Moores had no remaining evidence of trespass or contract damages, the district court entered summary judgment for Equitrans. Id. at *5–6. The Moores appeal to this Court once more.

II.

On appeal, the Moores contend that the district court: (1) abused its discretion in refusing to allow them to amend the complaint to add a claim of intentional trespass; (2) applied the wrong measure of trespass damages and ignored relevant state precedent; (3) abused its discretion in excluding certain evidence; and (4) lacked the authority to enter judgment sua sponte and erred in concluding that the Moores waived any claims for breach-of-contract damages and had no proper evidence supporting trespass damages. We agree only on the matter of the sua sponte judgment as to trespass damages and vacate and remand solely on that basis. Otherwise, we affirm.

A.

We turn first to the district court's denial of leave to amend the complaint to add an intentional-trespass claim. We review a district court's order denying leave to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion. Laber v. Harvey , 438 F.3d 404, 428 (4th Cir. 2006). Generally, leave should be denied "only when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment would [be] futile." Id. at 426 (quoting Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co. , 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986) ). However, the discretion of the district court to deny leave to amend "increases at later stages of litigation." Moore , 818 F. App'x at 217. This is because the "further [a] case progressed before judgment was entered, the more likely it is that the amendment will prejudice...