Moore v. Erin Knippenberg, Lottie Wilhelm, & Allstate Indem. Co.

Decision Date18 November 2016
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15CV193
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia
PartiesKEVIN M. MOORE, SR., Plaintiff, v. ERIN KNIPPENBERG, LOTTIE WILHELM, and ALLSTATE INDEMNITY CO., Defendants.

(Judge Keeley)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING ALLSTATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 70] AND DENYING ALLSTATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS AS MOOT [DKT. NO. 56]

Pending before the Court are two motions filed by the defendant, Allstate Indemnity Company ("Allstate"), a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 56; 70). The motion for summary judgment contends that Allstate is entitled to judgment as a matter of law regarding claims made by the plaintiff, Kevin M. Moore, Sr. ("Moore"), because the claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Allstate's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 70) and DENIES its motion to dismiss as moot (Dkt. No. 56).

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2004, Moore purchased a home in Burlington, West Virginia, which he later rented to a third party from 2009 to 2011 (Dkt. No. 70-2 at 2). Of importance to this litigation, during that rental period, he insured the property through Allstate under a landlord's policy. Id. at 4. In October 2011, he returned to the home, which later burned to the ground in 2013. Id. at 5. Although Allstate's landlord policy was still in place at the time of the fire, Moore argues that the fire loss should have been covered under a homeowner's policy. He alleges that, prior to the fire, he had informed Lottie Wilhelm ("Wilhelm"), an employee of Allstate agent Erin Knippenberg ("Knippenberg"), that he had returned to his home in Burlington and required a homeowner's policy (Dkt. No. 32 at 3).1 The instant suit is Moore's second suit against Allstate arising from the fire loss.

I. The First Allstate Action ("Moore I")2

On August 27, 2013, Moore filed suit in the Circuit Court of Harrison County, West Virginia ("Moore I"), naming Allstate, Knippenberg, and claims adjuster Ray Betler ("Betler") as defendants (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 4). Moore's complaint contained four counts, including (1) breach of contract, (2) violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (3) violation of the West Virginia Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act ("WVUCSPA"), and (4) punitivedamages. Id. at 7-10. During the pendency of the case in state court, Moore and Allstate voluntarily dismissed claims against Knippenberg and Betler without prejudice. Id. at 50.

After that dismissal, on October 11, 2013, Allstate removed Moore I to this Court, citing diversity jurisdiction (Dkt. No. 1). Much later, Moore sought to bifurcate his bad faith claims against Allstate, acknowledging that the fate of those claims depended on whether Allstate had breached its contract of insurance by not providing coverage for his personal property (Dkt. No. 33-1 at 4-5). On September 10, 2014, the Court granted in part and denied in part the motion, and limited the first round of briefing to the coverage question (Dkt. No. 39 at 1).

Allstate moved for summary judgment on the coverage issues (Dkt. No. 41). Following full briefing, the Court granted the motion and also dismissed with prejudice the remaining claims for bad faith against Allstate (Dkt. No. 48). Moore argued that although he had made Allstate aware that he had changed his address it had failed to convert his landlord policy to a homeowner's policy. In its Order, the Court noted that "the complaint did not include a claim against Knippenberg for failure to procure a homeowners policy." Id. at 5. The Court stated:

Simply put, there is no dispute that the policy in place at the time of the fire was the Landlords Policy, not a homeowners policy. It appears that the dispute in this case centers on whether Knippenberg, Allstate's insurance agent, acted negligently either by failing to procure a homeowners policy for Moore, or by misrepresenting to him that a homeowners policy was in place. That said, not only is Knippenberg no longer a defendant, but Moore's complaint also is conspicuously devoid of any such claims. Indeed, his complaint alleges only that Allstate breached the Landlords Policy . . . .
. . .
To the extent [Moore's] briefing includes arguments beyond the coverage question, such arguments are outside the scope of the motion filed by Allstate; nor are they alleged in Moore's complaint.

Id. at 8, 10. The Court concluded that "coverage existed under the Landlords Policy," and "Moore [had] received the benefits of such coverage . . . when Allstate paid the liability limits for personal property protection and dwelling protection." Id. at 10.

Thereafter, the Court declined to vacate and alter or amend the judgment when Moore pursued an argument that he had substantially prevailed on his debris removal coverage claim (Dkt. No. 52). It based this decision in part on the fact that Moore had "unequivocally represented throughout th[e] litigation that a ruling on coverage favorable to Allstate would moot his remaining claims." Id. at 4.

II. The Current Lawsuit ("Moore II")

Moore filed the current lawsuit ("Moore II") in the Circuit Court of Marion County, West Virginia, on January 22, 2015 (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 2), naming Knippenberg, Wilhelm, and Betler as defendants. He filed this lawsuit while the Court was still considering Allstate's motion for summary judgment in Moore I. This complaint alleges five causes of action, including counts for (1) negligent procurement of adequate insurance, (2) breach of contract, (3) negligent failure to reform the policy of insurance, (4) violation of the WVUCSPA, and (5) punitive damages. Id. at 7-12.

Knippenberg and Wilhelm removed the case to this Court on October 28, 2015 (Dkt. No. 1). The Court dismissed Betler, who had not been served within the time period required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (Dkt. No. 22). Later, on March 22, 2016, it granted Moore's motion to amend the complaint to add Allstate as a party (Dkt. No. 28). After Moore amended his complaint and properly completed service (Dkt. Nos. 32; 50), Allstate filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the Court's holding in Moore I is res judicata here (Dkt. No. 56).

The motion to dismiss was fully briefed on September 19, 2016; due to an abbreviated schedule, however, the Court was unable toissue a ruling before the deadline for dispositive motions arrived on October 14, 2016, when Allstate filed the pending motion for summary judgment, asserting the doctrine of res judicata (Dkt. No. 70). Moore did not respond to this motion. Because the motions are substantially similar, to the extent relevant to the motion for summary judgment, the Court will consider Moore's arguments in response to the motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 62).

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where the "depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" establish that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court reviews all the evidence "in the light most favorable" to the nonmoving party. Providence Square Assocs., L.L.C. v. G.D.F., Inc., 211 F.3d 846, 850 (4th Cir. 2000). The Court must avoid weighing the evidence or determining its truth and limit its inquiry solely to a determination of whether genuine issues of triable fact exist. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for the motion and of establishing the nonexistence of genuine issues of fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has made the necessary showing, the non-moving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" favoring the non-moving party will not prevent the entry of summary judgment. The evidence must be such that a rational trier of fact could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248-52.

APPLICABLE LAW

"The doctrine of res judicata precludes relitigation of the same claim," Horne v. Lighting Energy Servs., LLC, 123 F. Supp. 3d 830, 838 (N.D.W. Va. 2015) (citing Sattler v. Bailey, 400 S.E.2d 220, 225 (W. Va. 1990)), and is founded on wise public policy:

To preclude parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.

Conley v. Spillers, 301 S.E.2d 216, 220 (W. Va. 1983) (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979)). In West

Virginia, a lawsuit is barred by res judicata if the following three elements are satisfied:

First, there must have been a final adjudication on the merits in the prior action by a court having jurisdiction of the proceedings. Second, the two actions must involve either the same parties or persons in privity with those same parties. Third, the cause of action identified for resolution in the subsequent proceeding either must be identical to the cause of action determined in the prior action or must be such that it could have been resolved, had it been presented, in the prior action.

Syl. Pt. 4, Blake v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 498 S.E.2d 41 (W. Va. 1997).

"A final decision [is one] that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment." Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 86 (2000) (internal citation omitted). "An erroneous ruling of the court will not prevent the matter from being res...

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