Moore v. Ferguson
| Decision Date | 04 June 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 71A05-9610-JV-405,71A05-9610-JV-405 |
| Citation | 680 N.E.2d 862 |
| Parties | Vance Lamar MOORE, Appellant-Respondent, v. Tamela FERGUSON, Yvetta Chere Williams, Tracy Denise Young, Amina Leenya Easton, Jacqueline Marie Hunt, Galaine Teresse Hackney, Paulette Robertson, and Bernice Monique Clark, Appellees-Petitioners. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Vance Lamar Moore challenges the trial court's imposition of nine consecutive six-month sentences of imprisonment for nine charges of civil contempt based upon Moore's failure to pay court-ordered child support for his nine children. Moore raises the following restated issues:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Moore to nine consecutive six-month terms, thus making the civil contempt sentence punitive in nature?
2. Whether the sentence of imprisonment violates Article 1, Section 22 of the Indiana Constitution, which prohibits imprisonment for debt?
From 1988 to 1994, Moore was found to be the father and ordered to pay child support in the nine causes at issue. The right to support payments in each of the nine cases was assigned to the State. Prior to the contempt findings at issue, the trial court had found Moore in contempt a total of twenty-nine times for failure to pay support in the nine cases. The sentences of imprisonment on the previous contempt findings ranged from ten days of imprisonment, with a possible additional sixty days of imprisonment if Moore failed to purge the contempt within the ten days, to six months of imprisonment, concurrent to the time served for any other contempt findings. All of the previous contempt findings allowed Moore to purge the contempt by paying a certain amount towards support. On occasion, the trial court sentenced Moore to community service. The trial court had also repeatedly ordered Moore to find employment and participate in job training.
On January 29, 1996, the State filed an Information for Rule to Show Cause in each of the nine cases, alleging that Moore had failed and refused to comply with the support orders. On June 25, 1996, upon finding Moore in contempt in each of the nine causes, the trial court entered the following order:
The State of Indiana on behalf of the Petitioner appeared by Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Elizabeth Hurley, and the Respondent appeared in person and in custody and by his Attorney of Record, Louis Heygi, for hearing on the Petitioners' Rule to Show Cause. Hearing had on June 25, 1996, and the Court made the following FINDINGS and ORDERS:
1. The Respondent is in arrears in the payment of child support in the total amount of $78,597.00 [sic] as of June 14, 1996, and said sum is entered as a support arrearage judgment.
2. The Respondent's noncompliance with the prior order of this Court is without cause, justification or excuse and was the direct result of willful and intentional conduct, and the Respondent is in contempt of court by reason thereof.
3. Upon finding of contempt, the Court now orders that the Respondent shall be committed to the St. Joseph County Jail for a period of one hundred and eighty (180) days in each individual case, each sentence to run consecutive to the others (all such time to be served without credit for good time served), unless the Respondent purges himself of contempt by paying the sum of ten percent (10%) of the arrearage in each individual case to be applied to said outstanding arrearage. The cause numbers, Petitioners' names, total arrearage figures and the amount Respondent needs to pay in each case is set forth below.
Cause No. Petitioner's Name Arrearage Amount Respondent to Pay
9005JP470 Galaine Hackney $7850.00 $785.00
9204JP303 Galaine Hackney $5475.00 $547.50
8901JP52 Tracy D. Young $9600.00 $960.00
9401JP3 Bernice Clark $3125.00 $312.50
8903JP191 Amina Easton $9305.00 $930.05 [sic]
9004JP392 Jaqueline Hunt $8025.00 $802.50
9105JP413 Paulette Robertson $6600.00 $660.00
9405JP337 Tamela Ferguson $4741.00 $474.10
8809JP538 Yvette Williams $24,492.00 $2449.20
4. Execution of sentence to take place immediately, and the Sheriff of St. Joseph County is ordered to take charge of the person of the Respondent and to carry into execution the sentence of this Court.
Moore concedes that he is subject to the nine child support orders upon which his contempt findings are based, and that he is in arrears on those child support payments by a total of $79,213.00. 1 Moore does not challenge the findings of contempt, but rather challenges the court's sentence on the findings of contempt.
Moore asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to nine consecutive six-month terms of incarceration because such a sentence constitutes punishment and is thus an improper sentence for civil contempt. The Indiana Supreme Court has previously explained the distinction between civil contempt and criminal contempt as follows:
A civil contempt is a violation of a court order which results in a proceeding for the benefit of the aggrieved party. It is not an offense primarily against the dignity of the court, but rather is for the benefit of the party who had been injured or damaged by the failure of another to conform to a court order issued for the private benefit of the aggrieved party. Therefore, ... the primary objective of a civil contempt proceeding is not to punish the defendant, but rather to coerce action for the benefit of the aggrieved party. Punishment in the form of imprisonment or a fine levied against the defendant, which goes to the State and not to the injured party, is characteristic of a criminal proceeding. In a civil contempt action the fine is to be paid to the aggrieved party, and imprisonment is for the purpose of coercing compliance with the order.
Duemling v. Fort Wayne Community Concerts, Inc., 243 Ind. 521, 188 N.E.2d 274, 276 (1963) (citations omitted). However, the fact that imprisonment is the method by which the court seeks to coerce compliance does not make the proceeding a criminal contempt proceeding. Id. at 525, 188 N.E.2d at 276-77. Imprisonment may be used in civil contempt proceedings as well; an order of the court that a defendant be committed to jail for a certain period of time unless and until he complies with the original order is not punitive but coercive. Id. at 525, 188 N.E.2d at 277. If the court uses imprisonment to coerce the defendant into doing an affirmative act, the court must provide that the imprisonment cease as soon as the act is done, so that the defendant has " 'the key of his prison in his own pocket.' " Webster v. State, 673 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (quoting State ex rel McMinn v. Gentry, 229 Ind. 615, 100 N.E.2d 676, 678 (1951)), trans. denied (1997).
Thus, the issue before us is whether the contempt sentence was of a nature that could coerce Moore into compliance with the original support orders, or whether it was solely a punitive measure for Moore's failure to pay child support in the past. If the sentence is punitive then the trial court has abused its discretion in ordering such a sentence for civil contempt. Moore asserts that the fact that the court imposed consecutive sentences demonstrates that the sentence is punitive, because it results in an excessive sentence and because consecutive sentences are usually imposed only upon the finding of aggravating circumstances. Moore also argues that he is required to pay an excessive amount of money, $7,859.70, to purge himself from the contempt, and this further demonstrates the punitive nature of his sentence.
Although Moore's sentence may have punitive aspects, this does not make the sentence a criminal contempt sentence. "While any imprisonment, of course, has punitive and deterrent effects, it must be viewed as remedial if ...
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