Moore v. Fowinkle
| Decision Date | 14 June 1974 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 3-74-78. |
| Citation | 381 F. Supp. 587 |
| Parties | Dennis MOORE, Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated v. Eugene FOWINKLE, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Public Health, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
Jerrold L. Becker, Knoxville, Tenn., for plaintiff.
C. Hayes Cooney, Nashville, Tenn., Charles A. Maner, Jr., County Law Director, Knoxville, Tenn., for defendants.
This action was initiated on March 27, 1973 by a complaint requesting a three-judge court to temporarily and permanently enjoin the State's further enforcement of 53 Tenn.Code Ann. § 5501 et seq. and declare the same unconstitutional for the reasons set forth below. Plaintiff has since amended his complaint to delete his request for either temporary or permanent injunctive relief; accordingly, a three-judge court is no longer required. Seergy v. Kings County Republican County Committee, 459 F.2d 308 (2nd Cir. 1970); see also Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427, 90 S. Ct. 1763, 26 L.Ed.2d 378 (1970).
Jurisdiction of the Court lies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 28 U.S.C. § 1343.
Remaining before the Court, however, is plaintiff's request for declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202.
On October 1, 1973, plaintiff entered into a one-year rental agreement with his landlord, Ray DePue, in which he agreed to pay $95.00 a month for the rental of certain premises. Thereafter, in the belief that his premises were not in compliance with the minimum health standards for the rental of premises, 53 Tenn.Code Ann. § 5502, and owing his landlord no back rent, on February 19, 1974, plaintiff by telephone advised Mr. Elmer Dykes, the Building Inspector for Knox County, that he wished to invoke the statutory remedies set forth in 53 Tenn.Code Ann. § 5501 et seq. Defendant Dykes stated that no statutory inspection could commence until plaintiff deposited with the County Court Clerk the necessary deposit. Plaintiff claims that his poverty effectively precluded him from depositing this amount, thus denying him the statute's benefits.
There appearing to be no controversy of fact, the case is presently before the Court on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. F.R.Civ.P. 56. Oral argument was heard in support of and in opposition to the motion.
The Act1 requires the State Department of Public Health to promulgate
minimum health standards for rental premises and to forward the same to each county and public health department.
The tenant (any individual who pays $50.00 and under a week for rent) may file a complaint with the building inspector when he believes his premises are in violation of the minimum standards. However, before the tenant can file such a complaint two prerequisites must be satisfied:
1. He must have paid all rent owing to date.
2. The tenant must have filed with the Clerk of the Court a deposit in the amount of one month's rental.
This deposit is returned to the tenant upon a "final determination" that the premises fails to meet the minimal standards, but is "forfeited by the tenant to the state for the use of the county agency to whom the complaint was directed upon a final determination that the rented premises meets the said standards."
Upon the filing of the complaint and the posting of the necessary bond, an elaborate time scheme is invoked.
Within fourteen days of the filing of the complaint, the building inspector must inspect the premises. If the premises are found to be in noncompliance, the owner is notified and given 30 days to correct the condition. A second inspection follows within seven days following the expiration of the initial 30-day period. If at this time the landlord has not made the necessary repairs, the tenant pays to the county court clerk, all rental payments thereafter owing. A third inspection follows within seven days of the expiration of a six-month period. If the premises are still in noncompliance, a certificate of noncompliance is filed with the county court clerk and the six month's rental payments are forfeited by the landlord to the agency to whom the complaint was initially directed. The "county court clerk, for his services, shall receive the sum of five percent (5%) from all such rental payment sums, not including said deposit, which are forfeited to the state for the use of the county agency to whom the complaint was directed."
Plaintiff contends that the statute is subject to the following constitutional infirmities:
1. That the Act's bond requirement discriminates against the poor tenant in violation of the equal protection clause since, as plaintiff argues, the State has offered no rational basis for this provision. In support of this proposition plaintiff cites the Supreme Court's decision of Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 92 S.Ct. 862, 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972).
2. Secondly, plaintiff contends that 53 Tenn.Code Ann. § 5501 et seq. is violative of his First Amendment rights since the bond requirement denies him his right to petition the government for redress of grievances. In this vein, plaintiff contends that the state has created the only effective remedy and is seeking to deny its use through the allegedly unconstitutional condition. In light of the basis for the Court's holding, it is not necessary to address this second argument.
Defendant, like plaintiff, has couched its defense in the posture of the Lindsey case. Thus, both sides submit that that case controls in this instance. The defendants argue that (1) the Supreme Court in Lindsey held that there was no "constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality . . ." 405 U.S. at 74, 92 S.Ct. at 874, and (2) that there exists a rational basis for the deposit requirement here, unlike the double appeal bond in Lindsey.
The Court has carefully examined the Act under examination and the applicable principles of law and concludes that for the reasons set forth below 53 Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 5501-5507 is unconstitutional in its entirety.
In analyzing this Act, the Court is mindful of the principle set forth in Lindsey that the state may validly regulate the landlord-tenant relationship "by enacting special provisions applicable only to possessory disputes between them." 405 U.S. at 72, 92 S.Ct. at 873. However, while the Court recognized that the historically unique possessory relationship existing between the landlord and tenant permitted special regulation, it further concluded that a double appeal bond bore no rational relationship to any valid state objective. 405 U.S. at 74, 92 S.Ct. 862. Thus, the State in exercising its inherent police power to regulate the landlord-tenant relationship must demonstrate that such regulations reasonably relate to its objectives.
Initially, the Court observes that the Act does not apply to all tenants, both rich and poor, but instead is restricted to those persons who pay fifty dollars a week and under for rent. 53 Tenn.Code Ann. § 5501(b). Thus, the Act and its benefits are restricted to a class of tenants whose boundaries are determined by the amount of rent they pay. Assumably, the individual who pays over fifty dollars a week for his rent is left with his previous common law remedies. While it may be argued that the middle and lower rent tenant is more likely to be in need of the statutory inspection procedure, this reasoning alone cannot justify denying the Act's benefits to all tenants on an equal basis. It is clearly within the State's jurisdiction to provide the tenant with an expedient statutory remedy, but here the State has offered no reason for restricting this remedy to an exclusive class based upon rental payments. To permit certain tenants to invoke the benefits and protection of this statute and to deny the same to others, in the absence of any reasonable basis, offends the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court must conclude that the classification here is wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the legislation's objective of regulating the landlord-tenant relationship. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961).
More troublesome and disconcerting to the Court is the Act's provision at 53 Tenn.Code Ann. § 5503 that requires the tenant to post a deposit in the amount of one month's rent with the inspecting agency before he can invoke the inspection procedure. As noted above, in response to plaintiff's charge that the deposit provision is defective under Lindsey, defendant asserts that the nonrecognition of a constitutional right to adequate housing in Lindsey permits the State to regulate the landlord-tenant relationship in this particular manner. Defendant further contends that the deposit under examination here is distinguishable from the bond requirement before the Court in Lindsey because this deposit reasonably relates to the State's objective.
The fact that the Supreme Court found no constitutional guarantee to adequate housing is not dispositive of this case. Indeed, it was not dispositive of the bond issue before the Court in Lindsey. While the tenant may not enjoy a constitutionally protected right to have his premises maintained in accordance with minimal health and building standards, once the State recognizes such a right, it cannot be denied on grounds unrelated to the legislature's purpose:
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Moore v. Fowinkle
...a declaratory judgment that the statutory requirement for a security deposit is unconstitutional. In an opinion published at 381 F.Supp. 587 (E.D.Tenn.1974), the District Court held the requirement for a security deposit to be invalid under Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 92 S.Ct. 862, 31 L......
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