Moore v. Georgia
| Decision Date | 13 October 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-6914,86-6914 |
| Citation | 98 L.Ed.2d 204,108 S.Ct. 247,484 U.S. 904 |
| Parties | Linda S. MOORE v. GEORGIA |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
On petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979), this Court held that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction is constitutionally valid if the offender is not incarcerated. The following Term, however, in Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1585, 64 L.Ed.2d 169 (1980) (per curiam ), this Court held that such a conviction may not be used under an enhanced penalty statute to convert a subsequent misdemeanor conviction into a felony with a prison term.
Here, petitioner was convicted and sentenced to a prison term under Ga.Code Ann. § 40-6-391(C) (Supp.1987) which imposes a mandatory minimum sentence on a person convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol, where such person has at least two prior convictions for the same offense. Petitioner argued that Baldasar prohibited her conviction under § 40-6-391(C), because this conviction relied upon her two prior, uncounseled convictions for driving under the influence. The Court of Appeals of Georgia rejected this contention, and determined that Baldasar was inapplicable here because § 40-6-391(C) merely imposes a minimum prison term based on petitioner's prior convictions, and does not "increas[e] the maximum confinement authorized [or] conver[t] a misdemeanor offense into a felony." 181 Ga.App. 548, 549, 352 S.E.2d 821, 822 (1987) (emphasis added).
Possibly because this Court was sharply divided in Baldasar, with no opinion for reversal gaining more than three votes, courts attempting to apply that decision have come to different conclusions concerning its meaning. See Schindler v. Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F.2d 341, 344 (CA7 1983) () cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068, 104 S.Ct. 1419, 79 L.Ed.2d 745 (1984). Some courts have applied Baldasar as the Georgia court did here, and have allowed the use of prior, uncounseled convictions in cases quite similar to this one. E.g., Commonwealth v. Thomas, 510 Pa. 106, 112-114, 507 A.2d 57, 60-61 (1986); State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 175-176 (N.D.1985). Others, however, have read Baldasar more broadly, and have disallowed the use of prior, uncounseled convictions in prosecutions akin to petitioner's. E.g., State v. Oehm, 9 Kan.App.2d...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Moore
... ... Consequently, the resentencing panel's definition is not vague. It provides sufficient guidance to the sentencing authority "so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 96 S.Ct. 2909, ... Page 133 ... 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), and constitutes a " 'meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not,' " 428 U.S. at 188, 96 S.Ct. at 2932, quoting Furman v ... ...
-
Joubert v. Hopkins
... ... See Moore v. Clarke, 904 F.2d 1226, 1234-35 (8th Cir.1990) (F. Gibson, dissenting) (discussing Nebraska Supreme Court's pre-Palmer cases narrowing "exceptional ... Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255-56, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2968, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 201, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2938, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (no reason to assume the Georgia Supreme ... Page 1242 ... Court will not adopt ... ...
-
State v. Ryan
... ... bodies, concerning this particular aggravating circumstance, to prevent the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty ... " Moore v. Clarke, 904 F.2d 1226, 1234 (8th Cir.1990), reh'g denied 951 F.2d 895 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied 504 U.S. 930, 112 S.Ct. 1995, 118 L.Ed.2d 591 ... A death sentence is a "unique penalty" which implicates the 8th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2762, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). Whenever a State seeks to impose the death penalty, the ... ...
-
State v. Laurick
...a Georgia case in which a defendant received an enhanced penalty based on a prior uncounseled DWI conviction. Moore v. Georgia, 484 U.S. 904, 108 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed.2d 204 (1987). On Moore's later habeas corpus petition the Eleventh Circuit held that Baldasar does not forbid enhancing incar......