Moore v. Gloucester Cnty. Jail
| Decision Date | 05 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 13-6943 (RBK) (AMD) |
| Parties | VAUGHN ANTONIO MOORE, Plaintiff, v. GLOUCESTER COUNTY JAIL, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee incarcerated at the Gloucester County Jail in Woodbury, New Jersey. He is proceeding pro se with a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted based on the information contained therein and the Clerk will be ordered to file the complaint.
At this time, the Court must review the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from suit. For the reasons set forth below, the complaint will be dismissed.
The allegations of the complaint will be construed as true for purposes of this screening. Plaintiff names three defendants in this case: (1) Gloucester County Jail; (2) Sergeant Domanic Capanna; and (3) the Gloucester County Food Service Supervisor.
Plaintiff alleges that the Gloucester County Jail has no religious services for Muslims and does not allow Muslims to practice their religion freely. However, the thrust of the complaint centers on an incident that occurred on August 12, 2012, while plaintiff was detained at the Gloucester County Jail. He claims that he was let out of his jail cell at 4:00 a.m. on that date to receive his morning meal. It was Ramadan and plaintiff needed to eat before sunrise. Upon eating a scrambled egg sandwich, plaintiff states that he felt something in his mouth. It was a piece of a plastic bag. Plaintiff informed Officer Winslow who in turn informed Sergeant Capanna. Capanna ordered that plaintiff give him the plastic. After initially refusing, plaintiff eventually gave Capanna a small piece of the plastic.
Capanna then became upset with plaintiff and told him that he would not be receiving a food tray to replace the one that had the piece of a plastic bag in the eggs. Plaintiff informed Capanna that he believed he had swallowed some of the plastic. Capanna responded that since plaintiff did not choke or die that he would be "o.k." Capanna then told plaintiff that he would be getting smaller portions of food for the rest of Ramadan.
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (Apr. 26, 1996) ("PLRA"), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon whichrelief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
According to the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, "a pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim1, the complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the partyinjured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep't, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Plaintiff first names the Gloucester County Jail as a defendant and argues that the jail does not have religious services for Muslims. However, the Gloucester County Jail is not a proper defendant in this case. Indeed, the jail is not a "person" subject to suit under § 1983. See Parrish v. Ocean Cnty. Jail, No. 13-2020, 2013 WL 5554687, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 20, 2013) () (citations omitted); Ross v. Burlington Cnty. Jail, No. 12-338, 2013 WL 3514191, at *2 (D.N.J. July 11, 2013) () (citations omitted); Ruiz v. Stills, No. 09-4259, 2012 WL 762166, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2012) () (citations omitted). Accordingly, the claims against the Gloucester County Jail will be dismissed with prejudice as any potential amendment as to this particular defendant would be futile.
Plaintiff raises several claims against Capanna. Plaintiff alleges that Capanna violated his First Amendment rights by not allowing him to practice his religion freely and properly. Additionally, plaintiff claims that his constitutional rights were violated when he was subjected to and threatened to give up the piece of plastic that was found in his food. Plaintiff also asserts that his constitutional rights were violated when he was not given a replacement tray of food and when he was denied medical treatment by Capanna. Each of these claims is considered in turn.
Plaintiff states that Capanna violated his right to practice his religion properly or freely. The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. '"Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, . . . including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.'" DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 50 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). Nevertheless, Id. at 51.
In this case, plaintiff has identified that he is of the Muslim faith. "The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment is violated when the government has 'placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice' and no 'compelling governmental interests justifies the burden.'" Torres v. Davis, 506 F. App'x 98, 101 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quoting Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); see also Chavis v. United States, No. 14-2578, 2014 WL 3547851, at *5 (D.N.J. July 17, 2014). "In order to establish asubstantial burden, [a plaintiff] must . . . allege state action that is either compulsory or coercive in nature." Anspach ex rel. Anspach v. City of Phila. Dep't of Public Health, 503 F.3d 256, 272 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 621 (1992)) (remaining citations omitted).
Plaintiff does not allege facts in the complaint that Capanna placed a substantial burden of the observation of a central religious belief or practice. Indeed, plaintiff's 4:00 a.m. meal was because he was participating in his faith's practice of eating meals before sunrise during Ramadan. There are no allegations that Capanna substantially burdened plaintiff's ability to continue this practice during the holy period of Ramadan. Accordingly, the free exercise claim will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Plaintiff next alleges that Capanna violated his constitutional rights when he threatened plaintiff to give up the plastic that was found in his food. Plaintiff also alleges in the complaint that Capanna threatened him that he would be receiving smaller portions of food during Ramadan.
Allegations of threats or verbal harassment without more do not state a claim under § 1983. See Brown v. Hamilton Twp. Police Dep't Mercer Cnty., N.J., 547 F. App'x 96, 97 (3d Cir. 2013) (per...
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