Moore v. Goran, LLC, DA 17-0032
Docket Nº | DA 17-0032 |
Citation | 400 P.3d 729, 388 Mont. 340, 2017 MT 208 |
Case Date | August 22, 2017 |
388 Mont. 340
400 P.3d 729
2017 MT 208
Mark MOORE, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
GORAN, LLC and John Does 1-5, Defendants and Appellants.
DA 17-0032
Supreme Court of Montana.
Submitted on Briefs: June 28, 2017
Decided: August 22, 2017
For Appellants: W. Scott Mitchell, Brianne C. McClafferty, Holland & Hart LLP, Billings, Montana.
For Appellee: James R. Halverson, John L. Wright, Halverson, Mahlen & Wright, P.C., Billings, Montana.
Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 This appeal comes from the District Court's grant of a summary judgment motion in favor of Mark Moore.
¶2 We restate the issue on appeal as follows:
Did the District Court err when it granted summary judgment to Moore?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 Mark Moore (Moore) is the owner of the Moore gravel pit (Moore Pit) north of Red Lodge, Montana. Goran, LLC (Goran) is a Utah Limited Liability Company contracted by the Montana Department of Transportation (MDT) to build the Red Lodge Tied Projects. Moore and Goran entered into a contract (Contract) in which Moore agreed to provide Goran crushed aggregate material. Goran's form contract was used.
¶4 Moore loaded crushed aggregate onto Goran's trucks at the Moore Pit, where it was weighed and the driver of Goran's truck would sign for and receive a weight ticket. Each week Moore would send an invoice to Goran for the crushed aggregate, measured by the ton at the Moore Pit; Goran paid the invoices. Once Goran had removed all of the materials from the Moore Pit it needed, Goran refused to pay the final invoices. Moore sued for breach of contract, violation of the Montana Prompt Payment Act, and unjust enrichment. Goran filed a counterclaim for breach of contract, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment.
¶5 In the District Court, Goran argued it overpaid Moore for the materials it took from the Moore Pit. Moore disagreed, arguing that Goran clearly took material from the Moore Pit and then refused to pay. Goran argued the Contract did not specify how the parties would measure the amount of material taken from the Moore Pit and that the materials should be measured by volume by MDT at the Red Lodge Tied Projects.1 Moore argues the Contract requires measurement of the material by weight and that the only evidence of the material Goran took possession of was the measurements in tons at the Moore Pit scales.
¶6 Moore moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Contract unambiguously required Goran to base payment on the tonnage of crushed aggregate weighed by Moore's scales. The District Court agreed with Moore and granted his motion. The
District Court determined Goran breached the Contract by refusing to pay for the crushed aggregate material. The District Court determined that Goran
was unjustly enriched and owes Moore $66,269.952 for the crushed aggregate it removed, as measured by the Moore Pit scale. The District Court granted attorney's fees to Moore, as the prevailing party. Goran appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7 We review de novo a district court's grant or denial of summary judgment, applying the same criteria of M. R. Civ. P. 56 as a district court. Pilgeram v. GreenPoint Mortg. Funding, Inc. , 2013 MT 354, ¶ 9, 373 Mont. 1, 313 P.3d 839. The construction and interpretation of a written agreement are questions of law that we review for correctness. Ophus v. Fritz , 2000 MT 251, ¶ 19, 301 Mont. 447, 11 P.3d 1192 ; Mary J. Baker Revocable Trust v. Cenex Harvest States, Coops., Inc. , 2007 MT 159, ¶ 19, 338 Mont. 41, 164 P.3d 851. If the Supreme Court reaches the same conclusion as the District Court, but on different grounds, it may affirm the district court's judgment. Johnson Farms, Inc. v. Halland , 2012 MT 215, ¶ 11, 366 Mont. 299, 291 P.3d 1096.
DISCUSSION
¶8 Did the District Court err when it granted summary judgment to Moore?
¶9 Goran argues the District Court erred when it granted summary judgment to Moore; the District Court was presented with conflicting evidence regarding the amount of crushed aggregate removed from the Moore Pit, which created an issue of material fact. Goran asserts the District Court resolved this issue of material fact by improperly interpreting the Contract. Specifically, Goran asserts the District Court ignored the payment terms of Paragraph 3 and created its own definition of the term "project," in the Contract.
¶10 The District Court determined that, based on the language of the Contract that "delivery to the project" occurred when the crushed aggregate was loaded onto Goran's trucks at the Moore Pit. Goran argues the District Court's interpretation of the Contract language "delivered to the project" was incorrect.
¶11 A contract is to be taken together, as a whole, to give effect to every part if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other. Section 28-3-202, MCA. When interpreting a written contract, the court should determine the intention of the parties from
the writing alone if possible. Section 28-3-303, MCA. A court's duty is to enforce contracts as they are written, not to make new ones for the parties. Hein v. Fox , 126 Mont. 514, 521, 254 P.2d 1076, 1080 (1953). The interpretation of a contract is a question of law. Ophus , ¶ 19.
¶12 Initially we note that while Goran asserts MDT measurement by volume can be used to determine the amount of material removed from the pit, the Contract clearly indicates that the crushed aggregate material was to be bought and sold by the ton. As such, the MDT measurements by volume were not contemplated in the Contract between Moore and Goran. The only measurement available to the parties of the crushed aggregate in tons was the Moore Pit scales. The Contract requires the material to be weighed at the Moore Pit scales by the ton and the parties practice was for Goran to be invoiced based on those weights.
¶13 Goran argues that based on the Contract it owes Moore for material actually delivered to the project, that the term project was defined in the Contract as the "RED LODGE TIED PROJECTS," and therefore delivery could take place nowhere else.
¶14 However, Goran inserts language into the Contract by giving "project" a different meaning that the one actually used in the Contract. The contract specifically defines "project" within the general terms section. It is defined as "the construction project for which GORAN is arranging with SUPPLIER to purchase goods and/or services hereunder."
As defined in the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Folsom v. Mont. Pub. Employees' Ass'n, Inc., DA 16-0394
...has had an even higher standard of punitive damages liability than the common law standard articulated in Akins . Punitive damages are 400 P.3d 729available under Montana law only upon proof of "actual fraud" or "actual malice" by "clear and convincing evidence." Section 27-1-221(1), (5), a......
-
Donnes, Inc. v. Four Beers, Inc., DA 21-0304
...pretrial order. c. Attorney Fees for Unjust Enrichment ¶29 Donnes argues that the District Court erred by relying on Moore v. Goran, LLC, 2017 MT 208, 388 Mont. 340, 400 P.3d 729, in awarding attorney fees to Stillwater Excavating on Donnes's unjust enrichment claim. ¶30 The District Court ......
-
Orr v. Orr, DA 17-0095
...¶8 The construction and interpretation of a written agreement are questions of law that we review for correctness. Moore v. Goran, LLC , 2017 MT 208, ¶ 7, 388 Mont. 340, 400 P.3d 729 (citations omitted).DISCUSSION¶9 Did the District Court err when it determined that maintenance, incorporate......
-
Wallace v. Law Offices of Bruce M. Spencer, PLLC, DA 20-0611
...evidence must be material and of a substantial nature, not fanciful, frivolous, gauzy or merely suspicious.’ " Moore v. Goran, LLC , 2017 MT 208, ¶ 24, 388 Mont. 340, 400 P.3d 729 (internal citation omitted).¶13 The District Court further reasoned that, "because Wallace's claims for [IIED],......
-
Folsom v. Mont. Pub. Employees' Ass'n, Inc., DA 16-0394
...has had an even higher standard of punitive damages liability than the common law standard articulated in Akins . Punitive damages are 400 P.3d 729available under Montana law only upon proof of "actual fraud" or "actual malice" by "clear and convincing evidence." Section 27-1-221(1), (5), a......
-
Donnes, Inc. v. Four Beers, Inc., DA 21-0304
...pretrial order. c. Attorney Fees for Unjust Enrichment ¶29 Donnes argues that the District Court erred by relying on Moore v. Goran, LLC, 2017 MT 208, 388 Mont. 340, 400 P.3d 729, in awarding attorney fees to Stillwater Excavating on Donnes's unjust enrichment claim. ¶30 The District Court ......
-
Orr v. Orr, DA 17-0095
...¶8 The construction and interpretation of a written agreement are questions of law that we review for correctness. Moore v. Goran, LLC , 2017 MT 208, ¶ 7, 388 Mont. 340, 400 P.3d 729 (citations omitted).DISCUSSION¶9 Did the District Court err when it determined that maintenance, incorporate......
-
Wallace v. Law Offices of Bruce M. Spencer, PLLC, DA 20-0611
...evidence must be material and of a substantial nature, not fanciful, frivolous, gauzy or merely suspicious.’ " Moore v. Goran, LLC , 2017 MT 208, ¶ 24, 388 Mont. 340, 400 P.3d 729 (internal citation omitted).¶13 The District Court further reasoned that, "because Wallace's claims for [IIED],......