Moore v. Grady Mem'l Hosp. Corp.
| Decision Date | 20 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-11739,18-11739 |
| Parties | RONALD E. MOORE, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GRADY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL CORPORATION, FULTON-DEKALB HOSPITAL AUTHORITY, d.b.a. Grady Health System, KENNETH J. CARNEY, M.D., RAPHAEL GERSHON, M.D., KELVIN J. HOLLOWAY, M.D., et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
Non-Argument Calendar
D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-03534-ODE
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
Ronald E. Moore, M.D. appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to Grady Memorial Hospital, and related defendants, on his workplace discrimination and retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Dr. Moore argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to amend his complaint after concluding that his proposed amendment would be futile. Dr. Moore also contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Grady after concluding that he had no valid contractual right upon which to base his § 1981 claims. After a careful review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm.
The allegations surrounding Dr. Moore's claims are well known to the parties and were described in detail in a previous appeal. See Moore v. Grady Mem'l Hosp. Corp., 834 F.3d 1168, 1169-71 (11th Cir. 2016) ("Moore I"). We recount the material facts here, as developed during discovery.
Dr. Moore is a licensed, board-certified general surgeon and a specialist in laparoscopic and advanced robotic surgery. In 2011, Morehouse School of Medicine ("MSM") recruited Dr. Moore, an African-American male, to its faculty. Dr. Moore's employment agreement with MSM comprised of three separateappointment letters that MSM sent to Dr. Moore in 2012, 2013, and 2014, as well as MSM's bylaws, which were referenced in the appointment letters. The 2012 letter offered Dr. Moore a conditional appointment as a "Provisional Instructor" until he was approved as an "Assistant Professor." The 2013 letter incorporated the terms of the 2012 letter and confirmed his appointment as an "Assistant Professor." The 2014 letter then renewed Dr. Moore's 2013 appointment. We summarize these letters below.
The 2012 appointment letter included the following provision: D.E. 98-7 at 2. While holding a full-time appointment at MSM, 75% of Dr. Moore's time and effort would be devoted to medical services, counseling patients or families, administrative tasks, and clinical services. Dr. Ed Childs, the Chair of the Department of Surgery at MSM, had the authority to assign and change Dr. Moore's work duties. Dr. Moore would not be entitled to receive additional compensation for his clinical practice beyond his stated salary.
Dr. Moore signed similar appointment letters in 2013 and 2014. The 2013 appointment letter stated that "[a]ll other terms and conditions of your previousappointment letter shall remain in full force." D.E. 98-14 at 1. The 2014 appointment letter reiterated that "while holding a full-time appointment at the Morehouse School of Medicine, [Dr. Moore was] not permitted to practice medicine other than as a member of [the faculty practice plan]." D.E. 98-18 at 2. Both the 2013 and 2014 appointment letters also made Dr. Moore's employment contingent upon entering into a separate employment contract with MSM's faculty practice plan to deliver clinical services.
To comply with his clinical practice requirements under the agreement, Dr. Moore applied for and was granted clinical privileges at Grady Memorial Hospital ("Grady") in Atlanta, Georgia. Since 2001, MSM and Grady have had an affiliation agreement for clinical services whereby MSM's physicians, through MSM's faculty practice plan, would provide medical care to Grady's patients and train MSM's medical students.
For reasons not relevant to this appeal, Grady suspended Dr. Moore's clinical privileges in July of 2013. This prevented Dr. Moore from performing clinical services at Grady as required by the agreement. Dr. Moore was nevertheless paid his full salary and several bonus payments for that term. Further, despite his privileges being suspended, Dr. Moore's appointment was renewed in 2014.
In early January of 2015, Dr. Moore received a letter advising him that MSM would not renew his faculty appointment unless he "obtain[ed] clinical privileges within the next six months." Dr. Moore subsequently applied for and obtained privileges at Piedmont Atlanta Hospital and Dekalb Medical Center in March of 2015, but resigned from MSM soon thereafter. MSM continued to pay Dr. Moore his full salary through June 30, 2015.
In October of 2013, Dr. Moore sued Grady and multiple related defendants, alleging violations of § 1981; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.; and 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Dr. Moore also asserted two state-law claims—one for breach of MSM's bylaws and the other for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
"Among the many statutes that combat racial discrimination, § 1981 . . . has a specific function: It protects the equal right of '[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States' to 'make and enforce contracts' without respect to race." Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 474-75 (2006) (quoting § 1981(a)). "To state a claim of race discrimination under § 1981, plaintiffs must allege facts establishing: (1) that the plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) that the defendant intended to discriminate on the basis of race; and (3) that the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute."Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004) (). Such enumerated activities include the right to "make and enforce contracts." § 1981(a), (b). Therefore, "[a]ny claim brought under § 1981 . . . must initially identify an impaired 'contractual relationship,' § 1981(b), under which the plaintiff has rights." Domino's Pizza, 546 U.S. at 476 (footnote omitted).
In the previous appeal, we concluded that the district court erred in dismissing Dr. Moore's § 1981 claims and held that Dr. Moore's contract with MSM could satisfy § 1981's contract requirement, possibly allowing him to bring suit against Grady. See Moore I, 834 F.3d at 1174, 1176. On remand, the magistrate judge therefore considered "whether there was even a valid and enforceable contract in place [between Dr. Moore and MSM] that could have been impaired[.]" D.E. 115 at 2.
Following remand, Dr. Moore filed a motion to amend his complaint to restate state-law claims that the district court had dismissed in the first appeal and to raise three new state-law claims for tortious interference. The magistrate judge denied Dr. Moore's motion to amend, concluding that amendment would be futile. Dr. Moore did not object to or appeal the magistrate judge's decision prior to this appeal.
After some discovery on the issue of whether Dr. Moore had a valid contract with MSM on which to base his § 1981 claims, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The magistrate judge issued a report recommending that the district courtgrant summary judgment to the defendants. The report concluded that Dr. Moore entered into a contractual relationship with MSM, but that he violated the exclusivity provisions of the agreement prior to Grady's alleged interference by practicing medicine outside his relationship with MSM. The relevant facts follow.
From October of 2005 until at least 2016, Dr. Moore was also employed by a Florida corporation, Trauma and Critical Care Associates, Inc. ("TCCA"). As a TCCA employee, Dr. Moore provided trauma services at Broward General Medical Center in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Broward General's records show that from August 1, 2012 through December of 2014, Dr. Moore performed over 500 procedures and over 200 outpatient services. These procedures resulted in Dr. Moore earning $98,453 in 2012, $87,372 in 2013, and $74,304 in 2014.
At the same time, Dr. Moore owned and operated Minimally Invasive Surgery, Inc. ("MIS"), a Florida corporation. Dr. Moore conducted his private solo medical practice through MIS. In his employment application for MSM, Dr. Moore represented that he would stop working for MIS if he accepted the position at MSM. The Florida Secretary of State's records, however, show that MIS filed annual reports from 2012 through 2015, and MIS' tax returns reflect a six-figure gross income for Dr. Moore every year from 2012 to 2014. Dr. Moore's federal tax filings reported that, from 2012 to 2014, MIS was his primary medical practice and claimed that the time he spent working in Atlanta for MSM was out-of-town travel for MIS.
Owing to these breaches, the district court concluded that Dr. Moore could no longer rely on his agreement with MSM to satisfy the contractual element of his § 1981 claims. See Domino's Pizza, 546 U.S. at 476. The district court fully adopted the magistrate judge's report and overruled Dr. Moore's objections. This appeal followed.
We first address Dr. Moore's argument that the magistrate judge erred in denying his motion to amend after concluding that amendment would be futile. We then turn to whether the district court properly granted summary judgment on Dr. Moore's § 1981 claims.
Dr. Moore contends that the magistrate judge should have allowed him to amend his complaint to reassert state-law claims, which the district court dismissed without prejudice before his first appeal, and to bring new state-law claims for tortious interference. The magistrate judge denied Dr. Moore's motion to amend because it...
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