Moore v. Haviland

• Decision Date: 01 May 1889
• Citation: 17 A. 725,61 Vt. 58
• Parties: H. C. MOORE v. B. F. HAVILAND
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

17 A. 725

61 Vt. 58

H. C. MOORE v. B. F. HAVILAND

Supreme Court of Vermont

May 1, 1889

GENERAL TERM, OCTOBER, 1888.

This was an action for the false warranty of soundness in the sale of a horse. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the December term of Caledonia County Court, 1887, TAFT, J presiding. Verdict for the defendant, exceptions by the plaintiff.

The judgment of the County Court is affirmed.

Ide & Stafford, for the plaintiff.

OPINION

ROSS

I. There was no error in the exclusion of the defendant's representations made to Kirk when acting as the agent of another proposed purchaser of the horse through the agency of Kirk. Representations to an agent are in law representations to his principal. It would be illogical to hold that representations to an agent, acting for A., without being alluded to, entered into a subsequent transaction concerning the same subject matter conducted through the same agent for B. It does not follow that the seller would make the same representations at a subsequent time, which he made on a former occasion, nor that he would make the same representations in a trade with B. for the sale of an article, which he previously made in attempting to effect a sale of the same article to A. The article might, to his knowledge, have changed during the intervening time, or he might not desire, upon reflection, to abide by the representations he had made to A. But if this were not so the plaintiff, on his own testimony, relied upon the representations which the defendant made to him in person, when he and Kirk were present and examined the horse, and on his telegram to Kirk, which the jury must have found was never communicated to the defendant.

II. While the defendant contended that the horse was not a whistler at the time of the sale nor ever thereafter, he gave no evidence of his condition after he parted with the possession of the horse July 20. On the issue made by the evidence it was immaterial to compare the condition of the horse on July 21st and August 14th, as was done by the interrogatory and answer excluded in the deposition of Webber. No harmful legal error could arise out of this exclusion. While it is apparent that the evidence might have been such as to put in issue the condition of the horse August 14th, as compared with his condition July 21st, unless it did so, the court might well treat the comparison as immaterial. The exclusion of immaterial testimony cannot be held error. To render testimony legally admissible, it must be material to some issue on trial. The plaintiff contends that the condition of the horse August 14th was a disputed point. It was so by the claim of the defendant, but not by any evidence introduced by him. If on the evidence his condition August 14th was in contention, that fact would not necessarily render a comparison of his condition on that day with his condition July 21st material. We think from the exceptions bearing on this point, it is apparent the plaintiff did not suffer any legal injury by the exclusion of the comparison, and the exception is unsustained.

III. The...