Moore v. Henderson Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't
| Decision Date | 30 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-1243,13-1243 |
| Parties | CAREY "SAMMY" MOORE and JANICE JOHNSON, Plaintiffs, v. HENDERSON COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, HENDERSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, SHERIFF BRIAN DUKE, in his official capacity, VICTOR STANFORD, individually, HEATH DELANEY, individually, CITY OF SCOTTS HILL, SCOTTS HILL POLICE DEPARTMENT, and WES WOODWARD, individually, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;
GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' RULE 56(d) MOTION; AND
Plaintiffs, Carey "Sammy" Moore and Janice Johnson, brought this action against the City of Scotts Hill, the Scotts Hill Police Department, and Wes Woodward, in an amended complaint filed December 31, 2013 alleging violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and provisions of Tennessee common law. (D.E. 9.) Before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Plaintiffs' responsive motion to take discovery under Rule 56(d), to which Defendants have replied.
Plaintiffs filed the original complaint in this civil rights action against Henderson County, Tennessee, the Henderson County Sheriff's Department, Henderson County Sheriff, Brian Duke, and various other individuals on August 26, 2013. (D.E. 1.) Plaintiffs alleged that on August 27, 2012, they were awakened in their bedroom by Henderson County law enforcement officers, with weapons drawn, who had entered the home without permission or a warrant. Moore and Johnson claim the officers extensively searched the home before discovering they had come to the wrong location in search for a pontoon boat thief. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-23.) Plaintiffs explained that they named a number of possible individuals in the complaint after attempts to ascertain the officers' identities were frustrated by the unresponsive Sheriff's Department. (Id. at ¶¶19, 23.)
On December 18, 2013, Henderson County, the Henderson County Sheriff's Department, and Heath Delaney filed an answer to the complaint in which they stated as an affirmative defense that "they acted on presumably reliable information provided to them by Scotts Hills Police Department officer Wes Woodard [sic], and therefore [they] did not act intentionally, recklessly, or negligently." (D.E. 7 at ¶ 52.) They further stated that "the negligence of third parties was the sole proximate cause of the damages claimed by the Plaintiffs, to the extent Plaintiffs have compensable damages." (Id. at ¶ 53.)
On December 31, 2013, Moore and Johnson submitted an amended complaint adding the City of Scotts Hill, Tennessee, the Scotts Hill Police Department, and Wes Woodward as defendants (collectively the "Scotts Hill Defendants" or "Defendants").1 (D.E. 9.) Waivers of service for these defendants were returned executed on January 20, 2014, (D.E. 14) and their answer was filed on February 6, 2014 (D.E. 15). On March 19, 2014, this Court entered an orderdismissing Heath Delaney, Brian Duke, Victor Stanford, Henderson County, and the Henderson County Sheriff's Department from this lawsuit, leaving only the Scotts Hill Defendants remaining. (D.E. 22.)
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." "A dispute about a material fact is genuine 'if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.'" Smith v. Perkins Bd. of Educ., 708 F.3d 821, 825 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ford v. Gen. Motors Corp., 305 F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 2002)). A court's function at the summary judgment stage is not to "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter[,]" but it is "to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); see Bobo v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 665 F.3d 741, 748 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505) ("Credibility determinations . . . and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.")
The moving party has the initial burden to "show that there is no dispute regarding any genuine issue of material fact." Slusher v. Carson, 540 F.3d 449, 453 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing GMC v. Lanard Toys, 468 F.3d 405, 412 (6th Cir. 2006)); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). If the motion is properly supported, "the opposing party must go beyond the contents of its pleadings to set forth specific facts that indicate the existence of an issue to be litigated." Slusher, 540 F.3d at 453 (citation omitted). A court must grant summary judgment "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, againsta party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548; see In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 665 (6th Cir. 2001) (same). Finally, although a court does not weigh the evidence at this stage, it "must view all evidence and draw any reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party." Demyanovich v. Cadon Plating & Coatings, L.L.C., __F.3d _, _, No. 13-1015, 2014 WL 1259603, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar. 28, 2014) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986)).
Generally, a party must support its assertions of fact "by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). However, "[i]f a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).
The Court will first consider Defendants' argument that the amended complaint was not timely filed. Unlike the remainder of Defendants' arguments, Plaintiffs did respond to the merits of this averment.
A federal civil rights action in Tennessee must be initiated within one-year from when the cause of action accrued. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3); Moore v. Tennessee, 267 F. App'x450, 455 (6th Cir. 2008). The limitations period for these claims is borrowed from state law, but the accrual date is a question of federal law and is typically the day on which "the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action." Eidson v. Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2007). Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs' civil rights claims accrued on August 27, 2012, when the law enforcement officers entered their home, and thus, the statute of limitations ran on August 27, 2013. Moore and Johnson's original complaint was timely filed on August 26, 2013, (D.E. 1) however, the amended complaint naming Defendants was not submitted until December 31, 2013—126 days beyond the applicable one-year statute of limitations (D.E. 9). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3). As a result, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' federal claims should be dismissed because the amended complaint was untimely under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 and failed to meet the requirements for relation back under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). (D.E. 17-1 at 5-6.)
Moore and Johnson acknowledge that the claims against Defendants were filed outside the prescribed one-year limit, but insist that the complaint was nonetheless timely presented pursuant to the savings statute found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119, (D.E. 23 at 2-3) which provides in pertinent part that:
This provision was enacted in response to Tennessee's shift from a contributory negligence system to one of modified comparative fault. Mann v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 380 S.W.3d 42, 46 (Tenn. 2012); see also McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tenn. 1992) (). Its purpose is "to provide a plaintiff 'with a fair opportunity to bring before the trial court all persons who caused or contributed to the plaintiff's injuries.'" Becker v. Ford Motor Co., ___ S.W.3d ___, ___, No. M2013-02546-SC-R23-CV, 2014 WL 901510, at *4 (Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014) (quoting Mann, 380 S.W.3d at 50). The ...
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