Moore v. It's All Good Auto Sales, Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 October 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–2758–STA–cgc.,11–2758–STA–cgc.
• Citation: 907 F.Supp.2d 915
• Parties: Valerie MOORE, Plaintiff, v. IT'S ALL GOOD AUTO SALES, INC. and Mark Goodfellow, individually and d/b/a It's All Good Auto Sales, Inc., and Jimmy Foley, individually and as an agent of It's All Good Auto Sales, Inc., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

907 F.Supp.2d 915

Valerie MOORE, Plaintiff,

v.IT'S ALL GOOD AUTO SALES, INC. and Mark Goodfellow, individually and d/b/a It's All Good Auto Sales, Inc., and Jimmy Foley, individually and as an agent of It's All Good Auto Sales, Inc., Defendants.

No. 11–2758–STA–cgc.

United States District Court,

W.D. Tennessee,

Western Division.

Oct. 1, 2012.

Frank S. Cantrell, Craig P. Barnes, Memphis Area Legal Services, Inc., Memphis, TN, for Plaintiff.

Evan Nahmias, McDonald Kuhn, Memphis, TN, for Defendants.

ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND OVERRULING DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS

S. THOMAS ANDERSON, District Judge.

Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation of Defendants' (sic) Mark Goodfellow and It's All Good Auto Sales, Inc's Motion to Dismiss (D.E. # 19) entered by United States Magistrate Judge Charmiane G. Claxton on August 30, 2012. Also before the Court is Defendants' (sic) Mark Goodfellow and It's All Good Auto Sales, Inc.'s Objections to the Report and Recommendations Denying Motion to Dismiss (D.E. # 20), timely filed on September 12, 2012. For the reasons stated below, the Report and Recommendation is hereby ADOPTED and Defendants' Objections to same are OVERRULED.

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural Background

Plaintiff Valerie Moore (“Moore” or “Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint (D.E. # 1) on September 2, 2011, alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq. (“RICO”); the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq. (“TILA”) and Federal Reserve Regulation Z (“Reg Z”) (implementing TILA), 12 C.F.R. Part 226; the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, T.C.A. § 47–18–101, et seq. (“TCPA”), the Tennessee Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”); and common law causes of action for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. Defendants Mark Goodfellow (“Goodfellow”) and It's All Good Auto Sales, Inc. (“IAG”) filed a Motion to Dismiss (D.E. # 11) on November 9, 2011, stating that Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's claims. The Court Referred this Motion to Dismiss to Magistrate Judge Charmiane G. Claxton (D.E. # 17) on June 1, 2012. The Magistrate Judge entered a Report and Recommendation regarding this Motion to Dismiss on August 30, 2012.

II. Plaintiff's Allegations of Fact

For the purposes of the instant Report and Recommendation, the Court accepts the following facts as true: ¹

Moore is a 51 year old African American Woman residing in Shelby County, Tennessee. (Compl. ¶ 11). On or about September 4, 2010, Moore visited IAG to shop for a vehicle. (Compl. ¶ 12, 13). Moore visited IAG because it is a “major used-car dealer in Memphis,” because of its convenient location, and because of “numerous” advertisements in various media, including television, radio, and internet. (Compl. ¶ 14). These advertisements included a statement by Goodfellow that “I Don't Care About Your Credit. I Care About You.” Id.

Upon arrival at IAG, Moore saw a number of used luxury and sports cars parked towards the front of the lot, all of which appeared to be in good condition. (Compl. ¶ 15). A “few” of the cars had prices marked, but the rest did not have a price tag or any other notices in their windows. Id. A salesman greeted Moore, and inquired how much she had for a down payment. Moore informed him she had “$600 in her pocket for the down payment.” (Compl. ¶ 16). The salesman proceeded to show Moore several cars, includinga 1994 Toyota Camry. (Compl. ¶ 17). The salesman did not permit Moore to test drive the Camry on the road, but only in the lot. Id. The salesman told Moore that she would need a down payment of $800 to purchase the Camry, at which point Moore reiterated she only had $600. Id.

During the discussion of the down payment for the Camry, Defendant Jimmy Foley (“Foley”) introduced himself to Moore. (Compl. ¶ 18). Foley informed Moore that the down payment for the Camry would be $1000. Id. Moore once again stated she only had $600. Foley told her “We can work something out with you, we can work something out.” Id.

Moore completed a form with some personal information and Foley produced a contract for sale for the Camry. (Compl. ¶ 19). Foley drew Moore's attention away from certain numbers, such as the cash down payment, the deferred down payment, annual percentage rate (“APR”) and other disclosures mandated by TILA and towards a series of other numbers—the “quickpay.” (Compl. ¶ 20). Foley described three “quickpays,” without defining the term “quickpay.” Id. Moore understood the “quickpays” to be her down payment of $1000 for the Camry. (Compl. ¶ 22). After signing the contract and visiting her newborn great-granddaughter in the hospital, Moore took a closer look at the contract's terms. (Compl. ¶ 24). From the face of the contract, it appeared that the total down payment was $1520, not the $1000 discussed with Foley. Id.

Moore returned to IAG the next morning as soon as the dealership opened. (Compl. ¶ 25). Moore asked Foley why the down payment was $1520 instead of $1000. Id. Foley stated the $520 was sales tax. Id. Moore inquired why IAG had charged her twice for sales tax, indicating that line 7 of the sales contract showed a charge of $518.20 for sales tax. Id. Foley then discussed “quickpay” without defining the term, failing to answer Moore's questions. Id.

Moore returned to IAG on September 6th to speak to Goodfellow. (Compl. ¶ 27). Moore told Goodfellow about the discrepancy in her down payment, and also informed him that the car had begun to make a “knocking” sound. Id. Moore asked for a refund, a request Goodfellow refused. Id. Goodfellow told Moore that if she did not want the vehicle any longer, she could leave it on the lot. Id. The Court infers that this was so Goodfellow could resell the vehicle and apply the sales price to the balance of the sales contract. Although Moore “believed she had been cheated,” she chose to keep the vehicle because she did not want to lose the $650 down payment she had already made. (Compl. ¶ 28). Moore made timely payments on the “quickpays” in the amount of $870 and three regular payments of $250. Id. All told, Moore paid $2270 to IAG towards the purchase of the Camry. Id.

After the September 6th visit to IAG, Moore continued to have problems with the car. Id. IAG agreed to repair the vehicle in exchange for adding the cost of repairs to the amount of the sales contract. Id. Despite these repairs, the Camry continued to have problems and sometime in November 2010, the car suffered a complete breakdown. (Compl. ¶ 29). Three mechanics were unable to get the Camry to start. (Compl. ¶ 30). Moore contacted Goodfellow to tell him the vehicle was inoperable. (Compl. ¶ 31). Goodfellow told her to “fix the car.” Id. Moore informed him she could not afford to do so. Id. Goodfellow then asked her to bring the car to IAG, which Moore stated she could not do as it was inoperable. Id. Goodfellow suggested that Moore have the vehicle towed, which Moore said she could not afford. Id. Finally, Goodfellow offered to send his own tow truck, which Moore accepted.Id. The tow truck picked up the Camry later that day. Id.

Moore then called Goodfellow to find out when her car would be ready. (Compl. ¶ 32). Goodfellow replied that he did not know, because he had hundreds of other cars to get ready for “tax time.” Id. Moore determined from this conversation that Goodfellow and IAG had no intention of making repairs anytime soon. (Compl. ¶ 33). Believing she had been “lied to during and after the sale of the car,” Moore contacted an attorney, who drafted a rescission letter. (Compl. ¶¶ 33–34). When Moore visited IAG to deliver the rescission letter and collect her belongings from the Camry, she found the Camry in a “remote lot-nowhere near the dealership's repair shop.” (Compl. ¶ 35). From this, she deduced that IAG had no intention of repairing the vehicle. Id. In February, Moore received notice that IAG would sell the Camry in a public sale. (Compl. ¶ 36).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court has authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) to review de novo any portions of a Magistrate Judge's report to which objections are made. ² Furthermore, the Court must review all issues raised by Plaintiff's objections.³

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”) challenges a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This motion only tests whether the plaintiff has pleaded a cognizable claim.⁴ A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss meritless claims which would otherwise waste judicial resources on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.⁵ In determining whether it should grant a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must examine the complaint to determine whether the complaint contains a short and plain statement of the claim showing the plaintiff is entitled to relief.⁶ The court must also examine the complaint to determine whether the defendant has provided fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.⁷ While a complaint need not present detailed factual allegations, to be cognizable it must provide more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not suffice.⁸ The complaint must give a factual foundation, and the mere possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some set of undisclosed facts to support recovery is insufficient to survive a 12(b)(6) challenge.⁹ The facts, as pleaded, must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.¹⁰ The complaint must contain sufficient factual matters to state a claim that is plausible on its face.¹¹

When reviewing a complaint pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most...