Moore v. Juvenal

• Citation: 92 Pa. 484
• Parties: Moore <I>versus</I> Juvenal.
• Decision Date: 01 March 1880
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

92 Pa. 484

Moore versus Juvenal.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

January 19, 1880.

March 1, 1880.

January 19th 1880.

Before SHARSWOOD, C. J., MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON, TRUNKEY and STERRETT, JJ. GREEN, J., absent

Error to the Court of Common Pleas, No. 1, of Philadelphia county: Of January Term 1880, No. 20.

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J. Warren Coulston and Robert D. Benedict, for plaintiffs in error.—The relation of attorney and client existed until 1870, and the statute did not begin to run until the termination of that relation: McCoon v. Galbraith, 5 Casey 293. When the professional relation involves a series of acts and duties, an attorney is not liable until the relation is dissolved: Glenn v. Cuttle, 2 Grant's Cases 273. The action was rescued from the operation of the statute by the repeated promises to commence the action: Yaw v. Kerr, 11 Wright 333.

It would seem a necessary conclusion that the attorney's right to compensation for a given service, and the client's right of action for the attorney's negligence in the performance of the service, must arise at the same time, and be effected in the same way by the statute.

If the court, then, in the interest of attorneys, hold that their right of action for services is not affected by the Statute of Limitations until the termination of the relation of attorney and client, why must they not, in the light of even-handed justice, hold that the client's right of action for negligence in performing those services, is to stand on the same footing? Hale's Ex'r v. Ard's Exr's., 12 Wright 22; Lichty v. Hughes, 5 P. F. Smith 434. The action could not be brought until 1870, for the negligence was not discovered until that time: Derrickson v. Cady, 7 Barr 27; Morgan v. Tener, 2 Norris 305; Leasure v. Mahoning Township, 8 Watts 551. The agent cannot set up the statute where he has misled the principal and induced him to delay his action: Wickersham v. Lee, No. 1, 2 Norris 421. An attorney acting wrongfully, even under a wrong impression, is liable: Cox v. Livingston, 2 W. & S. 103.

John A. Brown, Thomas J. Diehl and George W. Thorne, for defendants in error.—The breach of duty being laid in the declaration as of May 23d 1859, it was, in view of this, that the defendant asked the court to charge as set forth in the the third point.

The English rule, in actions on the case for negligence, where the declaration alleges a breach of duty, and a special consequential damage, is that the cause of action is the breach of duty, and not the consequential damage; and the statute runs from the time when the breach of duty is committed, and not from the time the consequential damage accrued: Howell v. Young, 8 Dowl. & Ry. 14; 5 Barn. & Cress. 259; per Burnside, J., in Derrickson v. Cady, 7 Barr 31.

An attorney who collects money for his principal, is bound to pay it over at once, and his neglect to do so is a breach of the implied contract, for which an action of assumpsit will lie. The Statute of Limitations begins to run from the time the right of action accrues, and not from the time when notice is given of the receipt of the money, unless there has been fraudulent concealment on the part of the attorney. Fraud has no place in this controversy, nor was it at any time alleged. This case is governed by Campbell v. Boggs, 12 Wright 525, and Rhines v. Evans, 16 P. F. Smith 192.

Mr. Justice STERRETT delivered the opinion of the court, March 1st 1880.

The breach of professional duty on which this action is founded is the omission of defendant's testator to commence proceedings for the recovery of a claim against the Green and Coates Streets Passenger Railway Company, until after the same was barred by the Statute of Limitations.

The defence was twofold: 1st. That the duties he owed to his clients were faithfully discharged and hence he was not liable for the loss of their claim. 2d. That this suit, having been brought more than six years after the alleged cause of action accrued, was barred by the statute.

The first branch of the defence was withdrawn from the jury, and they were instructed to render a verdict for the plaintiffs subject to the opinion of the court on the question of law, as to the effect of the Statute of Limitations, raised by the defendants' first, second, third and seventh points. The court in banc gave judgment in favor of the defendants non obstante veredicto; and thus they were not in a position to complain of the ruling of the court on the first branch of their defence.

It was agreed that the facts, upon which the question of law was reserved, are embodied in the opinion of the court below; and the single question presented is whether upon the admitted facts the action was barred by the statute.

It appears that the alleged breach of duty must have occurred, if at all, prior to 1866. It is not claimed that anything was done or omitted to be done after that time whereby the plaintiffs were injured. The special damage complained of had all been done before, although it was not known or fully realized until 1870, when by the final judgment of this court in the case of the railway company above named against the present plaintiffs in error (14 P. F. Smith 79), it was determined that the claim, with the collection of which defendants' testator had been intrusted, was barred by the statute, because proceedings had not been commenced within six years after the right of action had accrued. The negligence complained of began after the decree of May 23d 1859, and must have been complete in six years thereafter, when the statute had run in favor of the railway company, so as to be an absolute bar to the plaintiffs' claim in that case. The defendants' testator, believing that the appraisement made in favor of the plaintiffs was in the nature of a legal award, and that they had twenty years within which to bring their action, delayed...