Moore v. Lalone (In re Moore)

• Decision Date: 30 June 2015
• Docket Number: Bankr. No. 13–70150–JAD,Adv. No. 13–07023–JAD
• Citation: 532 B.R. 614
• Parties: In re: Suzan Ann Moore, Debtor. Suzan Ann Moore, Plaintiff, v. Lane M. Lalone, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

532 B.R. 614

In re: Suzan Ann Moore, Debtor.Suzan Ann Moore, Plaintiff

v.Lane M. Lalone, Defendant.

Bankr. No. 13–70150–JAD

Adv. No. 13–07023–JAD

United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed June 30, 2015

Paul H. Mentzer, Laurel Legal Services, Johnstown, PA, for Plaintiff.

Timothy J. Sloan, Ebensburg, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JEFFERY A. DELLER, Chief U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

The matter before the Court is a motion filed by the Debtor–Plaintiff, titled as a “Request for New Hearing and Objection to Entrance of Judgment” (the “Motion for Relief”). The genesis of the Motion for Relief is the failure of the Plaintiff and her legal counsel to appear at the duly scheduled trial of this Adversary Proceeding, and the Debtor–Plaintiff's discontent with an adverse judgment resulting from her failure to prosecute this matter.

The Motion for Relief is a core matter over which this Court has the requisite subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A), 157(b)(2)(E), 157(b)(2)(O), and 1334(b). By the Motion for Relief, the Plaintiff essentially seeks to have this Court set aside its January 20, 2015 Order dismissing the Debtor–Plaintiff's adversary complaint (the “Dismissal Order”).

For the reasons set forth below, the Court shall enter an Order that (a) vacates the Dismissal Order, and (b) schedules a trial on the Plaintiff–Debtor's adversary complaint.

In addition, because counsel for the Plaintiff willfully ignored Orders of this Court and has otherwise egregiously failed to adequately represent the Plaintiff in this bankruptcy case (thereby causing unnecessary delay, burden, and expense), the Court shall separately issue an Order to Show Cause as to why Plaintiff's counsel should not be subject to monetary sanctions (beyond the reprimand set forth in this Memorandum Opinion).

I.

On March 1, 2013, Suzan Ann Moore (interchangeably referred to herein as: “Ms. Moore”, or the “Debtor,” or the “Plaintiff,” or the “Debtor–Plaintiff”) commenced this bankruptcy case by filing a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. At all times relevant hereto, Ms. Moore was represented by legal counselPaul Mentzer, Esq. The events that precipitated her bankruptcy apparently stem from a landlord-tenant dispute between Ms. Moore and her former landlord, Lane M. Lalone (who is the Defendant in this matter).

After the filing of her bankruptcy petition, Ms. Moore sought to recover property allegedly seized by Mr. Lalone. Specifically, on March 7, 2013, Ms. Moore filed with the Court a motion styled as a “Motion to Return Exempt Property.”¹ By Order of the Court dated March 12, 2013, Ms. Moore was informed that the relief requested by her “Motion to Return Exempt Property” must be sought through a formal civil action before this Court.²

On March 12, 2013, Ms. Moore proceeded to file her “Motion to Return Exempt Property” at Adversary Proceeding No. 13–07006–JAD. Since the filing was deficient in that there was, among other deficiencies, no adversary caption to the pleading (i.e., no plaintiff was identified and no defendant was identified), a request for corrective action was entered on the Court's docket. The corrective entry requested that the Plaintiff cure the deficiencies by way of an amended complaint. Mr. Mentzer ignored the request for corrective action, and an Order dated March 22, 2013 was further entered by the Court that directed counsel to correct the deficiencies by April 2, 2013 or face dismissal of the action.

Counsel did not correct the deficiencies, but instead re-filed a substantially similar deficient pleading on March 28, 2013. As a result, Adversary Proceeding No. 13–07006–JAD was dismissed without prejudice by way of an Order of the Court dated April 2, 2013.

On July 11, 2013, Ms. Moore filed the instant Adversary Proceeding against Mr. Lalone at Adversary No. 13–07023–JAD. The gravamen of the complaint is that Mr. Lalone had obtained a judgment within 90 days prior to the bankruptcy filing, that Mr. Lalone evicted Ms. Moore from her leasehold in connection with such proceedings, that Mr. Lalone was holding Ms. Moore's personal property, that Ms. Moore retained an exempt interest in the personal property, that Ms. Moore requested the return of the property, that Mr. Lalone refused to release the personal property to Ms. Moore, and that, given Mr. Lalone's refusals, Ms. Moore desired an entry of an order compelling Mr. Lalone to return the property.

Ultimately, a January 15, 2015 (at 1:30 p.m.) trial date was set for the complaint. By Order dated December 31, 2014 (the “Rescheduling Order”), which was contemporaneously served via electronically on all counsel of record, the trial date was continued to January 16, 2015 at 10:00 a.m.

Prior to the January 16, 2015 trial date, no one objected to the short continuance. Despite being served with the Rescheduling Order, no one advised the Court that Plaintiff's counsel could not appear at the trial. In addition, no one advised the Court that any party or witness could not appear at the trial. As a result, the trial remained on the calendar, and was duly called by the Court on January 16, 2015 at 10:00 a.m. At the January 16, 2015 trial, defense counsel appeared and so did the Defendant, Mr. Lalone. However, neither the Plaintiff nor her counsel, Mr. Mentzer, appeared at the trial.

Not only did the Plaintiff and her counsel not appear at the trial, the Plaintiff filed no proposed exhibits in advance of the trial; nor did the Plaintiff or counsel file any pretrial memoranda or statements in support of the relief they requested (even though the Court's original trial order required that such documents be filed at least fourteen (14) days prior to the trial). Thus, the Court was left to conduct a trial without the Plaintiff who bore the burden of proof in these matters.

Since the Court has no duty to rummage the file for the Plaintiff, and since the Court has no duty to raise legal arguments not asserted by a litigant, the Court was left to essentially hold that the Plaintiff both failed to prosecute this action and failed to meet her burden of proof. As a result, the Dismissal Order was entered by the Court.

Unsatisfied with this result, the Plaintiff filed her Motion for Relief. The Motion for Relief fails to expressly request that the Dismissal Order be vacated or otherwise be set aside. Instead, the Motion for Relief devotes most of its prose to a dissertation of Pennsylvania's Landlord and Tenant Act, and asks that the Court “grant [Ms. Moore] a hearing OR after review of the law grant her the right to recovery of her personal property.”

On February 26, 2015, the Court held a hearing on the Motion for Relief. At the hearing, the Court asked Plaintiff's counsel—Mr. Mentzer—to identify any rule or case law upon which Mr. Mentzer relied in seeking the relief requested by his motion. Mr. Mentzer was unable to cite any specific legal support for the Motion for Relief, other than a turbid appeal to fairness and justice. It is therefore in the absence of any legal clarity on the part of Mr. Mentzer that this Court will consider whether there is sufficient cause to set aside the Dismissal Order.

II.

No one has disputed that the Dismissal Order was issued pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), which is incorporated into this Adversary Proceeding pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7041.³ It is well established in the Third Circuit that a court dismissing a case pursuant to Rule 41(b) should balance the following six factors:

(1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and failure to respond to discovery; (3) whether there is a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of alternative sanctions other than dismissal; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir.1984).

Given the significance that dismissal with prejudice has on the Plaintiff's claims, the Court has elected to conduct a de novo review of the six Poulis factors to the record of this case to determine whether dismissal, with prejudice, is appropriate and whether the Motion for Relief should be granted.

Extent of Ms. Moore's Personal Responsibility

In Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633–34, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962), the U.S. Supreme Court established the general rule that a client is subject to the consequences of the acts and omissions of his lawyer (hereinafter, the “Link Rule”). However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit does not hold the Link Rule to be absolute; otherwise, there would be no reason for including an analysis of “the extent of the client's personal responsibility” among the six Poulis factors.

The Poulis factors are intended to address situations in which, inter alia, “[t]he brunt of the order falls on plaintiffs, who have been deprived of the opportunity to litigate their case on the merits, when the only culpable party may well be their attorney.” Burns v. MacMeekin (In re MacMeekin), 722 F.2d 32, 35 (3d Cir.1983) (citing Titus v. Mercedes Benz of North America, 695 F.2d 746, 750 n. 9 (3d Cir.1982) (opinion announcing judgment of court); Titus, 695 F.2d at 757 n. 4 (Garth, J., dissenting)). The Third Circuit acknowledges that “public confidence in the administration of justice is weakened when a party is prevented from presenting his case because of the gross negligence of his lawyer....” Carter v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 804 F.2d 805, 808 (3d Cir.1986).

This Court is mindful that the Third Circuit also recognizes an exception to the Link Rule in the related context of analyzing requests for relief pursuant to the catchall provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), which is incorporated into bankruptcy proceedings by operation of Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9024 and affords a...