Moore v. Mankowitz

• Decision Date: 03 October 1984
• Docket Number: No. 4-83-0771,4-83-0771
• Citation: 83 Ill.Dec. 199,469 N.E.2d 1133,127 Ill.App.3d 1050
• Parties: , 83 Ill.Dec. 199 Charlotte MOORE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Carl MANKOWITZ, Acting Director, Illinois Department of Public Aid; and Illinois Department of Public Aid, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1133

469 N.E.2d 1133

127 Ill.App.3d 1050, 83 Ill.Dec. 199

Charlotte MOORE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Carl MANKOWITZ, Acting Director, Illinois Department of Public Aid; and Illinois Department of Public Aid, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 4-83-0771.

Appellate Court of Illinois Fourth District.

Oct. 3, 1984.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Karen Konieczny, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, for defendants-appellants.

George Bell, Land of Lincoln Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc., Champaign, for plaintiff-appellee.

TRAPP, Justice:

The Department of Public Aid, and its director, Carl Mankowitz, appeal from an order of the circuit court of Macon County staying the reduction of plaintiff's AFDC benefits from $236 per month to $71 per month for a period of three months for plaintiff's failure to attend a WIN demonstration program meeting without good cause. We affirm.

Plaintiff, Charlotte Moore, resides in Macon County and receives AFDC benefits of $236 per month. Under provisions of the Illinois Public Aid Code, the Department is required to "initiate, promote and develop job search, training and work programs which will provide employment for and contribute to the training and experience of persons" receiving AFDC benefits. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 23, par. 9-6.) Section 11-20 of the Illinois Public Aid Code requires that each applicant or recipient of AFDC who is able to engage in employment and who is unemployed or working less than full time shall register for additional employment with the system of free public employment offices and shall utilize job placement services and other facilities. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 23, par. 11-20.) The Illinois Public Aid Code provisions and regulations thereunder (see 89 Illinois Administrative Code sec. 112.70 (1983)) were adopted to meet the requirements for Federal participation in Illinois' AFDC program. Section 602(a)(19)(A) of the Social Security Act requires as a condition of Federal financial participation that state plans shall provide for manpower services, training, employment, and other related activities. (42 U.S.C. sec. 602(a)(19)(A) (1976); 45 C.F.R. sec. 224.0 (1983).) The program required by the Social Security Act and administered by the state is called the work incentive demonstration program whose purpose is to "decrease dependency on the public welfare system by promoting employment opportunities for AFDC recipients." 89 Illinois Administrative Code sec. 112.70(a) (1983).

On May 17, 1983, the local WIN worker sent plaintiff a notice requiring her to appear at the WIN office on May 24, 1983, for the purpose of verifying that she had made 10 contacts for employment. Plaintiff failed to attend the meeting but called one week later to inform the local WIN worker that she was attending cosmetology school. A second notice was sent to plaintiff for an appointment on June 8, 1983, but plaintiff again failed to show up for the meeting. The WIN worker then submitted a report to the Macon County Department of Public Aid recommending a three-month sanction for plaintiff's failure to keep the appointments. Plaintiff was notified of the reduction on July 14, 1983, she then requested a hearing, and on August 29, 1983, a hearing was held at the Macon County Department of Public Aid.

This case is presented in the unusual posture that at the time the order for stay was issued by the trial court, the report of administrative proceedings had not been filed. Moreover, it has not been filed and is not available upon review. It is presented that the hearing officer swore the witnesses and heard evidence by telephone while that officer was in Chicago, and the plaintiff, her counsel and testimony were presented in Decatur. The proceedings included cross-examination of witnesses by plaintiff and the submission of documentary evidence.

The only apparent dispute at the hearing was whether the plaintiff called the WIN worker a day after the second meeting. The WIN worker disagreed that plaintiff called her, and the Department's findings and order indicate that the Department believed the WIN representative. The director of the Department of Public Aid affirmed the Department's decision to reduce plaintiff's welfare benefits for three months as a sanction for violating Department regulations. Department regulations provide that "sanctions will be imposed against those nonexempt individuals who refuse or fail to participate without good cause with [WIN]." 89 Illinois Administrative Code sec. 112.73(a) (1983).

Plaintiff then sought administrative review of the Department's ruling contending that the telephone hearing procedure violated due process and applicable provisions of the Public Aid Code and Department regulations. The complaint also charged that the Department's WIN rules were not properly promulgated, the WIN demonstration program was not operated as required by Federal law, and the Department's decision that plaintiff failed to cooperate without good cause was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

On October 28, 1983, the circuit court stayed the Department's decision finding that irreparable harm to the plaintiff had been demonstrated, and that plaintiff had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. At the time the trial court entered its stay order, the Department had not yet filed its answer. The trial court went on to certify two questions of law as to which the court found there was a substantial ground for a difference of opinion and the resolution of which would materially advance the termination of the litigation. These two questions certified by the trial court under Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (87 Ill.2d R. 308(a)) were whether the Department had the authority to conduct telephone hearings and whether such hearings violated due process of law. Defendant's notice of appeal, however, specifies that an appeal was taken under Supreme Court Rule 307(a) allowing an appeal from an interlocutory order granting an injunction. 87 Ill.2d R. 307(a).

Upon such background presented only in the briefs, counsel project their respective arguments upon constitutional and statutory validity. It appears clear that the granting of a stay by the court does not supply a ruling on the matters argued here and are not presented to this court for review with any record of the actual proceedings upon administrative review by the trial court.

To take an appeal under Supreme Court Rule 308 it is necessary not only for the trial court to make the findings that the order involves a question of law as to which there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal would advance the termination of the litigation, but there must also be an order from this court allowing this type of discretionary appeal. Thus, aside from the fact that defendants' notice of appeal specifies that an appeal is taken under Rule 307(a), this court has never entered an order allowing an appeal under Rule 308(a). We are also not aware of an...