Moore v. Martin

Decision Date17 July 1940
Docket NumberNo. 260.,260.
Citation14 A.2d 482
PartiesMOORE et al. v. MARTIN, State Tax Com'r.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

Certiorari to Prerogative Court.

Suit between J. H. Thayer Martin, State Tax Commissioner, and Perry E. Moore and the Chase National Bank of the City of New York, executors of the will of Clement Moore, deceased, involving the collection of taxes. To review an adverse decree, Perry E. Moore and the Chase National Bank of the City of New York bring certiorari.

Reversed, and tax assessment vacated.

Argued May term, 1940, before CASE, DONGES, and HEHER, JJ.

Pitney, Hardin & Skinner, of Newark (Charles R. Hardin, of Newark, of counsel), for prosecutors.

David T. Wilentz, Atty. Gen. (William A. Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen, of counsel), for defendant.

HEHER, Justice.

The question here is whether an inter vivos gift of property, by the testator to his son, was made "in contemplation of death" within the intendment of section 1 of Chapter 228 of the Laws of 1909, P.L. p. 325, as amended by Chapter 90 of the Laws of 1935, P.L. p. 264, now R.S.1937, 54:34-1, N.J.S.A. 54:34-1, and is consequently a taxable transfer.

The testator died on August 3, 1937. He was then the senior member of the firm of Robert Moore & Co., cotton merchants and brokers of the City of New York. He had been associated with this firm for about sixty years. The donee was his only child. The son entered the firm as a junior member in 1924. The gift in litigation was made on June 27, 1935. It consisted of a transfer by testator of $60,000, of his capital account in the firm to that of his son. In the federal gift tax return made by the donor at the time, he certified that "a transfer of funds was made to my son * * * to provide capital for business 6/27/35—$60,000."

Some three weeks before this transfer, the donor made his will, leaving his estate (with the exception of a few general legacies) to his wife and son in equal shares, and providing that the son's share should "be paid and transferred to him as soon as conveniently may be after" the testator's demise; and the Prerogative Court, in sustaining a succession tax assessment made by the State Tax Commissioner, concluded that "the natural inference" to be drawn from the evidence "is that after making the will," the testator "determined to transfer this much of his property to his son immediately instead of waiting for the transfer which he had provided should occur at his death under his will; that it was made as the result of a considered choice between testamentary transfer and present transfer; that it was therefore a transfer made with the intent and purpose that it should be in the place and stead of a testamentary final disposition of that much of his estate, and hence was a transfer made in contemplation of death * * *." We do not entertain this view.

While the testator was in his seventy-ninth year when the gift was made, his health was unusually good for a man of his age. He was very active in business and the ordinary pursuits of life; and there is nothing to suggest awareness of mortal disease, or apprehension of death in the near future. His physician testified that his "organic condition was good, no high blood pressure, no heart leakage, no severe arteriosclerosis or hardening of the arteries and pretty good circulation for a man of his years, very, very good." His was a family of singular longevity. His father died in his ninety-fifth year; and the deceased was survived by three brothers all beyond seventy-five years of age. He continued his customary business and other activities until ten days before his death. There had been no discernible physical or mental impairment. The cause of death was bronchial pneumonia; and the attending physician certified that a contributing cause was "chronic arthritis—1934." The physician testified, however, that this latter statement was a "typographical error," and that, as regards the onset of the chronic arthritic condition, the word "indefinitely" should be substituted for "1934."

While the gift was large, it was the last of a series of substantial gifts by the father to his son over a period of years: 1918, $15,000; 1924, $25,000; 1926, $10,000; 1927, $20,000; 1928-31, $16,437; and 1932, $5,700.

All these gifts, except the one made in 1918, were effected, as was the gift under consideration, by transfers of credit on the books of the firm. The gifts of $25,000 (in 1924) and $5,700 (in 1932) were made to enable the son to buy memberships in the New York Cotton Exchange and the National Raw Silk Exchange, respectively.

As we read his unreported conclusions, the learned Vice Ordinary considered these as decisive circumstances: The donor's age; the making of the will and gift a "few months after" a "flare-up" of a condition of arthritis in existence "some 15 to 20 years * * * which spasmodically caused a swelling in his hands and feet;" the devise of the bulk of his estate to his wife and son in equal shares, with a provision that the son's share should be paid as soon as convenient after his death; the gift was made to his only child, "a natural recipient of his estate at his death," and "consisted of more than one-quarter of decedent's capital interest in a firm he had served for 60 years," and "constituted approximately 21%, or over one fifth, of his...

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11 cases
  • Squier v. Martin
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • March 13, 1942
    ...Schcider v. Martin, supra. In the following cases it was held that the transfer was not made in contemplation of death. Moore v. Martin, 125 N.J.L. 189, 14 A.2d 482; In re Wimpfheimer's Estate, 126 N.J. L. 502, 20 A.2d 433, reversing 127 N.J.Eq. 587, 14 A.2d 59; MacGregor v. Martin, supra; ......
  • Dommerich v. Kelly
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • August 26, 1942
    ...the transfers at that time. The determinant of the taxability of such transfers is the motive of the transferor. Moore v. Martin, 125 N.J. L. 189, 14 A.2d 482; Squier v. Martin, 131 N.J.Eq. 263, 24 A.2d 865; Kavanagh v. Kelly, 131 N.J.Eq. 398, 25 A.2d 547; Plum v. Martin, 132 N.J.Eq. 1, 26 ......
  • Voorhees v. Kelly
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • September 1, 1942
    ...a present, outright, absolute, unqualified and consummate gift for the immediate needs and enjoyment of the donees, as in Moore v. Martin, 125 N.J.L. 189, 14 A.2d 482; MacGregor v. Martin, 126 N.J.L. 492, 20 A.2d 427; Wimpfheimer v. Martin, 126 N.J.L. 502, 20 A.2d 433; Kellogg v. Martin, 13......
  • Kellogg v. Martin
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • November 5, 1941
    ...or of the weight of evidence is a determination solely of this court. It has not been affirmed or approved on review. Cf. Moore v. Martin, 125 N.J.L. 189, at 192, bottom, 14 A.2d 482. A re-examination of the question is not precluded by the principle of stare decisis; no one in making any a......
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