Moore v. Melaleuca, Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. 27078.,27078.
• Citation: Moore v. Melaleuca, Inc., 137 Idaho 23, 43 P.3d 782 (Idaho 2002)
• Parties: Tina L. MOORE, Claimant-Respondent, v. MELALEUCA, INC., Employer-Appellant. and State of Idaho, Department of Labor, Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

43 P.3d 782

137 Idaho 23

Tina L. MOORE, Claimant-Respondent, v. MELALEUCA, INC., Employer-Appellant. and State of Idaho, Department of Labor, Respondent.

No. 27078.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, January 2002 Term.

March 12, 2002.

Thomsen & Stephens, P.A., Idaho Falls, for appellant.

Tina L. Moore, Idaho Falls, respondent pro se.

Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Evelyn Thomas, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent Department of Labor.

WALTERS, Justice.

This is a review of the Industrial Commission's decision granting unemployment benefits to Tina Moore. The employer, Melaleuca, Inc., is the appellant. The Department of Labor and the employee, Moore, are the respondents. Melaleuca argues that the Commission erred by deciding that Moore's appeal by protest of an adverse eligibility determination by a claims examiner was timely, and that the Commission erred further when it decided ultimately, on the merits, that Moore was entitled to unemployment benefits. The Department of Labor joins in Melaleuca's contention that Moore's appeal from the claims examiner's denial of benefits was untimely. Moore did not appear nor file a written brief in response to the issues raised in this appeal.

We hold that the Commission did not err in ruling that Moore's appeal was timely. We also affirm the Commission's decision that Moore was entitled to unemployment benefits.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

Tina Moore was employed in the marketing department of Melaleuca, Inc., developing and working on a prestige skin-care line for the company. She claims that from the time she informed the company that she was pregnant in January of 1999, she was subjected to inappropriate sexual remarks from one of her immediate supervisors and to continuing sexual discrimination from the chief operations officer who oversaw her position. After her maternity leave, Moore returned to work, but the work environment did not improve, affecting her physical and mental well-being. In March of 2000, following a performance review by her supervisor, Moore received a two and one-half percent pay increase. Believing that the "extremely low" raise was not warranted based on her work performance for 1999 but instead was due to discriminatory factors, Moore quit her job at Melaleuca, Inc., on April 14, 2000.

Moore filed a claim for unemployment compensation, which was denied by the claims examiner. The form determining that Moore was ineligible for benefits was mailed to her by the claims office on May 12, 2000, and advised her as follows:

05/12/2000 05/26/2000 Date of Mailing Last Day to Protest

PROTEST RIGHTS

If you disagree with this determination, you have FOURTEEN (14) DAYS from the date of mailing to file a protest. A protest must be in writing and signed by an interested party. The protest can be filed in person or mailed to any local Job Service Office. If the protest is mailed, it must be postmarked no later than the last day to protest. If no protest is filed, this determination will become final and cannot be changed. (Bold in original.)

Moore protested the claims examiner's denial of benefits by letter dated May 26, 2000, addressed to the Idaho Falls Job Service office. She delivered the letter to the post office in Idaho Falls on May 26, which was the last day for Moore to file her appeal. However, the envelope containing the letter was not postmarked by the post office in Idaho Falls. Instead, it was postmarked later the next afternoon, May 27, in Pocatello, Idaho, a city some fifty miles from Idaho Falls, before it was delivered to the Idaho Falls Job Service Office, where the letter was marked as received by that office on May 30, 2000. IDAPA Rule 09.01.06.012 governing the filing of a notice of appeal with the Appeals Bureau of the Department of Labor provides that "[i]f mailed, the appeal shall be deemed to be filed on the date of mailing as determined by the postmark on the request."

The Appeals Examiner conducted a hearing on June 13, 2000. Moore testified at the hearing that she had hand delivered the notice of appeal to the United States Post Office in Idaho Falls after she had been advised by a postal employee that it would be postmarked that same day if delivered before 6:00 p.m. Moore's husband testified that he drove his wife to the post office at 5:30 p.m. on May 26, 2000. On June 16, 2000, the Appeals Examiner issued a decision holding that Moore's request for an appeal hearing was not filed within the prescribed time limit and that "claimant has not established that the post office committed any error that caused the delay in the postmark." The Appeals Examiner concluded that the claims examiner's determination of Moore's ineligibility for unemployment benefits had thus become final and could not be changed.

Moore filed a timely appeal to the Industrial Commission from the decision of the Appeals Examiner. Moore included with her notice of appeal a letter from the United States Postal Service Supervisor in Idaho Falls acknowledging that Moore had handed her letter to a postal clerk at 5:35 p.m. on May 26, 2000, well before the 6:00 p.m. deadline after which the letter would have been stamped with the date of the following day. The supervisor further stated: "The letter should have been postmarked that day. If it wasn't, it is our error."

The Commission reviewed the matter de novo pursuant to I.C. § 72-1368(7). See In re Guajardo, 119 Idaho 639, 809 P.2d 500 (1991). The Commission relied on the tape recording of the hearing before the Appeals Examiner, the exhibits presented at the hearing, and the letter from the United States Postal Service Supervisor that was included with Moore's appeal to the Commission. The Commission found that Moore presented compelling evidence that her notice of protest to the Appeals Bureau was timely mailed and that the error in the postmark was that of the U.S. Postal Service and not claimant's. The Commission thus reversed the decision of the Appeals Examiner and remanded the matter for a hearing on the merits of Moore's timely filed protest. Following a hearing, the Appeals Examiner denied the claim for unemployment benefits finding that Moore had failed to establish good cause for quitting and failed to pursue a reasonable alternative resolution. Moore appealed that decision to the Industrial Commission. The Commission again ruled in Moore's favor, reversing the Appeals Examiner's decision. The Commission issued an order holding that Moore was eligible for unemployment benefits. Melaleuca, Inc., then brought this appeal.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Did the Commission err in reversing the finding by the Appeals Examiner that Moore's notice of protest initiating the appeal process was untimely filed?

2. Did the Commission err in finding (a) that Moore had established good cause to leave her employment with Melaleuca; and (b) that Moore had explored a viable option prior to quitting?

Standard of Review

This Court's review of Industrial Commission decisions is limited to questions of law. Idaho Const. Art. V, § 9. Thus, the Commission's findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal where they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Welch v. Cowles Publishing Co., 127 Idaho 361, 900 P.2d 1372 (1995).

DISCUSSION

I.

A. Did the Commission err in reversing the finding by the Appeals Examiner that Moore's notice of protest initiating the appeal process was untimely filed?

Melaleuca and the Department argue that Moore had until May 26, 2000, to file her protest to the claims examiner's decision of May 12, 2000. They rely upon the terms of IDAPA 09.01.06.012, that a protest, for the purpose of an appeal, is deemed to be filed on the date of mailing as determined by the postmark on the request. They assert that because Moore's letter filing her protest was postmarked May 27, 2000, the Appeals Examiner correctly held that the appeal was not timely. They submit that, pursuant to I.C. § 72-1368(3), the decision of the claims examiner denying Moore's eligibility for benefits became final fourteen days after notice of the decision was provided to Moore, the interested party, and the Commission lacked jurisdiction to rule contrary to that decision.

It is well settled that statutory requirements governing appeals under the Employment Security Act are mandatory and jurisdictional. Welch v. Del Monte Corp., 128 Idaho 513, 515, 915 P.2d 1371, 1373 (1996),citing Striebeck v. Employment Security Agency, 83 Idaho 531, 366 P.2d 589 (1961). Pursuant to I.C. § 72-1368(3), a claims examiner's determination "shall become final unless, within fourteen (14) days after notice, as provided in section (5), an appeal is filed with the department." The "notice" referred to in that section is explained in I.C. § 72-1368(5): "All interested parties shall be entitled to prompt service of notice of determinations and decisions. A notice shall be deemed served if delivered to the person being served or if mailed to his last known address; service by mail shall be deemed complete on the date of mailing." The IDAPA regulations provide guidelines regarding the filing of an appeal from a claims examiner's decision. The filing may be by personal delivery, by fax or by mail which may be accomplished by sending it to any Job Service Office or to the Appeals Bureau office in Boise. As noted above, the process for filing an appeal by mail is covered by IDAPA 09.02.06.012.01: "If mailed, the appeal shall be deemed to be filed on the date of mailing as determined by the postmark on the request." Another regulation, IDAPA 09.02.06.012.02, addresses "Date of Mailing" with regard to Department determinations and decisions, and provides: "The date indicated on Department determinations, redeterminations and decisions shall be presumed to be the date the document was deposited in the United States mail, unless shown otherwise by a preponderance of competent evidence." A related regulation, IDAPA 09.02.06.017, allows ...