Moore v. Metro. Grp. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 06 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. 10-212ML |
| Parties | PHILIP MOORE, on Behalf of Himself and All Similarly Situated Persons, Plaintiff v. METROPOLITAN GROUP PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, a Rhode Island Corporation; METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, a Rhode Island corporation; METLIFE, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
Plaintiff Philip Moore ("Moore"), a citizen of Arizona, brought claims of breach of contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment against Metropolitan Group Property and Casualty Company ("Met Group"), Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company ("Met Property"), two Rhode Island corporations, and against Delaware corporation MetLife, Inc., their parent holding company. The litigation arises from an accident in 2004, in which Moore's two month old automobile, covered under an insurance policy issued by Met Group, was substantially damaged. Moore alleges that the defendants refused to honor their contractual obligations under a Policy endorsement by electing to pay for the cost of repair to his car instead of compensating him for the cost of a full replacement of the car.
The diversity based case is now before the Court on the defendants' motion to dismiss certain claims in Moore's complaint (the "Complaint") on the grounds that (1) they are barred by the applicable Arizona statutes of limitation; and (2) the Complaint fails to allege facts that would support a plausible claim of liability against MetLife, Inc. For the reasons that follow, the defendants' motion to dismiss Counts II and III is DENIED, in part, and GRANTED, in part, and MetLife Inc.'s motion to dismiss the Complaint against it is GRANTED.
According to the Complaint, on July 31, 2004, Moore purchased a new 2004 Jeep Wrangler for $29,500. Less than two months and 3, 095 miles later, Moore was involved in a collision that caused extensive damage to the Jeep. At the time of the accident, Moore was insured under a "MetLife Auto & Home®"1 auto insurance policy (the "Policy") issued by Met Group. In addition to obtaining comprehensive and collision coverage under the Policy, Moore purchased an endorsement ("Endorsement V550") for "Physical Damage Special Loss Settlement." Policy METMOORE000040. Endorsement V550 provides, under the heading "Replacement Cost for Total Loss: "
whichever occurs first, we will pay, at our option, the full cost of repair or replacement, less the applicable deductible." Id. ().
"Total Loss" is defined in Endorsement V550 as "a loss in which the cost to replace or repair the vehicle to its pre-loss condition plus the salvage value, equals or exceeds the actual cash value." Id. METMOORE000041. "Actual Cash Value" is defined in the Policy as "the amount that it would cost to repair or replace damaged property, less allowance for physical deterioration and depreciation." METMOORE000020. In other words, if a qualified insured vehicle is damaged in an accident and the cost to replace or repair it to the condition it was in prior to the accident, when added to the salvage value, is the same or more than the cost to repair or replace the vehicle, less physical deterioration and depreciation, then Met Group will pay, at its option, the full cost of repair or replacement, reduced by any applicable deductible.
a. a previously untitled vehicle of the year, make, model and equipment of the damaged automobile or, if unavailable, b. a vehicle that is most similar in class and body type to the year, make, model and equipment of the damaged automobile." METMOORE00004 0, ¶2.
Further, Endorsement V550 states that "[w]e have the right to pay the loss in money or to repair or replace the damaged automobile." METMOORE000040, ¶2.3.
Moore's Complaint cites to certain promotional materials2 that allegedly reference "full replacement cost coverage" provided with each MetLife® Auto policy. According to the Complaint, the marketing materials state, inter alia, that
Complaint ¶4. (* in original quote).
Moore also alleges that Complaint ¶3. However, the Complaint does not indicate a source for that particular allegation and no supporting materials have been submitted for that proposition.
Met Property inspected the Jeep shortly after the collision occurred. Complaint ¶37. On September 27, 2004, Moore was provided4 with an initial repair estimate in the amount of $7,662.84. Id. On February 3, 2005, the ACV of Moore's Jeep was determined to be $23,438. Complaint ¶38. On February 16, 2005, a final repair estimate was prepared that indicated that the cost to repair Moore's automobile was $21,939.66. At that time, the Jeep had undergone more than five months of repair. Id.
Moore claims that he requested (1) that his Jeep be deemed a total loss; (2) that he be paid the full cost of a new replacement vehicle; and (3) that he be reimbursed for rental car expenses during the repair process. Complaint ¶ 39. After his request was met with a refusal, Moore filed an administrative complaint with the Arizona Department of Insurance on January 10, 2005. Defs.'
Mem. Exhibit 1. Moore explained in the administrative complaint that "the insurance company did not total the vehicle as they should have done," and that " [i] f the vehicle is returned to me, it will be worth less than half the original purchase price in trade." Id. at METMOORE000045.
On May 12, 2010, pursuant to Federal Rule 23, Moore filed a class action complaint in this Court on his own behalf and "all those similarly situated." Complaint ¶ 42. Moore defines the class5 of persons he seeks to represent as those "MetLife insureds" who filed a claim under Endorsement V550 for a "total loss" of a new vehicle and who did not receive "full" replacement cost from their insurer. Id.
Moore asserts breach of contract (Count I), on the grounds that he was paid less than the "full" cost of a new replacement vehicle and that he was left with a repaired vehicle worth substantially less than the pre-loss value because of extensive repairs. Complaint ¶ 62. Specifically, Moore alleges that the insurer refused to declare Moore's vehicle a "total loss[ ]" and that it paid to have his vehicle repaired instead of replacing it. Id. ¶ 60.
Moore's second claim asserts breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count II). Moore asserts that he has been damaged by the defendants' "unlawful and per se violation of the statutory and common law duty of good faith and fair dealing." Complaint ¶68.
In his claim for unjust enrichment (Count III), Moore alleges that the defendants benefitted from payments he made after being "induced to enter into, maintain and/or renew [a] policy contract[ ]" based on defendants' "full replacement cost coverage" representations. Id. ¶70.
Count IV is not a separate claim; rather, Moore "seeks a judgment declaring that notwithstanding MetLife's discretion to elect to pay for repairs or to replace damaged vehicles less than one year old and with less than 15, 000 miles at the time of loss, MetLife must declare new vehicles a 'total loss' and pay the 'full' replacement cost when they meet the policy definition of 'total loss.'" Complaint ¶80. Moore seeks certification of this litigation as a Class Action pursuant to Federal Rule 23, appointing him as Class Representative and his counsel as Class Counsel. Further, Moore requests equitable relief in the form of restitution and disgorgement; actual and punitive damages; pre-and post-judgment interest; and the cost of bringing this litigation, including attorney's fees. Complaint 18.
On July 23, 2 010, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss Counts II and III of the Complaint, asserting that, under Arizona law, the claims are time-barred. In addition, defendant MetLife, Inc. moved to have all claims against it dismissed, on the ground that Moore's Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. MetLife, Inc. states that Moore's attempt to sweep in the parent holding company of Met Property and Met Group "fails to allege facts that, if proved, would make a plausible case for imposing liability on a corporation that did not issue or handle claims under his policy." Def.'s Mem. at 15-16.
Moore filed an objection to the defendants' motion on September 8, 2010, and defendants filed a reply to Moore's objection on October 12, 2010.
Dismissal of a complaint is governed by Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A case may be dismissed, inter alia, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Motions to dismiss under either subsection are reviewed under the identical standard. Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. Telecomm. Regulatory Bd. of Puerto Rico, 189 F.3d 1, 14 n.10 (1st Cir. 1999) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial