Moore v. Miami-Dade County

• Decision Date: 18 July 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-22705-CIV.,06-22705-CIV.
• Citation: 502 F.Supp.2d 1224
• Parties: Sedric Lyndell MOORE, Plaintiff, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, Anthony Corbin, and in his official capacity as a police officer of Miami-Dade county, Kenneth Newry, individually and in his official capacity as security officer of Miami-Dade County, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

Page 1224

502 F.Supp.2d 1224

Sedric Lyndell MOORE, Plaintiff, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, Anthony Corbin, and in his official capacity as a police officer of Miami-Dade county, Kenneth Newry, individually and in his official capacity as security officer of Miami-Dade County, Defendants.

No. 06-22705-CIV.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

July 18, 2007.

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John Dennis Golden, Golden & Grimes LLP, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff.

Bernard Pastor, Miami, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS; DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

ALAN S. GOLD, District Judge.

This cause came before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [DE 5], filed November 20, 2006. Having reviewed the Motion, Response, and Reply, I grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. However, I dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint without prejudice, with leave to amend.

I. Factual Background

The following facts from the First Amended Complaint are assumed to be true for purposes of evaluating the Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff Sedric Moore ("Moore"), was employed as a longshoreman at the Port of Miami-Dade County. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 9). On April 23, 2003, Moore reported to work at approximately 6:30 a.m. (Id. ¶ 10). Moore attempted to enter the port security gate, while in his vehicle, but was unable enter because his security card did not work. (Id.). Defendant Kenneth Newry ("Newry") was employed by the Port of Miami-Dade County as a security guard, and was working at the gate that morning. (Id. ¶ 11). After Moore's ID card did not work, Newry did not allow Moore entry, and took possession' of Moore's ID card. (Id.). Newry instructed Moore to return to the ID office. (Id.). Moore then informed Newry that he had recently been issued a new ID card and had been having problems with it, and requested that Newry verify his eligibility to enter. (Id. ¶ 12). The Complaint is not entirely clear as to what happened next, but it appears that Newry took several of Moore's personal belongings along with the ID card. (Id. ¶ 13). Plaintiff then requested that his personal belongings be returned to him, and after an exchange of words, Officer Newry returned his personal belongings. (Id. ¶ 14). Newry instructed Moore again to return to the ID card office. (Id.).

Thereafter, Moore telephoned Ms. Frances Ladson of the ID card office to explain the situation, and was instructed to return to the gate and request to speak with Sgt. Gonzalez of the Miami-Dade Police Department for assistance. (Id. ¶ 15). Moore approached the gate in his vehicle at approximately 6:45 a.m., and was instructed by Newry to exit the entryway. (Id. ¶ 17). When Moore explained that he needed to speak with Sgt. Gonzalez, Newry replied that he did not care. (Id.). Moore then pulled his car forward, and exited the vehicle. (Id. ¶ 18). At that time, Newry left his guard booth and charged Moore and struck him with his chest. (Id. ¶ 19). Moore tried to leave; however, Newry struck him a second time to which he responded by attempting to wrestle Newry to the ground. (Id. ¶ 20). During the altercation, Newry struck Moore about the head with his radio. (Id. ¶ 21). At that point, Miami-Dade Police officer Fiston arrived on the scene and ordered that Moore be taken into custody. (Id.). Moore was taken into custody, strip searched, charged, and treated at Jackson Memorial Hospital for his injuries. (Id. ¶ 22). He was released at 9:00 p.m. that evening. (Id.).

A criminal action was filed by Defendant Miami Dade Police officer Anthony Corbin ("Corbin") against Moore. (Id. ¶ 23). The case was ultimately dismissed by the State Attorney's Office. (Id.).

Moore has filed a four-count Complaint. In Count I, Plaintiff asserts a false arrest claim, and seeks a civil remedy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Miami-Dade County, Port Security Officer Newry, and Officer Corbin. (Id. ¶¶ 24-29). In Count II, Plaintiff asserts a state law claim for false imprisonment against Miami-Dade County, Port Security Officer Newry, and Officer Corbin. (Id. ¶¶ 30-33). In Count III, Plaintiff asserts a state law claim for malicious prosecution against Miami-Dade County, Port Security Officer Newry, and Officer Corbin. (Id. ¶¶ 34-36). In Count IV, Plaintiff asserts a state law claim for battery against Miami-Dade County, Port Security Officer Newry, and Officer Corbin. (Id. ¶¶ 37-39).

Defendants have moved collectively to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint on various grounds, set forth below.

II. Standard of Review

As the Supreme Court recently held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), a complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. (12)(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." (rejecting the traditional 12(b)(6) standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Although a plaintiff need not state in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim, "Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a `showing', rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief." Bell Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 1965, n. 3 (2007). In other words, a plaintiff's pleading obligation requires "more than mere labels and conclusions." Id. at 1964-65; See also Pafumi v. Davidson, No. 05-61679-CIV, 2007 WL 1729969 at *2 (S.D.Fla. Jun. 14, 2007).

The previous standard that there be "no set of facts" before a motion to dismiss is granted has thus been abrogated in favor of one that requires a pleading to be "plausible on its face." Id. at 1968, 1974 (discussing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must have "nudged [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Id. at 1974.

While the Eleventh Circuit has yet to speak on the Bell Atlantic standard and the breadth of its holding, other circuits have had the opportunity to apply it. See In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortgage Servicing Litigation, 491 F.3d 638, 649 (7th Cir.2007) (explaining that a district court should now determine "whether the complaint contains `enough factual matter (taken as true)' to provide the minimum notice of the plaintiffs' claim that the Court believes a defendant is entitled to."); Marrero-Gutierrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir.2007) (applying the Bell Atlantic Standard to a claim of political discrimination); Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2nd Cir.2007) ("we believe the [U.S Supreme]. Court is not requiring a universal standard of heightened fact pleading, but is instead requiring a flexible "plausible standard." "); White v. Ockey, ___ Fed. Appx. ___, ___, No. 06-4245, 2007 WL 1600483 at *3 (10th Cir. Jun. 5, 2007) (holding that plaintiffs claim failed to allege enough facts to state a claim under Fair Housing Act).

In determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all the factual allegations in the complaint as true and evaluate all inferences derived from those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hoffend v. Villa, 261 F.3d 1148, 1150 (11th Cir.2001). Moreover, I reiterate that Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) prohibits me from looking beyond the "four corners" of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint or considering any additional allegations Plaintiff included in his Response.¹

Furthermore, when a governmental official, sued individually, asserts qualified immunity as is the case here, controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent imposes a "heightened pleading" standard for the complaint instead of the minimal notice pleading required by Rule 8. A dismissal motion grounded on the defendant's qualified immunity requires the court to accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 994-995 (11th Cir.2003). Only "well-pleaded facts" and "reasonable inferences drawn from those facts" should be accepted. Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481, 1485 (11th Cir. 1992). "[U]nsupported conclusions of law or of mixed fact and law have long been recognized not to prevent a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal." Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1036 n. 16 (11th Cir.2001). The motion should be granted if the complaint fails to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Dalrymple, 334 F.3d at 995. With the foregoing standard in mind, I will consider Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint.

III. Legal Analysis

Defendants argue seven points in support of their Motion to Dismiss: (1) the County cannot be liable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983; (2) Officers Corbin and Newry are entitled to qualified immunity; (3) the County is entitled to sovereign immunity for Counts II, III, and IV; (4) Plaintiff fails to properly state a claim for malicious prosecution; (5) Plaintiff cannot maintain an action against the officers in their official capacity; (6) Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney's fees for Counts II through IV; and (7) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the First Amendment. I will address each argument in turn.

A. County liability under 42 U.S.C. section 1983

Count I names the County as a defendant for alleged violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983.² Defendants argue that this count must be dismissed for the following reasons:

1. The County cannot be liable under a theory of respondeat superior.

"The Supreme Court has placed strict limitations on [local government] liability under § 1983." Tennant v. Florida, 111 F.Supp.2d 1326, 1331 (S.D.Fla.2000). For example, local governments may not be found liable under section 1983 merely because its agents or employees have caused a constitutional injury. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct....