Moore v. Moore, 910174-CA

• Decision Date: 06 April 1994
• Docket Number: No. 910174-CA,910174-CA
• Citation: 872 P.2d 1054
• Parties: Roy B. MOORE, Plaintiff, Appellee, and Cross-Appellant, v. Lorna B. MOORE, Defendant, Appellant, and Cross-Appellee.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

Page 1054

872 P.2d 1054

Roy B. MOORE, Plaintiff, Appellee, and Cross-Appellant, v. Lorna B. MOORE, Defendant, Appellant, and Cross-Appellee.

No. 910174-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

April 6, 1994.

John Walsh, Salt Lake City, for defendant, appellant.

Clark W. Sessions, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff, appellee.

Before BILLINGS, P.J., and BENCH and DAVIS, JJ.

OPINION

BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:

Lorna B. Moore appeals from the trial court's order granting Roy B. Moore's petition to modify the parties' divorce decree. Principally, Mrs. Moore complains that the trial court erred in finding a substantial change in her material circumstances and in reducing her alimony award from $1050 per month to one dollar per month three years after the filing of the present action. Mr. Moore has filed a cross-appeal claiming the court erred in continuing alimony at $1050 per month for three years. We reverse and remand for reinstatement of the original alimony award.

FACTS

The parties were married in Elko, Nevada, on March 25, 1964, and had three children during the course of their sixteen-year marriage. All three children have reached majority. In 1980, the parties entered into a stipulation and property settlement agreement, which became the basis for a divorce decree entered on December 23, 1980. At the time of the divorce, the parties had an adjusted gross income of $40,996, the majority of which was Mr. Moore's income as Mrs. Moore was employed part-time for five dollars an hour. At the time the decree was entered, the parties had discussed Mrs. Moore's plan to recertify as a school teacher or to obtain a master's degree in sociology.

Pursuant to the decree, Mr. Moore was required to pay $1150 per month in alimony during the first year following the divorce and $1050 per month thereafter. Additionally, the divorce decree divided the parties' marital property and required Mr. Moore to pay $750 per month in child support. This support obligation ceased when all three children reached the age of majority.

In October 1989, Mr. Moore filed a petition for modification of the divorce decree asking that his alimony obligation be terminated. The trial court determined that a substantial change of material circumstances had occurred because the parties' children had become emancipated and Mrs. Moore then had a stable income. In its written findings, the court found that Mrs. Moore had a monthly income of $1373--the same amount she would have earned if she had been employed as a school teacher at the time of the divorce. Moreover, the court found that Mrs. Moore had reasonable monthly expenses of $2783.87. The court also determined that Mr. Moore's income had increased since the entry of the divorce decree from $40,000 per year to $120,000 per year. Based on these findings, the trial court granted Mr. Moore's request to modify the divorce decree and reduced alimony from $1050 per month to one dollar per month beginning November 1992. This appeal followed.

SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF MATERIAL CIRCUMSTANCES

Mrs. Moore argues that the trial court erred in finding that a substantial change of material circumstances had occurred since the decree was entered, affecting the issue of alimony. This court will not overturn a trial court's modification of a divorce decree absent a clear abuse of discretion or manifest injustice. Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 161 (Utah App.1989). This court must consider whether the findings of the trial court adequately support the determination that there has been a substantial change in the parties' material circumstances. In this regard, "the trial court must make findings on all material issues, and its failure to delineate what circumstances have changed and why these changes support the modification made in the prior divorce decree constitutes reversible error unless the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted and only support the judgment." Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah App.1990); accord Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). " 'On a petition for a modification of a divorce decree, the threshold requirement for relief is a showing of a substantial change of circumstances occurring since the entry of the decree and not contemplated in the decree itself.' " Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah App.1990) (emphasis added) (quoting Stettler v. Stettler, 713 P.2d 699, 701 (Utah 1985)).

In determining there had been a change in Mrs. Moore's circumstances, the trial court considered the emancipation of the three children to be a substantial change of material circumstances. We need not decide whether a child reaching majority constitutes a substantial, material change in circumstances as it certainly is a circumstance that was contemplated at the time the decree was entered. See id. at 713. The divorce decree provided that Mr. Moore would pay $750 per month in child support until the children reached majority. ¹ Moreover, the decree provided for permanent alimony separate from the child support. Therefore, the plain language of the divorce decree demonstrates the parties agreed that even once...