Moore v. Morales
| Decision Date | 16 August 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 04 C 2545.,04 C 2545. |
| Citation | 445 F.Supp.2d 1000 |
| Parties | Frederick MOORE, Administrator and Personal Representative of the Frederick Grady Estate, Plaintiff, v. Officer Leo MORALES, Star # 4479, Officer Luis Garza, Star # 18948, Officer Donald Tuleja, Star # 3849, Sergeant D. Boyle, Star # 1294, Captain R. Miller, Star # 115, Joseph Palmsone, Star # 309119, and Demetrius Williamson, Star # 305598, Individually and in their Official capacity as City of Chicago Police Officers and/or employees of the Chicago Police Department, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Berve M. Power, Power & Dixon, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.
Robert W. Barber, Stacy Ann Benjamin, J. Ernest Mincy, III, Christopher Michael Murray, Mara Stacy Georges, City of Chicago, Dept. of Law, Individual Defense Litigation, Chicago, IL, Arlene Esther Martin, Kathryn M. Doi, Corp. Counsel's Office, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
This case arises out of the tragic death of Frederick Grady ("Mr.Grady") on April 8 or 9, 2003, while he was in the custody of several officers and employees of the Chicago Police Department ("CPD"). Plaintiff Frederick Moore ("Moore"), as Mr. Grady's eldest son and the administrator of Mr. Grady's estate, brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendments. Moore filed his initial complaint on April 9, 2004, and his current fifth amended complaint on October 7, 2005. Moore names as defendants Officer Leo Morales, Officer Luis Garza, Officer Donald Tuleja, Sergeant D. Boyle, Captain R. Miller, Detention Aide Joseph Palmsone, and Detention Aide Demetrius Williamson (collectively "Defendants") in their individual and official capacities. Moore claims that Defendants did not have probable cause to arrest Mr. Grady and that Mr. Grady suffered physical pain, significant bleeding, and death as a result of Defendants' use of excessive force or, in the alternative, as a result of Defendants' deliberate indifference to Mr. Grady's medical needs in violation of Section 1983. Currently before this Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, this motion is denied in part and granted in part.
On April 8, 2003, shortly after 6:00 p.m., Frederick Grady was involved in a two car, rollover traffic accident near the intersection of Clark and 18th Streets in the City of Chicago. (R. 114, Def.'s Facts ¶ 5.) Mr. Grady was the driver of one of those vehicies and had to be extricated from his van by the Chicago Fire Department ("CFD"). (Id. ¶ 6.) Mr. Grady was wearing his seat belt during the accident. (Id. ¶ 7.) Upon arrival, CFD paramedics John Kaveney and Renee Sanchez observed Mr. Grady walking around the scene of the accident. .) Mr. Grady told the paramedics that he was uninjured and the paramedics documented no observed signs of injury to Mr. Grady as a result of the accident. .) According to the ambulance report, Mr. Grady refused treatment, although it is not clear if he suffered from minor bumps and bruises from the accident or no injuries at all. , .) Mr. Grady refused transportation to the hospital for further evaluation. .)
Defendants claim that while the paramedics were documenting Mr. Grady's refusal of treatment in their records, Mr. Grady returned to the paramedics with a laceration to his right hand that he somehow sustained while trying to re-enter his overturned vehicle. (Id. ¶ 11.) Defendants further claim that Mr. Grady allowed the paramedics to dress his wound with sterile bandages, but refused further medical treatment. (Id. ¶ 12.) It is not clear if Moore disputes whether Mr. Grady in fact injured his hand after the accident or the manner in which Mr. Grady injured his hand. Moore does not admit or deny the statement, but states that "[m]aterial facts are in dispute as to whether Mr. Grady, in fact, severely lacerated his right hand after the accident by cutting his hand on glass or some other sharp object" and he further states that the laceration is the result of "blunt force trauma." .) He further disputes whether Mr. Grady allowed the paramedics to dress his wound since the traffic crash report indicates that Mr. Grady refused treatment. (Id. ¶ 12.) Mr. Grady signed the paramedics' report, acknowledging that he was refusing further medical care and had been warned of the risks of not going to the hospital. .)
A City of Chicago Streets and Sanitation ("CCSS") tow truck towed Mr. Grady's vehicle, although the parties dispute where the vehicle was towed to. (R. 128, Pl.'s Resp. to Defs. Facts ¶ 14.) After the accident, Mr. Grady's vehicle ended up on a private lot located at 1913 S. Jefferson in Chicago, although it is unclear whether CCSS towed it there. Shortly after 8:00 p.m., Wallace Lockard, the owner of the lot, called the CPD to report a trespasser on the property. .) Chicago Police officers Garza and Morales responded to the scene. (Id. ¶ 18.) They observed a man standing on the lot behind the locked fence. (Id.) Lockard told the officers that the man inside the gate did not have permission to be there. (Id.) Lockard opened the gate and Garza and Morales handcuffed the man, whom they learned was Mr. Grady, and placed him in the back of their squad car. (Id. ¶ 19.) Although Lockard signed a complaint charging Mr. Grady with criminal trespass, it is disputed whether Mr. Grady was actually trespassing. .) Upon his arrest, Mr. Grady informed the officers that he was trying to get his tools from his van, which was on the lot. Morales and Garza arrested Mr. Grady at approximately 8:45 p.m. on the evening of April 8, 2003.
It is disputed whether Mr. Grady had a gauze bandage or any injury at all on one of his hands at the time of his arrest. The City claims that his hand was bandaged, but neither Garza nor Morales observed any blood coming from the bandage while Mr. Grady was in their custody. .) The City further claims that Mr. Grady informed one of the arresting officers that he injured his hand around the time of the car accident, which the officers assumed was treated by paramedics on the scene. (Id. ¶ 23.) Moore claims that material facts are in dispute as to whether Mr. Grady had a bandage on his hand when he was arrested because none of the Defendants noted any injuries on any report prior to Mr. Grady's death. He also disputes whether Mr. Grady informed officers at the scene that he been injured shortly after the car accident. (R. 128, Pl.'s Resp. to Defs. Facts ¶¶ 22, 23, 26.)
When Morales and Garza transported Mr. Grady to the 12th District Police Station, Morales handcuffed Mr. Grady to a bar in the police station for nearly two hours. During those two hours, Morales did not recall seeing any blood coming from Mr. Grady's hand nor did he send Mr. Grady to receive medical treatment. (Id. ¶ 22.) While in the police station, one of the officers asked Mr. Grady if he needed any medical attention to which Mr. Grady responded no. .) The parties dispute Mr. Grady's reasons for declining medical attention. Defendants argue that he was injured but declined medical attention, and Moore claims that he was not injured and declined medical treatment. .) After the paperwork for Mr. Grady's arrest was completed, the arresting officers transported him to the lockup. .)
Mr. Grady was admitted into the lockup at approximately 10:30 p.m. .) Tuleja was the lockup keeper at the time Mr. Grady was brought into the lockup. Palmsone and Williamson assisted Tuleja in the processing of prisoners. (Id. ¶ 28.) The lockup process includes taking custody of the prisoner from the arresting officer; taking the prisoner's personal property and depositing it into a bag; searching the prisoner's person (without removing his pants or bottom layer shirt); observing and asking questions of the prisoner to assess the need for medical or mental health treatment; photographing and fingerprinting the prisoner; allowing a telephone call; and finally, placing the prisoner in a jail cell. (Id. ¶ 30.) Mr. Grady was processed in accordance to this procedure and was not rejected from the lockup because of any injuries. After Mr. Grady made a phone call, Palmsone escorted Mr. Grady to his cell. Mr. Grady walked on his own accord, was cooperative, and did not appear to be in any distress. (Id.)
Palmsone checked the well-being of all prisoners by walking by each of the jail cells approximately every fifteen minutes, and documented each of these checks in a log. (Id. ¶ 41.) After Mr. Grady was placed in his jail cell, Palmsone checked him several times. (Id. ¶ 42.) Mr. Grady was asleep during the majority of the time he was in his cell. (Id.) Boyle and Miller also toured the lockup and neither observed anything wrong with Mr. Grady and they were never told that he needed medical attention. (Id. 1143.) Williamson also made rounds and did not notice anything wrong with Mr. Grady. (Id. ¶ 44.) At no time did Mr. Grady request medical attention. (Id. ¶ 45.) At approximately...
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