Moore v. Pantoja
| Decision Date | 26 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. CIV-15-688-HE |
| Parties | CHARLES LEE MOORE II, Plaintiff, v. LT. PANTOJA et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma |
Plaintiff Charles Moore, a state prisoner appearing pro se, brings this federal civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl. (Doc. No. 1); Pl.'s Br. in Supp. (Doc. No. 2). Chief United States District Judge Joe Heaton has referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's claims (Doc. No. 20), and Plaintiff, in a motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 26), has responded. In turn, Defendants have responded to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 28), and Plaintiff has replied (Doc. No. 29). The undersigned recommends that the Court deny both motions.
Plaintiff alleges that on November 24, 2014, while he was housed at the Oklahoma State Reformatory ("OSR") in Granite, Oklahoma, one correctional officer (Defendant Pantoja) assaulted him and two others (Defendants Harvey and Mangalona) observed the assault and did not intervene. Compl. at 2-3. Plaintiff asserts a § 1983 claim against these Defendants in their individual capacities based on an alleged violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Id. He seeks nominal and punitive damages. Id. at 2, 4.
Plaintiff initially asserted claims against Defendants Harvey and Mangalona, alleging "[w]hile this incident took place, [they] stood just outside of the Plaintiff's cell and watched the incident take place, yet failed to intervene and protect the Plaintiff from harm." Id. at 3. However, in his motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff states that he "will dismiss Sgt. Matthew Harvey and Tina Mongalona without prejudice." Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 2. Defendants do not object. Defs.' Resp. at 3. Because Defendants have not filed an answer or a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss these parties without a court order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i).
Defendant Pantoja seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's claim under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to adequately plead an Eighth Amendment violation and on the basis of qualified immunity. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 9, 12-13. While Defendant Pantoja challenges Plaintiff's Complaint on a multitude of fronts, his intertwined arguments generally fall into two categories: (1) Plaintiff does not adequately allege that the force used against him by Defendant Pantoja was unnecessary or malicious or sadistic, and (2) Plaintiff's pleading establishes that the force used by Defendant Pantoja was justified. Id.
In analyzing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) the court "accept[s] as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and view[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Burnett v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 706 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 2013). A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when it lacks factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). Bare legal conclusions in a complaint are not entitled to the assumption of truth; "they must be supported by factual allegations" to state a claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
"[A] pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (1991); see also Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997). Whether a complaint contains sufficient facts to avoid dismissal is context-specific and is determined through a court's application of "judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments," and accordingly "places restraints on prison officials . . . [from using] excessive physical force against prisoners." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); see U.S. Const.amend. VIII. In order to hold a prison official liable for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, a two-prong standard applies: "(1) an objective prong that asks 'if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively "harmful enough" to establish a constitutional violation,' and (2) a subjective prong under which the plaintiff must show that 'the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.'" Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 191 F.3d 1281, 1289 (10th Cir. 1999) (alteration omitted) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)). With respect to the second prong, "when officials stand accused of using excessive physical force," the court asks "whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 978 (10th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Pantoja physically assaulted him on November 24, 2014. See Compl. at 2-3. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he had just returned to his cell from the shower and was taking his "heart and thyroid medication" when Defendant Pantoja "entered Plaintiff's cell, grabbed him by the throat, and threw him violently to the ground." Id. Defendant Pantoja then "allowed Plaintiff to stand at which time he starred at the Plaintiff for a brief moment before spraying him with mace for twenty (20) [to] thirty (30) seconds." Id. at 3. Plaintiff states that he was "completely naked" and "never resisted and remained completely docile and uncombative for the duration of this entire episode." Id.; see also Pl.'s Br. in Supp. at 2-5. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he "suffered extreme pain to his throat, eyes, and face" from the pepper spray. Pl.'s Br. in Supp. at 4.
Plaintiff has alleged specific facts that, when assumed to be true, plausibly assert that Defendant Pantoja used objectively harmful physical force against a non-combative, non-resisting inmate and did so for a reason other than a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. This is sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Defendant Pantoja "is liable for the misconduct alleged," Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, under the governing law. See, e.g., DeSpain, 264 F.3d at 978 (); accord Graham v. Sheriff of Logan Cnty., 741 F.3d 1118, 1123 (10th Cir. 2013) .
Relevant to the subjective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim, Defendant Pantoja argues that an exhibit attached to the Complaint—a grievance response in which another prison official stated that Defendant Pantoja's conduct on November 24, 2014, "was actually a use of force in response to [Plaintiff] physically pushing Lt. Pantoja while trying to destroy contraband"—"casts doubt on [Plaintiff's] claims" and "contains evidence that Plaintiff's account of the incident is inaccurate and/or incomplete, and [provides] justification for the use of force." Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 6 (citing Compl. at Ex. 1). Without citing any authority, Defendant Pantoja suggests that the prison official's statement should be considered true for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.See id. at 22-23 & n.7. Essentially, Defendant Pantoja argues that Plaintiff has pleaded himself out of court by attaching this grievance response—which contains a third-party prison official's retrospective explanation of the challenged conduct—as an exhibit to his Complaint. See id. at 22-26; Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); Kennedy v. Peele, 552 F. App'x 787, 792 (10th Cir. 2014) ("[F]actual allegations that contradict a properly considered document are not well-pleaded facts that the court must accept as true." (ellipsis omitted) (quoting GFF Corp. v. Assoc. Wholesale Grocers, 130 F.3d 1381, 1385 (10th Cir. 1997)).
This argument overstates the impact of the grievance response and misapprehends how the Rule 12(b)(6) standard is applied. As a result of Plaintiff's inclusion of the grievance response as part of his Complaint, the Court may accept as true the facts that the response was made and that a prison official stated therein that the use of force was justified. But that official's conclusion that the physical force used on Plaintiff on November 24, 2014, was justified is not entitled to any such assumption and does not permit the Court to discount Plaintiff's otherwise well-pled allegations that on that day Defendant Pantoja "entered Plaintiff's cell, grabbed him by the throat, and threw him violently to the ground" before spraying mace in the "completely docile" Plaintiff's face for twenty or thirty seconds. Compl. at 3. Those facts, if proved to be true, would support a reasonable inference that Defendant Pantoja's use of force was not "applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore disciple," but rather was applied "maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (per curiam).
Defendant Pantoja also argues that a...
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