Moore v. Pfister, 15 CV 10376

• Decision Date: 31 March 2018
• Docket Number: No. 15 CV 10376,15 CV 10376
• Parties: COREY MOORE, Petitioner, v. RANDY PFISTER. Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

COREY MOORE, Petitioner, v. RANDY PFISTER. Respondent.

No. 15 CV 10376

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

March 31, 2018

Judge John J. Tharp, Jr.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Petitioner Corey Moore brings this habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to challenge the convictions he received after two bench trials in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois involving related murders. In the first trial, Moore was convicted of the first degree murder of his employer, Lonnie Williams, the attempted first degree murder of Lonnie's wife Melanie Williams, and armed robbery. In the second trial, he was convicted of the first degree murder and aggravated unlawful restraint of his girlfriend Kimberly Fort, who had provided information about the Williams murder to the police. At a combined sentencing hearing, the trial judge sentenced Moore to life imprisonment in the Williams case and to death in the Fort case. The death sentence was subsequently commuted to a term of life. Moore is serving these sentences at Stateville Correctional Center in Joliet, Illinois, and the Respondent in this case is Randy Pfister, Stateville's warden (hereafter, "the state"). Moore's petition identifies three claims in his § 2254 petition, each relating to both cases: (A) that he was denied due process because the state withheld impeachment evidence concerning a prosecutor who testified concerning Moore's confessions to the crimes; (B) that he was denied his right to counsel because the trial court limited the scope of Moore's post-conviction counsel's appointment; and (C) that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by advising him to waive his rights to a jury trial. For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum Opinion, Moore's petition, and his motion for an evidentiary hearing, are denied.

I. Background

Factual determinations made by state courts are presumed to be correct unless a petitioner offers "clear and convincing evidence to the contrary." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (citing § 2254(e)(1)). Moore's petition fails that requirement and so this Court derives the following facts from the record established in the state court proceedings. The Court takes these facts primarily from the opinion of the Illinois appellate court denying Moore's postconviction petition (Ex. I,¹ People v. Moore, 2014 IL App (1st) 123480-U (6th Div. Aug. 15, 2014)), the last state court that ruled on the merits of Moore's due process claim and from the opinions of the Illinois appellate courts in Moore's direct appeals, which were the last courts to address the merits of Moore's Sixth Amendment right to counsel claim and jury waiver claim (Ex. B; People v. Moore, 359 Ill. App. 3d 1195 (2005), No. 1-04-0766 June 21, 2005 (Williams case); and Ex. F, People v. Moore, 389 Ill. App. 3d 1031 (1st Dist. April 6, 2009) (Fort case)). Frentz v. Brown, 876 F.3d 285, 293 (7th Cir. 2017) ("The state court whose decision we review is the last one that ruled on the merits of the issue.").

To set the groundwork, it is undisputed that petitioner Moore shot and killed Lonnie Williams in a stairwell of his apartment building on September 3, 1996. Investigation of the Williams murder brought police to Moore's girlfriend, Kimberly Fort, who provided information identifying Moore and his possible whereabouts. About two months later, on November 21, 1996, Fort was murdered in front of the apartment building where she lived. Investigation of theFort murder also implicated Moore, who was arrested shortly thereafter in Atlanta, Georgia. Moore was charged separately for the Williams and Fort murders, and related crimes, in two cases: Case No. 97 CR 1779, for the Williams murder, and Case No. 97 CR 1780 for the Fort murder. In the Williams case, Moore's defense was predicated on the theory that he shot Williams in self-defense after Williams produced a gun during an argument the two were having over money that Williams owed him. Ex. T, Defense Opening Statement, Williams Trial, Tr. 3-22-99 at J-17 (describing struggle for gun produced by Williams resulting in Williams' being shot); Request for Evidentiary Hearing, ECF No. 23 at 4 n.2 ("Moore claim[ed] self-defense"). In the Fort case, Moore claimed that he was in Atlanta when Fort was murdered. Ex. V, Defense Opening Statement, Tr. 3-29-99 at N12:22 - N13:7. Ultimately, Moore was tried and convicted of these charges in separate bench trials, conducted back-to-back by the same trial judge, Cook County Circuit Judge James D. Egan, in the spring of 1999. A capital sentencing hearing encompassing both cases followed and Judge Egan sentenced Moore to life without parole in the Williams case and to death in the Fort case. The death sentence was commuted to life without parole by Illinois Governor George Ryan in January 2003.

A. Pre-Trial Suppression Hearing

Before the trials, Moore moved in both cases to suppress statements he made to police, claiming that he had been physically and mentally coerced into making them. Ex. I at ¶ 6; Ex. Q, Amended Motion to Suppress Statements at 45-49; Ex. S, Tr. 6-30-98 at 52-115 and at 117-184. In particular, Moore alleged that Assistant State's Attorney Mike Rogers had coerced him to make statements by promising Moore that he would not receive the death penalty if he did so. Ex. I at ¶ 6. At a joint suppression hearing in both cases, ASA Rogers and Detective Andrew Abbott testified. Id. ¶ 7. Rogers told the court that he spoke with Moore on December 12, 1996, at the Area 3 police station at about 2 a.m. after giving Moore his Miranda warnings. Id. ¶ 9.Rogers testified that he asked Moore about Lonnie Williams' murder, but that Moore denied being involved. Id. Rogers told Moore that Melanie Williams had implicated him and that Moore's cousin had tried to dispose of the same type of gun that had been used in Lonnie Williams' murder. Id. But Moore told Rogers he did not want to speak with him any further, and Rogers ended the interview. Id.

Abbott testified at the suppression hearing that he and Detective William Morrissette talked to Moore later that day at around 9:30 a.m. at the Area 2 police station. Id. ¶ 7. Abbott also advised Moore of his Miranda rights, and Abbott and Morrissette talked with Moore about Fort's murder. Id. Moore was placed in a lineup at around 11:30 a.m. that day, and at about 6 p.m., Abbott talked to him for a second time after again giving him his Miranda warnings. Id. Abbott testified at the suppression hearing that during these two talks, Moore did not ask to speak to a lawyer or to family members. Id. Abbott also denied that any officers physically assaulted Moore. Id. Rogers went to the Area 2 police station at about 6:30 p.m. that evening in connection with Fort's murder, and learned that Moore was in custody at that location. Id. ¶ 10. Rogers talked to Moore at about 6:45 p.m., again advising him of his Miranda rights. Id. Rogers then told Moore that he had been implicated in the murders of Lonnie Williams and Fort, and asked Moore if he would take responsibility for his actions. Id. Moore started to cry and said, "I did it. I killed them both." Id. Shortly thereafter, Moore provided two court-reported statements about the Williams and Fort murders.² Rogers asked Moore whether any promises or threats had been expressed to him in exchange for his statements, and Moore said that none had. Id. ¶ 11. Moore confirmed that he was allowed to use the bathroom and had also been provided food,drinks, and cigarettes. Id. At the hearing, Rogers denied threatening Moore or making him any promises. Id. The state trial court denied Moore's motion to suppress in both cases. Id.

The defense did not present any witnesses at the suppression hearing. Id. ¶ 13. In post-trial proceedings, Moore has asserted that he wanted to testify at the suppression hearing but was prevented from doing so by Carey. Moore maintains that he would have testified that his statements to Rogers were not voluntary but rather were the product of violent and coercive police interrogation and Rogers' promise that he would not receive the death penalty.

B. Jury Waivers

As trial approached, Carey told the judge that after discussing the matter with Moore, "it looks like we are going to be waiving jury as to both cases both for trial and sentencing." Ex. T, Tr. 3-15-99, at I3. It does not appear that Moore was present in court for that statement, but the following week, on March 22, 1999, the state court engaged in the following discussion with Moore:

The Court: Mr. Moore is present. At this juncture, it was indicated on the last date that we will be proceeding by way of bench; is that correct?

Mr. Carey: That is correct, Judge. I have again explained to Mr. Moore the differences and the consequences of waiving his right to a jury, and he has executed a jury waiver for both cases, 1779 and 1780 as to trial phase and as to sentencing. We are ready to proceed at this time.

The Court: Mr. Moore, I have been tendered, to start with, two jury waivers to two cases for trial. Is that your signature on the jury waiver forms?

Defendant Moore: Yes.

The Court: You understand you have a right to a jury trial, and do you understand what a jury trial is?

Defendant Moore: Yes.

The Court: By signing these, you are giving up your right to jury trials, asking that I hear the evidence to determine whether you're guilty or not guilty. Do you understand that?

Defendant Moore: Yes.

The Court: I also have been tendered two waiver forms for the sentencing phase. If there is a finding of guilty on either of the two trials, you have a right to a jury to decide whether—if you were found eligible—you have a right to a jury deciding the sentencing phase. Did you understand that when you signed the waivers, you're giving up a right to a jury trial at sentencing phase when you signed these jury waivers? Do you understand that?

Defendant Moore: Yes.

The Court: And you signed

...