Moore v. Reeves

• Decision Date: 16 August 1991
• Parties: 71 Ed. Law Rep. 340 Alfred Charles MOORE v. Benjamin REEVES, et al. 1900914.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 173

589 So.2d 173

71 Ed. Law Rep. 340

Alfred Charles MOORE v. Benjamin REEVES, et al.

1900914.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Aug. 16, 1991.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 4, 1991.

Trey Riley, Huntsville, for appellant.

Danny D. Henderson and Wesley G. Smith of Spurrier, Rice & Henderson, Huntsville, for appellees.

HOUSTON, Justice.

Alfred Charles Moore appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of the defendants, Benjamin Reeves, Robert Patterson, Geno D'Andrade, and James Patterson. We reverse and remand.

The summary judgment was proper in this case if there was no genuine issue of material fact and the defendants were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, A.R.Civ.P. The burden was on the defendants to make a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that they were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. If that showing was made, then the burden shifted to the plaintiff to present evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact, so as to avoid entry of a judgment against him. In determining whether there was a genuine issue of material fact, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all reasonable doubts against the defendants. Wakefield v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 572 So.2d 1220 (Ala.1990). Because this action was not pending on June 11, 1987, the applicable standard of review is the "substantial evidence" rule. Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-12. "Substantial evidence" is "evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989); § 12-21-12.

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Moore, as required under the applicable standard of review, reveals the following:

At the time of the accident made the basis of this appeal, Moore, who was 70 years old, was employed as a security guard or security officer by Oakwood Seventh Day Adventist Church School System, Inc., a corporation, doing business as Oakwood College ("the college"), in Huntsville, Alabama. As part of his duties, Moore patrolled the campus at the college. Defendant James Patterson was a sergeant with the security department at the college and was Moore's immediate supervisor; he was responsible for maintaining and repairing the vehicles in the security department. Defendant D'Andrade was the safety director at the college, and he had assigned the responsibility for maintaining and repairing the vehicles in the security department to James Patterson. D'Andrade reported to and answered to defendant Robert Patterson, who was vice-president of finance of the college. Defendant Reeves was the president of the college.

On the date of the accident, when Moore arrived for his shift, he was informed that his normal patrol vehicle needed repair and was not usable; therefore, James Patterson gave Moore the keys to a 1976 Plymouth station wagon and instructed him to use that vehicle to patrol the campus. ¹ Moore previously had refused to drive the 1976 Plymouth, because, he said, it was "junk"; it was, according to Moore, in a state of disrepair. Specifically, the driver's door of the 1976 Plymouth would come open, if it were not closed securely and locked, so that the driver had to hold the door in order to keep it from opening. D'Andrade and James Patterson were aware that the door and the door closure mechanism of the 1976 Plymouth did not function properly; they had been aware of this problem for several months prior to the accident, but had not repaired the door. D'Andrade had issued an order precluding the use of the 1976 Plymouth on patrol duty and directly instructing James Patterson to inform Moore not to use that vehicle, because it was "unsafe"--that is, the door "went bad." James Patterson had indicated that at the time of Moore's accident, "because it was not the best vehicle, [it was] used ... for stake-outs, just for parking, surveillance." Although this problem had existed for several months prior to the accident, on the day of Moore's accident, at the insistence of James Patterson and after having registered a complaint regarding its safety, Moore used the 1976 Plymouth to patrol the campus. Because the door would not close properly, Moore drove the 1976 Plymouth while holding the door shut with his elbow on the outside. As he was rounding a curve, the door came open; he fell out; as he fell out, his foot became caught between the accelerator and the brake pedal; and he was dragged along by the vehicle until it crashed into a tree. As a result, Moore sustained injuries to his back.

Moore sued the defendants under Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-11(c)(2) (a provision of the Alabama Workmen's Compensation Act), alleging that the injuries he sustained from the accident resulted from the inoperable condition of a safety guard or device upon the vehicle he was driving--that the mechanism designed and installed by the manufacturer of the vehicle to keep the door closed while the vehicle was being operated, thus keeping passengers inside the vehicle during its operation, was inoperable for a significant time preceding the accident made the basis of this suit.

We note that this case appears to be conceptually different from the majority of workmen's compensation cases filed pursuant to § 25-5-11(c)(2), which involve a safety guard or device on a machine in a factory-type, industrial setting, such as Harris v. Gill, 585 So.2d 831 (Ala.1991) (a case in which an employee sued his supervisory co-employees for "bypassing" palm control buttons on a punch press designed to cut metal collars, which buttons were intended as a safety device or safety guard to protect the employee from injury). See, also, Bailey v. Hogg, 547 So.2d 498 (Ala.1989), and Williams v. Price, 564 So.2d 408 (Ala.1990). In this case, Moore, as the employee, sued the defendants, as his co-employees, for failing to maintain and/or repair the door and door closure mechanism on the vehicle he had to operate in order to patrol the campus, which was the job for which he was employed. Although not involving the more common machine in the more common industrial setting, the facts of this case nonetheless support an action under § 25-5-11(c)(2).

Section 25-5-11(c)(2) reads as follows:

"(c) As used herein, 'willful conduct' means:

"....

"(2) The willful and intentional removal from a machine of a safety guard or device provided by the manufacturer of the machine with knowledge that injury or death would likely or probably result from such removal; provided, however, removal of such a guard or device shall not be willful conduct unless such removal did, in fact, increase the danger of the use of the machine and was not done for the purpose of the repair of the machine or was not part of an improvement or modification of the machine which rendered the safety device unnecessary or ineffective."

In Creel v. Bridewell, 535 So.2d 95, 97 (Ala.1988), this Court held that "[a] duty to provide co-employees with a safe workplace naturally encompasses a duty to provide co-employees with machines that function properly and safely." Thus, pursuant to the provisions of § 25-5-11(c)(2) and based on the well-settled law in Alabama, it was incumbent upon Moore to present substantial evidence that the defendants willfully and intentionally removed from the machine the safety guard or device provided by the manufacturer of the machine with knowledge that injury would likely or probably result from the removal. See Harris v. Gill, supra.

Moore contends that the willful and intentional failure to maintain or repair a safety guard or device that renders the guard or device inoperable or ineffective, is the equivalent of the "removal" of or the "failure to install" a safety guard or device within the purview of § 25-5-11(c)(2). Moore contends that the door and door closure mechanism of the 1976 Plymouth he was driving was as ineffective at keeping him inside the vehicle as if it had been removed; that the undisputed evidence establishes that his injuries resulted from the inoperable condition of that vehicle, because the door and door closure mechanism did not operate properly; and that that condition had existed for some time prior to his accident. He further contends that he presented substantial evidence that he was instructed to use the 1976 Plymouth in spite of its dangerous condition, with full knowledge on the part of the defendants that the vehicle was unsafe to operate and that operating it would result in injury.

The defendants contend that Moore failed to make out a prima facie case under § 25-5-11(c)(2). According to the defendants, this case does not even involve a safety guard or device as specified in § 25-5-11(c)(2). They contend that to hold that a door and door closure mechanism of a vehicle is a safety guard or device would implicitly extend the definition of those two terms "to encompass every aspect of a piece of machinery, which, in case of its malfunction, could result in an injury to an employee" and, therefore, "would result in a proliferation of co-employee suits." They also contend that Moore failed to present any evidence that the defendants, in allowing the door and door closure mechanism to remain unrepaired, knew that injury or death would likely or probably result.

Thus, ever mindful of, and consistent with, the well-established law that the Alabama Workmen's Compensation Act is to be construed liberally to effect its beneficent purposes, resolving all reasonable doubts in favor of the claimant, Riley v. Perkins, 282 Ala. 629, 213 So.2d 796 (1968); Tiger Motor Co. v. Winslett, 278 Ala. 108, 176 So.2d 39 (1965), we must first determine, under the facts of this case, whether the door and door closure mechanism of a particular vehicle is a safety guard or device within the...