Moore v. Reynolds

Decision Date28 February 1985
Docket NumberNo. 0468,0468
PartiesRobert M. MOORE, Jr., Appellant, v. William M. REYNOLDS, III, Respondent. . Heard
CourtSouth Carolina Court of Appeals

Edward V. Atkinson, of Atkinson, Davis & Newman, Sumter, for appellant.

Harry C. Wilson, Jr., of Lee, Wilson, Erter & Booth, Sumter, for respondent.

CURETON, Judge:

Respondent William M. Reynolds, III, brought this action to enjoin appellant Robert M. Moore, Jr., from obstructing a right-of-way. After the circuit court granted Reynolds's motion for summary judgment on the question of his right to an easement affecting the right-of-way, the remainder of the case was heard by a master-in-equity who recommended that the injunction be granted. The circuit court confirmed the master's findings and granted the injunction and Moore appeals. We affirm.

The issues that we consider in this appeal are (1) whether the circuit court erred in confirming the master's conclusion that Reynolds should elect pursuant to Circuit Court Rule 78 the theory upon which he based his right to an easement, to wit, an easement by grant, prescription, or necessity, and (2) whether the court committed error in confirming the master's findings as to the location of the easement and determination of its width.

Reynolds alleged in his complaint that he is the owner of a tract of land located in Sumter County and that Moore is the owner of an adjacent tract over which he is entitled to an easement along an "Old Neighborhood Road." Moore's answer admitted that he is the owner of the tract in question but denied that the neighborhood road crosses his property in the fashion claimed by Reynolds. Reynolds moved for summary judgment. The circuit court entered its order finding that Reynolds had "an easement appurtenant over, across and upon the lands of the defendant [Moore] and [that] the determination of the location of the easement appurtenant is hereby denied with the same to be determined upon trial of the matter." No appeal was taken from this order and the case was thereafter referred to a master.

Both Reynolds's and Moore's properties were originally part of a 2,141-acre tract of land belonging to the Estate of W.W. Anderson. This acreage was divided by Anderson's heirs into several tracts. Tract number one containing 166.3 acres of upland, 103.7 acres of swamp land and 227 acres of mill pond was awarded to Mary Virginia Nelson who in 1926 deeded the mill pond and fifty-two acres of the swamp land to Mary Virginia Saunders White. The deed to White contained the following easement:

A right of way over and upon the neighborhood road leading from the road known as Stateburg and Sumter's Landing Road, terminating on and into the 52 acres above described as a right of way appurtenant thereto.

Subsequently, in January 1927, Mrs. Nelson conveyed to Moore's predecessor in title the remainder of tract number one. Mrs. White died in 1959, devising the 227-acre tract and the fifty-two-acre tract to her children. In 1960 the children joined in a conveyance of the two tracts to Reynolds's grandfather. The latter deed contained the precise easement described in the 1926 deed to Mrs. White. In 1977, Reynolds received title to the tracts under his grandfather's will.

In disposing of Moore's contention that Reynolds was required to elect the theory on which he relied to support his claim of an easement, we find no merit to it. The circuit court found that Reynolds was entitled to an easement across Moore's land. The order was not appealed. Therefore, the basis upon which the circuit court found that the easement existed was not before the master for determination. Moreover, our review of Reynolds's complaint convinces us that he claims an easement by grant only.

We now turn to the question of whether the court committed reversible error in adopting the master's findings as to the location of the easement and the determination of its width. In an action in equity tried first by a master, findings of fact concurred in by a circuit judge will not be disturbed on appeal unless we find no evidentiary support for the findings. Lund v. Gray Line Water Tours, Inc., 277 S.C. 447, 289 S.E.2d 404 (1982). We find evidentiary support for the concurrent findings of the master and circuit court judge.

Moore concedes that Reynolds has an easement to his property along the "Old Neighborhood Road" but denies that the old road takes the route across his property as claimed by Reynolds. Therefore, the master had to decide the location of the old road. Essentially, Reynolds claimed the old road commenced at the Stateburg and Sumter's Landing Road, crossed property entirely owned by Moore and terminated upon the fifty-two-acre tract. On the other hand, Moore claimed that the old road left the main road from a different point, took a...

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4 cases
  • Tupper v. Dorchester County
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • April 16, 1997
    ...710 (1987). However, the determination of the extent of a grant of an easement is an action in equity. Moore v. Reynolds, 285 S.C. 574, 577, 330 S.E.2d 542, 544 (Ct.App.1985). Thus, this Court may take its own view of the evidence on the latter issue. Townes Assocs., Ltd. v. City of Greenvi......
  • Smith v. Commissioners of Public Works of City of Charleston
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • December 9, 1993
    ...710, 711 (1987). However, the determination of the extent of a grant of an easement is an action in equity. Moore v. Reynolds, 285 S.C. 574, 577, 330 S.E.2d 542, 544 (Ct.App.1985). Thus, we may take our view of the evidence on the latter issue. Townes Assoc., Ltd. v. City Council of Greenvi......
  • Widell v. Tollefson
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • October 23, 1990
    ...is "reasonable, convenient and necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the right-of-way was created." Moore v. Reynolds, 285 S.C. 574, 330 S.E.2d 542, 545 (App.1985). While the judgment does not give a precise width, we conclude that the term "driveway (roadway)" referred to in the ju......
  • Giles v. Parker
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • December 4, 1990
    ...is reasonable, convenient and necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the right-of-way was created." Moore v. Reynolds, 285 S.C. 574, 578, 330 S.E.2d 542, 545 (Ct.App.1985). The rule set forth in Moore is consonant with the majority of cases examined in Annotation, Width of Way Create......

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