Moore v. Robbins
| Decision Date | 11 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 13–1122 BAH |
| Citation | 24 F.Supp.3d 88 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
| Parties | Johnny Andrew Moore, Sr., et al., Appellants, v. Judy A. Robbins, United States Trustee, Appellee. |
Johnny Andrew Moore, Sr., Washington, DC, pro se.
Maria Ford Moore, Washington, DC, pro se.
Joseph Anthony Guzinski, U.S. Department of Justice, Alexandria, VA, Noah M. Schottenstein, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Appellee.
The pro se appellants, Johnny Andrew Moore, Sr. (“Mr.Moore”) and Maria Ford Moore (“Mrs.Moore”) (collectively, the “appellants”), appeal from the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia denying the appellants' discharge under Chapter 7 of the bankruptcy code for failure to obey a court order and dismissing the appellants' counterclaim filed in that action. The appellants also seek review of the Bankruptcy Court's denial of the appellants' motion for recusal. The Court affirms the Bankruptcy Court's Order.1
The Order which is the subject of this appeal stems from the appellants' alleged violations of the Bankruptcy Court's orders in the bankruptcy petition proceedings. The Court first describes the bankruptcy petition proceedings before turning to the adversary proceeding resulting in the Order at issue.
The appellants petitioned for Chapter 13 bankruptcy on May 27, 2010. Bankruptcy Record (“B.R.”) (Johnny Andrew Moore, Sr. Voluntary Bankruptcy Petition, Case No. 10–515) at 1, ECF No. 2.2 In response to the objection to the petition filed by a bank holding a deed of trust on one of the appellants' homes, the appellants began making various frivolous legal claims and demands in an apparent attempt to invalidate the mortgage on their property. For instance, the appellants filed a document entitled “Interrogatives [sic] Depositions for Disclosure & Discovery,” which, inter alia, sought an admission from the bank that 30–year mortgages were “illegal.” See B.R. at 34, ECF No. 2. The appellants also sent the objecting bank an “Affidavit & Official Cancellation Discharge Note–Draft” that purported to discharge Mr. Moore's mortgage and allow Mr. Moore to retain his property “free and clear of all claims.” B.R. at 39, ECF No. 2.
The appellants voluntarily converted their petition from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 on October 22, 2010, B.R. at 109 (), and subsequently filed an amended schedule of assets and statement of financial affairs on May 4, 2011, B.R. at 142, ECF No. 2. The Chapter 7 trustee timely objected to many of the exemptions claimed in this new schedule and moved the Bankruptcy Court, inter alia, to direct “the [appellants] to permit the Trustee and his auctioneers reasonable access [to] the [appellants'] residences to review and evaluate all partially exempt and non-exempt personal property.” See B.R. at 171 (), ECF No. 2. The Bankruptcy Court sustained the trustee's objections and ordered the appellants to “permit the Trustee and his auctioneers reasonable access to [the appellants'] residences to review and evaluate all partially exempt and non-exempt personal property” as well as to “permit the Trustee and his real estate broker reasonable access to the [appellants'] residences.” B.R. at 200 (Order Sustaining Trustee's Objection to Exemptions), ECF No. 2. The actions that followed this Order—and the Bankruptcy Court's subsequent Orders—were the subject of the adversary proceeding.
On August 16, 2012, the Chapter 7 trustee initiated an adversary bankruptcy proceeding against the appellants, objecting to the appellants' discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727. B.R. at 3 (Trustee's Compl. Objection to Debtors' Discharge Under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6)(A) and (a)(4)(A) ), ECF No. 2–1. Specifically, the trustee moved the Bankruptcy Court to deny the appellants' discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6), B.R. at 15, ECF No. 2–1, which allows a court to refuse to grant discharge to a debtor if “the debtor has refused, in the case (A) to obey any lawful order of the court, other than an order to respond to a material question or to testify.”3 The instant appellee moved for and was granted permission to intervene in the adversary proceeding pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 307, on October 2, 2012. B.R. at 67–68 (), ECF No. 2–1. The appellee, Judy A. Robbins as United States Trustee, was substituted as primary plaintiff in the adversary proceeding on November 20, 2012. B.R. at 79–80 (Order Substituting United States Trustee As Primary Plaintiff and Retaining Jurisdiction Over Adversary Proceeding After Closure of Bankruptcy Case), ECF No. 2–1. The Bankruptcy Court held a bench trial in the adversary proceeding on May 20, 2013. See Trial Tr. (“Tr.”) at 2:2–4, ECF No. 5.
On the morning of the adversary proceeding trial, the appellants filed a purported “Verified Counter–Complaint For Breach of Fiduciary Duty and an Accounting,” B.R. at 185– 260, ECF No. 2–1, alleging, inter alia, that the trustee had a duty to investigate whether the mortgages entered into by the appellants were fraudulent. The Bankruptcy Court noted that the counterclaim was “not properly before the Court.” Tr. at 104:8–9. When the hearing commenced, the appellants stated their appearances as “Cecilia ... the executive and beneficiary for the legal person, Maria Ford Moore,” and “Johnny, the executor, administrator and beneficiary of the legal name, Johnny Andrews Moore Trust.” Id. at 2:10–19, ECF No. 5. Mrs. Moore objected to the attorney for the appellee calling her a debtor because Mrs. Moore stated she was Id. at 10:17–21. In their opening statement, the appellants attempted to challenge the trustee's actions in their bankruptcy petition, which the Bankruptcy Court found to be in contravention of its Order on the appellee's motion in limine4 prohibiting such evidence. See id. at 11:18–12:5. The appellants went on to state that as “Judas betrayed Christ for a few pieces of silver ... the United States Government and the state of the trustees, of the trust created under this public law, one which place all property of the people into the U.S. Government and state, and that these possessions are a trust to be used as a credit line, okay?” Id. at 17:14–22.
Counsel for the appellee called the Chapter 7 trustee, Mark Albert (“the trustee”), to testify as to the events that occurred after the Bankruptcy Court's Order sustaining the trustee's objections to the appellants bankruptcy petition. Id. at 19:22–23. The trustee testified that, in the Court's order sustaining his objections to the appellants' asset schedules, the Court “permitted [him] and any sales agents and auctioneers to have access to the residences of Mr. and Mrs. Moore to look at the personal property that was listed on the schedules, and [the Court] particularly gave [the trustee] the right, with [his] realtor, to have access to the residence.”Id. at 28:15–20.5
The trustee testified that he and his realtor “attempted to ask [the appellants'] cooperation, [so] that [they] could have access to both [of the appellants'] properties,” id. at 29:10–12, but the appellants did not respond, id. at 31:7–10. Following these attempts, the trustee testified that he filed a “[m]otion to compel access to the real and personal property,” id. at 31:17–18, which the Bankruptcy Court granted, id. 32:1. The trustee testified that, after the Bankruptcy Court granted his motion to compel, he again attempted to contact the appellants and he again received no response. Id. at 33:23–34:4. The trustee next filed a motion “to have the U.S. Marshals aid [him] in the process of gaining access to the properties and changing locks,” id. at 34:16–18, since “some of the pleadings that had been filed [by the appellants', and] some of the actions that had taken place in Court, either were sort of incomprehensible or sort of almost bordering on libelous,” id. at 34:22–35:1. According to the trustee, the Bankruptcy Court granted his motion seeking the aid of the U.S. Marshals. Id. 35:14.
After obtaining the Bankruptcy Court's Order, the trustee testified that the Marshals accompanied him to the appellants' property on Independence Avenue in Washington, D.C. where he “had the door opened with the locksmith.” Id. at 37:6–8. At that time, the trustee testified that he “had the locks changed” on the Independence Avenue property. Id. at 36:11. The trustee testified that he next visited the appellants' property on 44th Place S.E. in Washington, D.C., again accompanied by the Marshals. Id. at 37:16–25. When approaching the 44th Place property, the trustee testified that the Marshals first donned their bulletproof vests because “[t]hey were not getting good feelings about this [visit] because, you know, there was a knock on the door, they—no one was answering, but [the Marshals] were convinced there was folks in that property.” Id. at 37:19–22. The trustee testified that the Marshals eventually gained access to the 44th Place property, after which Mr. Moore and two children left the home while Mrs. Moore remained inside. Id. at 39:21–40:2. Upon entry, the trustee testified that he did not observe anything “that would suggest [the appellants] had anything in the neighborhood of [the] amount of personal property” they claimed on their amended asset schedules. Id. at 42:1–4.
Following these events, the trustee testified that “since there was personal property in [the appellants'] Independence Avenue [property], even though the Court authorized [the trustee] to change the locks, [the trustee] felt that [he] should give Mr. and Mrs. Moore a key to have access, in case they wanted to remove...
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