Moore v. Safehome Sys.
| Decision Date | 22 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | 7:21cv452 |
| Parties | WANDA MOORE, Plaintiff, v. SAFEHOME SYSTEMS, INC. BOARD OF DIRECTORS Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before me on the motion of plaintiff Wanda Moore (“Moore”), proceeding pro se, for leave to amend her complaint.[1] Dkt. 17. Defendant Safe Home Systems, Inc Board of Directors (“Safe Home”), by counsel opposes the motion to amend. Also pending is a motion to dismiss the original complaint. Dkt. 5. These motions are ripe, and no hearing is necessary. I recommend granting in part and denying in part Moore's motion for leave to amend by accepting Moore's proposed Amended Complaint with respect to the race discrimination claim[2] but not the hostile work environment claim and denying as moot the motion to dismiss.[3]
I. Background
On August 25, 2021, Moore, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint against Safe Home, alleging a claim for race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.[4] Safe Home moved to dismiss the Complaint. Moore moved for leave to amend to allege additional facts in support of her claim for race discrimination and to add a hostile work environment claim. Dkt. 17-1.
Moore alleges in her proposed Amended Complaint that she is an African American woman and a former employee of Safe Home. She worked in the human services field for over 30 years and after serving as an intern at Safe Home for two years, was hired in December 2016 as the Underserved Outreach Coordinator. Moore enjoyed several intermediate promotions and in October 2018 was promoted to Executive Director. Moore alleges she did her job “very well” including managing the day-to-day operations, staff, and grant funding, and received positive performance evaluations. Moore alleges she began to “receive adverse treatment” from the Board President Janet Bryan and Treasurer Trudy Woodzell in April 2019, including questioning her intelligence and financial integrity, and showing favoritism and preferential treatment to nonAfrican American employees in personnel issues. Moore was fired on July 3, 2019, and her replacement was a white woman. Moore claims that the stated reason for her termination -altering an agency document - was a pretext for discrimination and that there were “a host of disciplinary actions” Safehome could have used short of termination. In fact, she claims the white Executive Directors hired after her termination were treated more favorably.
II. Motion for Leave to Amend
Once the defendant files a responsive pleading, the plaintiff may amend his complaint only by leave of the court or by written consent of the defendant. Furthermore, leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). “Leave to amend a pleading should be denied only when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment would have been futile.” Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426-27 (4th Cir. 2006) citing Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986). Here, Safe Home opposes granting leave to amend on the grounds of futility, arguing that Moore's proposed amended complaint fails to allege either a race discrimination or hostile work environment claim.[5]
Leave to amend would be futile when the amended complaint could not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See U.S. ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2008). Still, leave to amend should only be denied for futility “when the proposed amendment is clearly insufficient or frivolous on its face.” Johnson, 785 F.2d at 510 citing Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 615 F.2d 606, 613 (4th Cir. 1980). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). However, while the complaint need only “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests, ” the plaintiff's pleading obligation “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). Employment discrimination claims carry no heightened pleading standard. See Swierkiewicz v. N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002) (); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569-70.
A plaintiff may “ultimately prove a race-discrimination claim under § 1981 through ‘direct or circumstantial evidence showing that an adverse employment action was [caused] by intentional discrimination aimed at the plaintiff's [race],' or through the ‘burden-shifting framework' of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, (1973).” Ali v. BC Architects Engineers, PLC, 832 Fed.Appx. 167, 171 (4th Cir. 2020), as amended (Oct. 16, 2020). “Absent direct evidence[6], the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination are: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class.” Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010) ().[7] Safe Home primarily criticizes the proposed Amended Complaint for failing to provide suitable comparators, arguing Moore “failed to show that similarly situated non-Black employees were treated more favorably than her.” D.'s Br. at 56, Dkt. 19. However, a “plaintiff is not required as a matter of law to point to a similarly situated comparator in order to succeed on a discrimination claim.” Laing v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 703 F.3d 713 (4th Cir. 2013); Bryant v. Aiken Reg'l Med. Centers Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 546 (4th Cir. 2003). Of course, plaintiffs who rely on similarly situated comparators to show unlawful discrimination must demonstrate that the similarity between the comparators is “clearly established in order to be meaningful.”[8] Swaso v. Onslow Cty. Bd. of Educ., 698 Fed.Appx. 745, 748 (4th Cir. 2017), as amended (Aug. 11, 2017) (citing Lightner v. City of Wilmington, 545 F.3d 030, 265 (4th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotations omitted). Still, I need not determine whether the alleged comparators are sufficiently similar at this stage. See Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 650 (4th Cir. 2017).
Moore's proposed Amended Complaint satisfies the elements for a race discrimination claim such that it is not futile. Indeed, “an employment discrimination plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination . . . to survive [a] motion to dismiss, ” because “[t]he prima facie case . . . is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510-515. Liberally construing Moore's proposed Amended Complaint, Moore seems to pursue a claim of race discrimination based on racially discriminatory discharge. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, she also alleges elements of a race discrimination claim based on racially discriminatory enforcement of disciplinary measures. A plaintiff can prove disparate treatment by showing she was disciplined more severely than a similarly situated white employee (discriminatory enforcement of disciplinary measures) or by showing that her replacement after termination was a similarly situated white employee (discriminatory discharge). See Moore v. Penfed Title, LLC, No. 1:20-CV-0867, 2021 WL 2004785, at *10 (E.D. Va. May 18, 2021) (). Proving discriminatory discharge generally requires that a plaintiff show she was performing at a level that met her employer's legitimate expectations, but a claim for discriminatory enforcement of disciplinary measures does not. See Jones v. Southcorr, L.L.C., 324 F.Supp.2d 765, 777 (M.D. N.C. ), affd sub nom. Jones v. Southcorr, LLC, 117 Fed.Appx. 291 (4th Cir. 2004) ().
To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, Moore must show: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered from an adverse employment action; (3) at the time the employer took the adverse employment action she was performing at a level that met her employer's legitimate expectations; and (4) that the position remained open or was filled by a similarly qualified applicant outside the protected class. See King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 2003)[9] ( that when the claim is discriminatory termination, instead of race discrimination based on disparate treatment, the elements are altered slightly); see also Jones, 324 F.Supp.2d at 781; Moore v. Penfed Title, LLC, No. 1:20-CV-0867, 2021 WL 2004785, at *6 (E.D. Va. May 18, 2021) ().
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination for a disparate discipline claim, the plaintiff must show: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) the prohibited conduct in which she engaged was comparable in seriousness to misconduct of employees outside the protected class; and (3) the disciplinary measures...
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