Moore v. Sater

Decision Date25 February 1959
Citation335 P.2d 843,215 Or. 417
PartiesFloyd D. MOORE, Appellant, v. Hans O. SATER, Nora R. Sater, Herbert D. Redmond, Grace Schureman, Anna Oergal, Etta B. Gibson, Martha E. Stromberg, Rozaltha Beldin, Eva M. Schroeder and Mrs. Raymond C. (Lorraine C.) Vaughters, Respondents.
CourtOregon Supreme Court

Floyd D. Moore, pro se, B. G. Skulason, Portland, for appellant.

Don Eva and Bartlett Cole, Portland, for respondents.

PERRY, Justice.

This is a libel action brought by the plaintiff Floyd D. Moore, an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the state of Oregon, against the defendants, who reside in Portland, Oregon.

The plaintiff, in general, alleges in his complaint that he is a reputable attorney practicing in Portland, and a friend of and had been attorney for one Hulda Hollander and her deceased husband. That Hulda Hollander desired to transfer her real property to the plaintiff and his wife, and this she did. She also named the plaintiff executor and residuary legatee in her will. In August, 1954, plaintiff, upon advice of a psychiatrist, caused Mrs. Hollander to be committed to the Eastern Oregon State Hospital and later in that month he petitioned the probate department of the circuit court of Multnomah County to be appointed guardian of the person and estate of Mrs. Hollander. Thereafter the defendants, describing themselves as neighbors and friends of Mrs. Hollander, filed a written document with the circuit court protesting the appointment of the plaintiff as guardian of the person and estate of Mrs. Hollander, in which they stated plaintiff 'served said Hulda Hollander as a confidant, and while laboring under mental adversities said Floyd D. Moore [plaintiff] induced said Hulda Hollander, and said Hulda Hollander did then and there on or about October 28, 1953, convey to said Floyd D. Moore title to said real property, reserving in herself a life estate, and in addition thereto, said Hulda Hollander paid and delivered unto said Floyd D. Moore all property to her belonging, except and for a sum or sums amounting to $500.00 or thereabouts as the petition of said Floyd D. Moore indicates.' From this allegation and others, the plaintiff by innuendo draws the conclusion that the plaintiff was libelled because it was stated he had wrongfully deprived Mrs. Hollander of her property and caused her wrongfully to be incarcerated in the state hospital.

The defendants filed a demurrer to plaintiff's complaint. The trial court sustained the demurrer and the plaintiff has appealed.

It is the contention of the plaintiff that the statements made by the defendants in their protest against his appointment were libelous per se and not being absolutely privileged, the demurrer was erroneously sustained.

It is a rule of law of general application that statements made in pleadings filed in a judicial proceeding if relevant to the issue, although libelous, are absolutely privileged and no action will lie based on the statements made. Grubb v. Johnson, 205 Or. 624, 289 P.2d 1067; McKinney v. Cooper, 163 Or. 512, 98 P.2d 711.

In Grubb v. Johnson, supra [205 Or. 624, 289 P.2d 1070], we approved the statement of the general rule found in 33 Am.Jur. 123, Libel and Slander § 125, as follows:

'An absolutely privileged communication is one in respect of which, by reason of the occasion on which, or the matter in reference to which, it is made, no remedy can be had in a civil action, however harsh it may bear upon a person who claims to be injured thereby, and even though it may have been made maliciously.

'The class of absolutely privileged communications is narrow and is practically limited to legislative and judicial proceedings and others acts of state, including, it is said, communications made in the discharge of a duty under express authority of law, by or to heads of executive departments of the state, and matters involving military affairs. The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those...

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11 cases
  • Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • 8 Julio 1981
    ...109, 559 P.2d 1280 (1977). This privilege has been extended to statements in pleadings as well as statements in court. Moore v. Sater, 215 Or. 417, 335 P.2d 843 (1959). The policy reason for this privilege is the same as that found in the "special injury" requirement for malicious prosecuti......
  • Ramstead v. Morgan
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • 16 Diciembre 1959
    ...made in the performance of these duties.'' Moore v. Weaver, 2 K.B. 520, 521 (1928). Generally to the same effect see Moore v. Sater, 1959, 215 Or. 417, 335 P.2d 843; Grubb v. Johnson, 1955, 205 Or. 624, 289 P.2d 1067; Gatley on Libel and Slander (4th ed.), p. 168 et seq.; Newell, Slander an......
  • Hofer v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ.
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • 18 Mayo 2022
    ...functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages." Moore v. Sater et al , 215 Or. 417, 420, 335 P.2d 843 (1959). The application of absolute privilege to statements made by attorneys in pleadings or in open court in the course of litiga......
  • Brown v. Gatti
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • 13 Octubre 2004
    ...are made in pleadings, in the courtroom, or in correspondence between opposing parties or their attorneys. See, e.g., Moore v. Sater, 215 Or. 417, 420, 335 P.2d 843 (1959) (privilege applies to statements made in pleadings); Chard, 277 Or. at 114, 559 P.2d 1280 (privilege applied to stateme......
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