Moore v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 11 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 8:18-cv-1555-MSS-AAS |
| Parties | ANDREU MOORE, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Andreu Moore petitions for the writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C § 2254 and challenges his state court convictions for burglary, two counts of sexual battery, and criminal mischief for which he is serving an aggregate 50-year sentence. (Doc 1 at 1) After reviewing the petition, the response and appendix (Docs. 9 and 11), and the reply (Doc. 14), the Court DENIES the petition.
A jury found Moore guilty of the crimes. (Doc. 11-2 at 65-68) At trial, the victim testified that she and Moore dated and lived together for six years. When the two broke up, Moore moved out of the victim's home. Every few days, the victim and Moore contacted each other by telephone or text message. The victim still had feelings for Moore, but the relationship was broken.
On March 27, 2009, the victim spent the evening with several friends at a bar in Tampa. Moore kept calling the victim and sending her text messages because Moore wanted the victim to come visit him. The victim told Moore to come visit her instead because she knew that Moore lived 30 miles away and had neither a car nor any money to buy gas for the trip. In the past, when the victim told Moore to visit her, Moore stopped bothering her.
At 1:00 A.M. the victim returned home and sent a text message to Moore to let him know that she arrived home safely because he had asked her to do so. The victim heard a knock at her door and saw Moore outside. The victim asked Moore why he had come over and Moore pushed his way into the victim's home. Moore repeatedly hit the victim's face with a closed fist and demanded to know with whom she had been. Moore pressed down on the victim's shoulder with his foot and kicked the victim's shoulder through a wall.
Moore kept hitting the victim as he followed her upstairs. Moore slashed the screen on the victim's television with a pocketknife. The victim estimated that the value of the television was $2, 700.00 new and $1, 000.00 used. Moore used the pocketknife to cut off the victim's ponytail. After realizing the magnitude of what he had done, Moore sat on the floor and threatened to kill himself with the knife. Moore commented, “I'm at least going to get a nut before I die, ” dragged the victim into her bedroom, and vaginally and anally raped her while she cried and told him “no, don't.” After the victim promised not to call the police, Moore left. Shortly after, Moore called the victim and left a voicemail lamenting, “I'm going to hell for what I've done.” The prosecution introduced into evidence photographs of the victim's injuries, the victim's cut hair, and swabs from the victim's breast and vagina which contained a partial DNA profile matching Moore's DNA.
Moore testified in his own defense. Moore described his relationship with the victim as “dysfunctional.” Moore dated another woman named Liz who made the victim jealous. A week before the incident, the victim called Moore told Moore that she loved him, and said that she would see him soon. But Moore became upset when the victim later told him that she would rather spend time with another man. Text messages showed that the victim invited Moore over to her home the night of the crimes. Moore claimed that he went over and had consensual vaginal sex with the victim. Afterwards the two argued about Liz, and Moore broke the victim's mobile telephone. The victim broke Moore's finger and Moore punched the victim a few times, pushed her butt through the wall, slashed the screen on her television, and cut her hair. Moore made the statement on the voicemail because he regretted beating up the victim.
Moore appealed, and the state appellate court affirmed his convictions and sentences. (Doc. 11-3 at 486) Moore sought post-conviction relief in state court (Docs. 11-3 at 491-93 11-4 at 4-15, and 11-7 at 5-73, 145-57), which the post-conviction court denied (Docs. 11-3 at 494-524, 11-4 at 16-69, 11-7 at 158-319, and 11-8 at 41-312) and the state appellate court affirmed (Docs. 11-3 at 535, 11-4 at 94, and 11-8 at 384). Also, Moore filed a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (Doc. 11-5 at 2-193), which the state appellate court denied. (Doc. 11-5 at 195) Moore's timely federal petition followed.
Because Moore filed his federal petition after the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, AEDPA governs his claims. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to require:
A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the U.S. Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the U.S. Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).
A decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the U.S. Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” 529 U.S. at 413. Clearly established federal law refers to the holding of an opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court at the time of the relevant state court decision. 529 U.S. at 412.
“[AEDPA] modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). An unreasonable application is “different from an incorrect one.” Id. Even clear error is not enough. Virginia v. LeBlanc, 137 S.Ct. 1726, 1728 (2017). A federal petitioner must show that the state court's ruling was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility of fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).
Moore asserts ineffective assistance of counsel - a difficult claim to sustain. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 687 (1984) explains:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
The Court need not “address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” 466 U.S. at 697. “[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” 466 U.S. at 690. “[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct.” 466 U.S. at 690.
“An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 466 U.S. at 691. A reasonable probability is a “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 466 U.S. at 694.
Strickland cautions that “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. A defendant cannot meet his burden by showing that the avenue chosen by counsel was unsuccessful. White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220-21 (11th Cir. 1992). Because the standards under Strickland and AEDPA are both highly deferential, “when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly' so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. “Given the double deference due, it is a ‘rare case in which an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that was denied on the merits in state court is found to merit relief in a federal habeas proceeding.'” Nance v. Warden, Ga. Diag. Prison, 922 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
The state appellate court affirmed in a decision without an opinion the post-conviction court's order denying Moore's ineffective assistance of counsel claims. (Doc. 11-8 at 384) A federal court “‘look[s] through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale [and] presume[s] that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).
Because the post-conviction court recognized...
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