Moore v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 12 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:06-cv-127-MMH |
| Parties | THOMAS JAMES MOORE, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner Thomas James Moore, an inmate of the Florida penal system initiated this action with the assistance of counsel on February 10, 2006, by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doc 1),[1] with a memorandum of law (Memorandum; Doc. 4). Moore proceeds on an Amended Petition (Doc. 15) filed on September 17, 2014, with an amended memorandum of law (Amended Memorandum; Doc. 16). In the Amended Petition, Moore challenges a 1993 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for first-degree murder, attempted armed robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, armed burglary, and arson. He raises sixteen grounds for relief. See Amended Petition at 18-120. Respondents submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Amended Petition, see Response (Doc. 26), with exhibits.[2] Moore submitted a brief in reply, see Reply (Doc. 59), with attachments, see Doc. 60. This action is ripe for review.
On January 21, 1993, the State of Florida charged Moore by indictment with first-degree murder (count one), attempted armed robbery (count two), conspiracy to commit robbery (count three), armed burglary (count four), arson (count five), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (count six). Resp. Ex. 1 at 3-4. The State did not pursue a trial on count six. Resp. Ex. 2 at 115. Moore proceeded to a guilt phase trial on the remaining counts, and on October 29, 1993, the jury found Moore guilty of all counts. Resp. Ex. 11 at 428-32. On November 3, 1993, after a penalty phase trial, the jury recommended by a nine-to-three vote that the trial court impose a death sentence as to count one. Resp. Ex. 17 at 480.
On December 2, 1993, the trial court issued a sentencing order and found that the State established three aggravating factors of “great weight:” (1) Moore was previously convicted of a felony involving the use, or threat to use, violence; (2) Moore committed the murder for the purpose of avoiding or preventing lawful arrest; and (3) Moore committed the murder for pecuniary gain. Id. at 502-03. It found one statutory mitigating factor of “slight weight:” Moore's age when he committed the murder. Id. at 503. The trial court also assigned “no significance or value” to evidence of Moore's character as a non-statutory mitigating factor. Id. at 503-04. Determining that the statutory aggravating factors greatly outweighed the minimal statutory and non-statutory mitigating factors, the trial court sentenced Moore to death for count one consistent with the jury's recommendation. Id. at 504. Moore received a thirty-year term of imprisonment, with a ten-year minimum mandatory, for count two; a ten-year term of imprisonment, with a five-year minimum mandatory, for count three; a term of life imprisonment, with a fifteen-year minimum mandatory, for count four; and a term of life imprisonment, with a fifteen-year minimum mandatory, for count five. Resp. Ex. 20 at 510-14. The trial court also adjudicated Moore to be a habitual violent felony offender as to counts two, three, four, and five, and ordered the sentences imposed for those counts to run concurrently with the sentence imposed for count one. Id.
On direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Moore, with the assistance of counsel, filed an initial brief, arguing that the trial court erred when it: limited Moore's cross-examination of two State witnesses, Vincent Gaines and Carlos Clemons, on crucial points of fact (ground one); limited Moore's cross-examination of Captain Earl Mattox, Jr., refused the defense's proffer of questions, and denied a motion for mistrial (ground two); made prejudicial comments in the presence of the jury (ground three); admitted Larry Dawsey's testimony that Moore possessed a firearm two days after the victim's death (ground four); admitted a copy of Clemons's written statement to police (ground five); admitted victim impact evidence during the penalty phase trial (ground six); and permitted the State to use mitigation as non-statutory aggravation during closing arguments (ground seven). Resp. Ex. 21. The State filed an answer brief, Resp. Ex. 22, and Moore filed a reply brief, Resp. Ex. 23. On October 2, 1997, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Moore's convictions and sentences in a written opinion.[3] Resp. Ex. 24; Moore v. State, 701 So.2d 545, 547 (Fla. 1997). The court denied rehearing, and issued the mandate on December 18, 1997, Resp. Ex. 25; Moore, 701 So.2d at 545.
On February 17, 1998, Moore sought a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. Resp. Ex. 26. The State filed a brief in opposition. Resp. Ex. 27. On April 20, 1998, the United States Supreme Court denied Moore's petition for writ of certiorari without a written opinion. Resp. Ex. 28; Moore v. Florida, 523 U.S. 1083 (1998).
On March 29, 1999, Moore, with the benefit of counsel, filed a motion for postconviction relief with a special request for leave to amend pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Doc. 55-3 at 4-32.[4] On June 22, 1999, Moore filed an amended Rule 3.851 motion with a special request for leave to amend. Resp. Ex. 29 at 300-405. On September 20, 1999, Moore filed a second amended Rule 3.851 motion, again, with special request for leave to amend (Rule 3.851 Motion), arguing that: state agencies' refusals to provide Moore with public records violated his rights to due process and equal protection, and rendered Moore's postconviction counsel ineffective (ground one); Moore's convictions are materially unreliable due to the cumulative effect of the ineffective assistance of counsel, the State's withholding of exculpatory or impeachment material, newly discovered evidence, and the trial court's erroneous rulings (ground two); newly discovered evidence rendered Moore's convictions constitutionally unreliable (ground three); the State withheld material and exculpatory evidence (ground four); counsel was ineffective during voir dire (ground five); Moore was denied a fair trial when the State misstated the law and facts, as well as made inflammatory and improper comments, during the guilt and penalty phase trials, and counsel was ineffective when he did not object to the comments (ground six); counsel was ineffective when he did not adequately investigate and prepare a voluntary intoxication defense, retain mental health experts, or inform the jury about Moore's mental state at the time of the offenses (ground seven); Moore was denied his rights under Ake v. Oklahoma[5] when counsel did not obtain an adequate mental health evaluation of Moore and failed to provide the necessary background information to the mental health expert (ground eight); counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase trial when he did not adequately investigate and present available mitigating evidence or adequately challenge the State's case (ground nine); Moore is innocent of first-degree murder (ground ten); Moore is innocent of the death penalty (ground eleven); Moore was absent from critical stages of the trial (ground twelve); the jury instructions from the penalty phase trial improperly shifted the burden of demonstrating that a death sentence was inappropriate to Moore, and counsel was ineffective when he did not object to the instructions (ground thirteen); the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the standard by which it must consider expert testimony (ground fourteen); the jury received inadequate guidance on the consideration of aggravating factors because Florida's capital sentencing statute is facially vague and overbroad (ground fifteen); comments, questions, and instructions misled the jury by diluting its sense of responsibility towards sentencing, and counsel was ineffective when he did not object to the error (ground sixteen); Moore was denied his constitutional rights and the effective assistance of postconviction counsel because of the rule prohibiting his attorneys from interviewing jurors (ground seventeen); execution by electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment (ground eighteen); Florida's capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied, and to the extent the issue was not preserved at trial, counsel was ineffective for not preserving it (ground nineteen); Moore was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury as a result of pretrial publicity (ground twenty); the trial court's sentencing order does not reflect independent weighing or reasoned judgment (ground twenty-one); the judge and jury were provided with and relied upon misinformation when sentencing Moore (ground twenty-two); the lack of adequate funding for the Office of Capital Collateral Counsel denied Moore's right to effective representation (ground twenty-three); the State's use of a jailhouse agent violated Moore's constitutional rights, and the State withheld material and exculpatory evidence and/or presented misleading evidence (ground twenty-four); and Moore was denied a proper appeal due to omissions in the record (ground twenty-five). Resp. Ex. 30 at 1-132.
The State filed a response to Moore's Rule 3.851 Motion. Resp. Ex. 31 at 160-217. On April 6, 2000, Moore filed a third amended Rule 3.851 motion. Resp. Ex. 32 at 308-452. The State moved to strike the motion. Resp. Ex. 33 at 490-94. On August 4, 2000, the postconviction court refused to consider the “untimely and unauthorized” third amended Rule 3.851 motion and summarily denied the Rule 3.851 Motion. Resp. Ex. 34 at 529-44.
On April 2,...
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