Moore v. State
Decision Date | 03 October 1978 |
Docket Number | 6 Div. 575 |
Citation | 364 So.2d 411 |
Parties | Calvin MOORE v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Quentin Brown, Jr., Birmingham, for appellant.
William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen., and Barry V. Hutner, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State, appellee.
Calvin Moore was indicted by the Jefferson County Grand Jury for first degree murder being charged with the shooting death of Larry Thomas McCracken. At arraignment he entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.
Following arraignment, at defense counsel's request, a mental competency hearing was held and appellant was found sane and competent to stand trial. Immediately after the competency hearing, a jury was empanelled and after hearing evidence presented at trial, found Moore guilty of second degree murder. His punishment was fixed at thirty years imprisonment. After giving prompt notice of appeal, a motion for a new trial was filed and denied. He is now before this court as an indigent with appointed counsel and free transcript.
The evidence presented to the jury at the appellant's competency hearing showed that Moore was a twenty-five-year-old male, who, according to his mother, had not been normal since birth. She testified that, at age of nine or ten, Moore was struck on the back of the head with a baseball bat and that the injury required sutures. She said that following this injury, her son complained of frequent headaches, but their cause was never discovered.
Prior to the shooting in 1976, Moore was an in-patient at the University Hospital in Birmingham, Alabama. Moore's mother had informed the hospital staff that the patient was nervous, complained of headaches, and "shook a lot." She stated that, prior to her son's admission to the hospital, she had received complaints from her neighbors that he had been exposing himself in public.
Following his admission to the hospital, Moore was under the supervision of Dr. Teresa Young, a resident in psychiatry. Dr. Young was part of a treatment team and testified that the appellant had taken a battery of psychiatric and psychological tests. The results of these tests indicated that the appellant had an intelligent quotient of fifty-six, which placed him in a mildly retarded classification.
The appellant was also given a Bender-Gestalt test which indicated some degree of brain damage. However, no specific organic dysfunction was found by x-ray or electroencephalographic readings.
Dr. Young testified that the appellant had manifested paranoid psychotic characteristics in the form of hallucinations which involved "little green men" and a voice from the television telling the appellant that he would kill him. According to Dr. Young, the appellant was placed under heavy medication.
In October, 1976, Moore was discharged as an in-patient from the hospital. Shortly thereafter he received treatments on an out-patient basis at the Smolian Clinic in Birmingham.
The preceding paragraphs recite substantially what was presented at the appellant's competency hearing. In our judgment, there was sufficient evidence to present the question of appellant's sanity to the jury.
At the conclusion of the competency hearing, another jury was empanelled for the trial on the merits and the following evidence was presented to them.
The evidence tended to show that on the morning of December 3, 1976, Larry McCracken, the victim, took about seven dollars from the appellant, Moore. Moore demanded the return of his money, and when the deceased refused, Moore went home and returned with his brother's pistol. Moore again asked McCracken to return his money and, according to Sammy Thompson, an eyewitness, McCracken replied: "I'm going to give you your money."
Thompson stated that Moore walked up to McCracken. He further said that he did not see anything in Moore's hands. Thompson described what had occurred in the following manner:
Further cross-examination of Thompson:
On the evening of the shooting, after the appellant had surrendered himself to the police, he was given his Miranda warnings. He said he understood them and then made a statement. The statement was recorded and admitted into evidence without objection.
In this recorded statement, Moore said that the deceased would not give him his money so he shot him. Further, Moore told the police that the deceased did not have a gun or a knife, and did not threaten him. Moore told the police that he drew the gun on McCracken when he (Moore) asked for the return of his money.
Several witnesses were called to testify to appellant's reputation in the community. Their opinion was that Moore was retarded, insane, confused, and did not know right from wrong. Further, he was known in his neighborhood as "Wheelbarrow Moore," a name derived from his shuffling gait, or "Mad Moore."
Dr. Young, on further questioning, testified that, although appellant had some difficulty in doing so, he could discern between right and wrong.
The appellant contends that during opening statements the prosecution made comments concerning the defendant's past criminal record and time served in prison. He argues that this amounts to reversible error when the defendant does not take the stand and when the statement is unrelated to any attempt to show motive, intent, scienter or identity. The remarks in question are quoted below:
We have examined the opening statements by the prosecution and the defense attorney and have not found that any objection was made to this remark. In fact, at the conclusion of the defense attorney's opening statement, he made the following comment:
In the absence of an objection by counsel, a motion to exclude, a ruling on the objection, or a refusal of the trial judge to rule thereon, improper argument or remarks by counsel are not subject for review by this court. Brown v. State, 50 Ala.App. 471, 280 So.2d 177; Veith v. State, 48 Ala.App. 688, 267 So.2d 480; Hutcherson v. State, 40 Ala.App. 417, 114 So.2d 572.
However, an exception to this rule exists where the comment is so prejudicial that its effect is ineradicable. Anderson v. State, 209 Ala. 36, 95 So. 171; Christian v. State, Ala., 351 So.2d 623; Gunnels v. Jimmerson, Ala., 331 So.2d 247. But, in view of the materiality of the appellant's mental condition, we do not believe that the comment...
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