Moore v. State
Decision Date | 27 September 1996 |
Docket Number | CR-95-1626 |
Citation | 697 So.2d 800 |
Parties | James Michael MOORE v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Don Hamlin, Pell City, for appellant.
Jeff Sessions, Atty. Gen., and Rosa Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The appellant, James Michael Moore, was convicted of capital murder, see § 13A-5-40(a)(10), Code of Alabama 1975, two or more persons murdered by one act pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct. The appellant waived the sentencing phase of his trial, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
The appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing the indictment to proceed on the "one scheme" or "course of conduct" theory. The appellant argues that the evidence did not indicate that he committed the two murders pursuant to a plan or scheme or a pattern of conduct evidencing a continuity of purpose.
The indictment against the appellant charged:
"... the Grand Jury of said County charges that before the finding of this Indictment, JAMES MICHAEL MOORE, whose true name is otherwise unknown to the Grand Jury, pursuant to one scheme of course of conduct, did intentionally cause the death of Judy Kay Lumpkin by striking her head with a blunt instrument, and did intentionally cause the death of Jerry Michael Estill, by striking his head with a blunt instrument, in violation of Sec. 13a-5-40(a)(10) of the Code of Alabama."
However, the extensive evidence presented by the State revealed that the appellant and an accomplice left together at two o'clock in the afternoon to go play pool. They encountered Jerry Michael Estill at the bar where they were playing pool and, shortly thereafter, met Judy Kay Lumpkin at the next bar they visited. These four left that bar together in the accomplice's vehicle. The appellant killed Estill by beating him on the head with a car tool, while the accomplice had sex with Lumpkin. It was unclear whether Lumpkin was aware that Estill had been killed. Following Estill's death, the remaining three visited a mobile home belonging to the accomplice's father, left to purchase beer for the father, and took a detour on their return trip after buying the beer. During the detour, the accomplice again had sex with Lumpkin but, when she left the car, the appellant attempted to beat her to death, because he believed that she might have seen him kill Estill. The appellant then dragged her to the water and threw her in, but when she hit the water, she revived and grabbed at his crotch. He stated that she told him that she knew he would kill her, but that she would come back "to get him." The appellant then forced her head between his legs and began to beat her head with a concrete block. He then threw her body in the water. Apparently, prior to disposing of the body he had removed some of Lumpkin's jewelry. The appellant got fresh clothes from the accomplice's father and disposed of the clothes he had been wearing. The appellant and the accomplice drove to a friend's house to sell the stolen jewelry. They got $60 in cash and some marijuana in return for the jewelry. The accomplice then also got some money his employer owed him. They disposed of certain evidence of the killings and left for Miami, where the accomplice's mother lived.
This evidence was clearly sufficient to indicate that the killings occurred as the result of one course of conduct that began one evening and was completed in the early morning hours of the following day. " 'An indictment is sufficient if it apprises the accused with a reasonable certainty of the nature of the accusation against him so that he may prepare his defense and plead the judgment of conviction as a bar to any subsequent prosecution for the same offense.' " Moore v. State, 659 So.2d 205, 208 (Ala.Cr.App.1994), quoting Rice v. State, 620 So.2d 140, 142, (Ala.Cr.App.1993).
" "
Ex parte Hamm, 564 So.2d 469, 471 (Ala.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1008, 111 S.Ct. 572, 112 L.Ed.2d 579 (1990).
Pace v. State, 652 So.2d 321, 324-25 (Ala.Cr.App.1994), cert. denied, 652 So.2d 328 (Ala.1994).
In the present case, there was no material variance between in the proof presented by the State and the offense charged in the indictment. The appellant was sufficiently apprised of the nature of the offense with which he was charged.
The appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting into evidence testimony concerning prior bad acts of the appellant. The appellant refers to testimony by the accomplice's wife concerning her conversation with the appellant following the offenses. The accomplice's wife testified that the appellant told her that he had murdered the victims because they had attempted to rob them. He told her in detail about killing the female victim. The witness testified that when she became upset, the appellant told her not to worry, that he "had done this plenty of times before--put bodies in the river and they had never been found." Following this testimony, the appellant made a motion for a mistrial; the prosecutor responded that the substance of that testimony was in a statement given by the witness that had been provided to the appellant. The trial court denied the motion and the witness again testified that the appellant stated that he "had killed other people and put them in the river and they had never been found, and then he just laughed."
This testimony was clearly admissible. The general rule in Alabama is that the acts and declarations of the accused against his interest and having a relation to the offense charged are always competent evidence. In Nicks v. State, 521 So.2d 1018, 1028-29 (Ala.Cr.App.1987), aff'd, 521 So.2d 1035 (Ala.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241, 108 S.Ct. 2916, 101 L.Ed.2d 948 (1988), the defendant had made a statement during a robbery to a victim that, if the victim did not do as he was told, the defendant would kill him "like he did that man up the street." This Court held that that statement, although concerning a collateral offense, was admissible as a declaration against interest.
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